Showing posts with label meaningful work. Show all posts
Showing posts with label meaningful work. Show all posts

Friday, August 19, 2011

Pret à mourir (12 Aug 2011)

I borrowed the title for this post from my friend Anton of Generation Bubble, who forwarded me a link to this NYT article by Stephanie Clifford about Pret à Manger, sort of the Target of sandwich shops, assuming Subway is the Wal-Mart. If you want to see a horrific application of all the principles of immaterial and affective labor, Virnoesque virtuosity, lateral surveillance, obligatory reflexivity, emotional management, gamification and so on, you need look no further.

How does any company encourage teamwork? At Pret a Manger, executives say, the answer is to hire, pay and promote based on — believe it or not — qualities like cheerfulness.

There is a certain “Survivor” element to all of this. New hires are sent to a Pret a Manger shop for a six-hour day, and then the employees there vote whether to keep them or not. Ninety percent of prospects get a thumbs-up. Those who are voted out are sent home with £35 ($57), no hard feelings.

The crucial factor is gaining support from existing employees. Those workers have skin in the game: bonuses are awarded based on the performance of an entire team, not individuals. Pret workers know that a bad hire could cost them money.

All the joys of tournament labor markets like those that exist in academia, with none of the "life of the mind" rationalizations. And instead of solidarity against management, each worker becomes the face of management, another Stasi spy for the happy police.

But that is not nearly enough surveillance to allow Pret's management to discriminate among workers:
Pret also sends “mystery shoppers” to every shop each week. Those shoppers give employee-specific critiques. (”Bill didn’t smile at the till,” for instance.) If a mystery shopper scores a shop as “outstanding” — 86 percent of stores usually qualify — all of the employees get a £1-per-hour bonus, based on a week’s pay, so full-timers get around $73. “There’s a lot of peer pressure,” said Andrea Wareham, the human resources director at Pret.

DARE sessions in school taught me that peer pressure was bad, but I suppose peer pressure, in this context, is good. It is the vaunted power of worker collaboration and cooperation turned inside out and made into a coercive management tool. One's very ability to get along with others is alienated and quantified,amde into somethign you would only do for money rather than from basic human solidarity. Pret rejects the sort of human sociality that might thrive outside of capital, that is possible in environments where making a profit by selling commodified service experiences isn't the overriding goal. Instead Pret chooses to incentivize human feeling and turn the point of exchange into an explicit, quantified moment of affective labor while turning worker cooperation into a reified shadow of itself. That policy is carried out all down the line, apparently, with no sociality left unincentivized and thus unexploited:

Pret reinforces the teamwork concept in other ways. When employees are promoted or pass training milestones, they receive at least £50 in vouchers, a payment that Pret calls a “shooting star.” But instead of keeping the bonus, the employees must give the money to colleagues, people who have helped them along the way.

There are other rewards. Every quarter, the top 10 percent of stores, as ranked by mystery-shopper scores, receive about £30 per employee for a party. The top executives at Pret get 60 “Wow” cards, with scratch-off rewards like £10 or an iPod, to hand out each year to employees who strike them as particularly good. Pret has all-staff parties twice a year, and managers get a monthly budget of £100 or so to spend on drinks or outings for their workers.

“Rewards, through bonuses or ‘outstanding’ cards, affect behavior,” Ms. Wareham says.

Wow cards, I suppose, are the Scooby snacks of the service industry. It's always nice to be recognized, but there seems to be something backhanded about making even that a lottery scenario. And in the end, it's just Pavlovian manipulation, not genuine recognition of the worker as a human. The incentivizing of feeling leaves no space for the employees to be recognized in and of themselves. Everything about them as feeling creatures has been subsumed by the wage relation. That's what is so creepy about going into a Pret -- you know they are being forced to be nice to you and are being carefully watched by other fake-nice bosses and informers. It feels like those moments in movies about people in a mental asylum, where the patients try to maintain a facade of controlled politeness in hopes of demonstrating their newfound sanity. This sounds sort of insane to me, anyway:
Every new employee gets a thick binder of instructions. It states, for example, that employees should be “bustling around and being active” on the floor, not “standing around looking bored.” It encourages them to occasionally hand out free coffee or cakes to regulars, and not “hide your true character” with customers.

Can a boss really force you to display your "true character" without driving you into an insane spiral of endlessly recursive reflexivity? And is one's "true character" nothing more than picking random lottery-winner customers to hand a cake to? Are human interactions so conditioned by the imperative of exchange that giving and getting something for nothing is the best way to simulate genuineness, or sincere benevolence? Perhaps the looting in London was just a big expression of love.

The article should put to rest any ideas that the implementation of such concepts as gamification and the general intellect are inherently benevolent or subversive. Instead, they can be deployed by management to create a kind of affective Taylorism, where emotional experiences are assembled under hurry-up conditions and energetically concealed duress. Unless you believe that it's more fun to be forced to pretend to be having fun while working a deli counter -- maybe the findings that people who are forced to smile report being happier apply here also. Clifford notes that Pret's "annual work force turnover rate is about 60 percent — low for the fast-food industry, where the rate is normally 300 to 400 percent." Stockholm Syndrome is a powerful management tool.

The emotional labor being extracted from Pret employees exemplifies the way tight labor markets give employers the chance to cement expectations of a more pliant disposition from workers. The new normal is a grotesque sycophancy sugarcoated as a fun, cheerful workplace where "teamwork" rules. In an email, Anton says Pret's approach elicits an "unprecedented self-relation -- instrumentalization of mood and affect as a way of producing surplus value. It can only end in a psychotic break." I'm inclined to agree.

Marshall McLuhan Centennial (21 July 2011)

To mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Canadian media guru Marshall McLuhan, Megan Garber has an extensive post about his ideas at the Neiman Journalism Lab site, pointing out, somewhat cryptically, that "McLuhan’s theories seem epic and urgent and obvious all at the same time. And McLuhan himself — the teacher, the thinker, the darling of the media he both measured and mocked — seems both more relevant, and less so, than ever before." I think that means that we take McLuan's useful insights more or less for granted even as they shape the contours of the debate about the impact of mediatization. McLuhan certainly wasn't afraid to make sweeping, unsubstantiated generalizations, which definitely makes his account of history occasionally "epic," but almost unfalsifiable as well. So sometimes it seems like McLuhan is just relabeling phenomena (this is a "hot" medium, this is a "cold" one) without performing much analysis, translating things into jargon without necessarily developing arguments.

Garber notes a recent essay by Paul Ford about the media's role in imposing narratives on the flux of events and regularizing time and points out that "If McLuhan is to be believed, the much-discussed and often-assumed human need for narrative — or, at least, our need for narrative that has explicit beginnings and endings — may be contingent rather than implicit." That is, the norms of our reading, or rather our media consumption generally, are shaped by existing levels of technology and how that technology is assimilated socially. We don't come hardwired with a love of stories, as literary humanists sometimes insist. Narrative conventions are always part of what society is always in the process of negotiating -- they are political, ideological, like just about every other kind of relation. McLuhan believed that new media forms would retribalize humanity, undoing some of the specific sorts of freedoms market society (which he links specifically to books and literacy) guaranteed and introducing different ways to construe it. The danger, as Garber implies, is that we will get swallowed by real time, which old media broke into manageable increments but which mew media has redissolved. This opens up possibilities of deliberate disorientation and unsustainable acceleration of consumption.

Anyway, I recently read McLuhan's Undertstanding Media and this is what I took away from it. The general gist is that print media support individualism and economistic rationality: "If Western literate man undergoes much dissociation of inner sensibility from his use of the alphabet, he also wins his personal freedom to dissociate himself from clan and family" (88). Literacy, in McLuhan's view, makes capitalist-style consumer markets possible: "Nonliterate societies are quite lacking in the psychic resources to create and sustain the enormous structures of statistical information that we call markets and prices.... The extreme abstraction and detachment represented by our pricing system is quite unthinkable and unusable amidst populations for whom the exciting drama of price haggling occurs with every transaction" (137). This ties in to the idea that humans must learn to be rational in an economic sense -- that such calculation is not inherent but socially constructed. Capitalist society (and its media) equips us with this form of reason during the process of subjectivation.

But the atomized, anonymized individuals of the literate world are prone to anomie, to being "massified." Whereas subsequent media (more immersive and real-time; accelerated) are returning culture dialectically to a more "tribal" orientation -- the "global village." We collectively try to defeat time by pursuing the instantaneousness of new media; this speed, this accelerated transience begins to undo economism in favor of some new collectivity. "Fragmented, literate and visual individualism is not possible in an electrically patterned and imploded society" (51). So it's obvious why the P2P types and the technoutopian futurists are attracted to McLuhan, who more or less established their rhetorical mode. But McLuhan occasionally issues some warnings about the mediated future as well. This, for example, seems like a prescient critique of the attention economy and recommendation engines:

Once we have surrendered our senses and nervous systems to the private manipulation of those who would try to benefit from taking a lease on our eyes and ears and nerves, we don't really have any rights left. (68)

And later he writes, "The avid desire of mankind to prostitute itself stands up against the chaos of revolution" (189). In other words, technology will be commercialized rather than become subversive.

McLuhan claims that "the effect of electric technology had at first been anxiety. Now it appears to create boredom" (26). That is, it exacerbates the paradoxes of choice, encourages us to suspend decision making for as long as possible, since switching among a newly vast array of alternatives appears easy. But such suspension, such switching may have hidden cognitive costs, may contribute to ego depletion. He points out how technology tends to accelerate exchange, noting that, for example, "by coordinating and accelerating human meetings and goings-on, clocks increase the sheer quantity of human exchange." This seems to be a structural fit with capitalism's need to maximize exchange to maximize opportunities to realize profit. Photographs, too, create a world of "accelerated transience" (196).

He also notes that certain technologies seek to make self-service labor possible, eliminating service requirements and prompting us to take on more responsibility for ourselves as a form of progress (36). That is, technology institutes convenience as a desirable value that trumps other values; ease and efficiency make collectivity appear progressively more annoying, a social ill to be eradicated in the name of individualist freedom, the only freedom that counts.

McLuhan anticipates the rise of immaterial labor, as "commodities themselves assume more and more the character of information" -- they become signifiers, bearers of design distinctions and lifestyle accents. "As electric information levels rise, almost any kind of material will serve any kind of need or function, forcing the intellectual more and more into the role of social command and into the service of production." Hence the rise of the "creative class" and the importance of social production, building brands and meanings and distributing them authoritatively. Manufacturing becomes a pretense for information, where the real profit margins are:

At the end of the mechanical age people still imagined that press and radio and even TV were merely forms of information paid for by the makers and users of "hardware," like cars and soap and gasoline. As automation takes hold, it becomes obvious that information is the crucial commodity, and that solid products are merely incidental to information movement. The early stages by which information itself became the basic economic commodity of the electric age were obscured by the ways in which advertising and entertainment put people off the track. Advertisers pay for space and time in paper and magazine, on radio and TV; that is, they buy a piece of the reader, listener, or viewer as definitely as if they hired our homes for a public meeting. They would gladly pay the reader, listener, or viewer directly for his time and attention if they knew how to do so. The only way so far devised is to put on a free show. Movies in America have not developed advertising intervals simply because the movie itself is the greatest of all forms of advertisement for consumer goods.

McLuhan insists that "the product matters less as the audience participation increases" -- that is because that participation is the product, the manufactured good, the pretense. "Any acceptable ad is a vigorous dramatization of communal experience," McLuhan claims (228); by this I think he might mean that ads plunge us into visceral experience of what Baudrillard calls the "code" of consumerism. McLuhan asserts that ads draw us into neotribal experiences of collectivity; I think this claim is undermined by the rise of personalization and design ideology. We collectively participate in the idea of customizing our consumer goods, but finding a unique angle on this common culture is the main avenue for hipster distinction. We craft our own niche for ourselves, and become anxious to isolate ourselves from others within the various constituencies brands create for themselves. Belonging to the communities facilitated by media products fosters a simultaneous tension to escape their embrace, o make one's participation singular. That is to say, media participation is as competitive as it is collaborative.

In the last chapter, McLuhan says this of the future of work:

The future of work consists of earning a living in the automation age. This is a familiar pattern in electric technology in general. It ends the old dichotomies between culture and technology, between art and commerce, and between work and leisure. Whereas in the mechanical age of fragmentation leisure had been the absence of work, or mere idleness, the reverse is true in the electric age. As the age of information demands the simultaneous use of all our faculties, we discover that we are most at leisure when we are most intensely involved, very much as with the artists in all ages.

This sounds a lot like the autonomist idea of the general intellect, which kicks in after automation becomes standard in industry. McLuhan's way of putting it: "Many people, in consequence, have begun to look on the whole of society as a single unified machine for creating wealth.... With electricity as energizer and synchronizer, all aspects of production, consumption, and organization become incidental to communications." He suggests that the only profession of the future will be teacher. We will be all teaching each other new ways to please and divert ourselves, new ways to want more things. Learning itself becomes "the principal form of production and consumption" (351). That sounds like a good thing, but one must factor in the ramifications of widespread, institutionalized narcissism, which leads us to become experts in one very particular subject: ourselves. When the alleged structural unemployment subsides, this is the sort of service economy we will be left with -- the full flowering of communicative capitalism. We are consigned by automation to industrialized, mass-produced individuality that we must never stop blathering about.

Thoughts on Ross Perlin's 'Intern Nation' (21 June 2011)

Many of the reviews of Ross Perlin's recent book Intern Nation seem to be marked by a relief that someone else has taken the trouble to acknowledge (i.e. done all they can realistically be expected to do to solve) an obvious problem -- that interns are like strike-breakers before the fact, except they work not for compromisingly low wages so much as for the privilege of sucking up to bosses and building all-important white-collar social capital (here are two reviews that buck the trend). Employers in certain fields, ones that can establish a nominally plausible but essentially simoniac relationship with universities, can take advantage of loopholes in the U.S. labor protection laws to eliminate full-time positions and hire students as underpaid temps to do the work.

Once, this was restricted mainly to the "glamor industries" -- a situation well-condemned in a Baffler article from 1999 by Jim Frederick (sadly not online, Google books preview here). In the past decade, internships have spread throughout the postindustrial sectors of the economy, so that a period of corvée labor in service to the managerial overlords in corporate America is now simply programmed into the college experience for most privileged kids. Many intern programs are a racket geared not toward democratizing economic opportunity but conserving privilege through nepotistic mechanisms, and the ones that aren't about ensuring that the children of elites meet suitable mentors are typically schemes for offloading as much menial work as possible onto unpaid laborers who have no recourse to legal protections.

Not that anyone should have been surprised by this situation. If you have ever worked in offices or even watched TV shows about working in offices, how can you be surprised that internships aren't especially educational? Or that companies are eager to gain leverage over workers however they can? Does anyone think businesses would do anything but exploit interns as long as they can get away with it? And does anyone think labor-law enforcement is anywhere close to being a priority for the series of neoliberal administrations the U.S. has endured since Reagan? Reviewers least of all should have been surprised, as most of the publications use interns unapolegetically and some of the reviewers admit to having been interns themselves. Presumably they see their own experience as an exception to the general rule of exploitation and the conservation of privilege to those with connections. Internships in general might clearly seem exploitative, eviscerating hard-earned rights for workers, but one's own internship always isn't so bad and gives a necessary leg up, lets you meet some really nice, really useful people.

But if you find internships problematic enough to hail a book like this, then you should be concerned about the collective action problem that perpetuates the system -- the individualistic ethos of interns that prompts them to participate in an obviously corrupt system so that they can get the edge on their competitors in the labor market. Such an attitude is the outcome of an extended effort by employers and universities to normalize the abuse of internships as pseudo-educational training programs (in his book, Perlin effectively traces this), which in turn is part of the larger sweep of neoliberal reform, which is intended to accustom individual workers to a dog-eat-dog capitalist world and get them to shoulder more and more social risk personally. Under neoliberalism, individuals need to live as though there is no social safety net, that they are perpetually vulnerable to bad fortune and thus accrue as much unfair advantage over others as they can as a form of private insurance. Internships are merely among the first steps in this dismal education process.

Perhaps the intended audience for the book is college students who might consider becoming an intern themselves. Such an audience would be appropriate, because the most straight-forward way to derail internship abuses would be to incite a general refusal among college-age workers to accept employment on those terms. Given the competitive realities of the labor market, however, such a turn of events seems extremely unlikely. Instead, internships acclimate those entering the workforce to the realities of at-will employment, which requires that employees perpetually exceed expectations and assume personal responsibility for developing the necessary strategies for success within the firm. To train interns in a set of procedures agreed upon in advance would undermine the whole purpose of internships for most enterprises; internships serve as a elaborate test to see if the interns can invent ways to make themselves useful. If you have to tell them how to be useful, they are not being trained in the realities of the workplace, which necessarily puts a premium on self-starting and solving problems for oneself in the course of the working day (which contributes to overall efficiency and productivity). Thus rote obedience is often less important for interns than being the sort of worker who can intuit ways to be useful through careful observation and open-ended obsequiousness. With the overriding imperative of making a good impression guiding them, successful interns master ways of sussing out the office power-brokers, sidling up to bosses, getting themselves heard in meetings despite their novitiate status, and so on. They create their own opportunities and are paid in goodwill (much like bloggers).

Perlin recognizes the place of internships in the "new spirit of capitalism" (to use Boltanski and Chiapello's phrase as he does), arguing that they represent the evolution of training programs to suit post-Fordist work conditions: "What structured training programs were to the bureaucratic firms of the mid-20th century, internships may well be to the new network capitalism of firms dealing with intangible goods." Modern production in many sectors has less to do with learning industry-specific skills that require focused apprenticeship. Instead, much of production has become social, as Tiziana Terranova explains in this talk. That is to say, production is less a matter of skilled labor than of what is sometimes called immaterial labor -- the ability to collaborate, cooperate and innovate, often in consumption processes, to enrich the symbolic value of commodities. Perlin notes that this serves to justify office internships as de facto training, no matter how menial the intern's actual jobs seem on the surface. "To an economist, the logic goes like this: if white-collar firms are increasingly organized around their intangible human or organizational capital—whether it be their brand or their 'culture of innovation'— then this is what interns have to learn, just as much as any specific skill set."

That sounds a lot like what post-autonomist theory has to say about post-Fordist labor conditions. In Grammar of the Multitude, Paolo Virno describes this shift in labor from away from skills and toward congeniality and what he calls "virtuosity" -- work as ambitiously performative. Often this is a matter of innovating your own work processes, writing your own job description (as the management gurus might put it), finding opportunities to schmooze and impress higher-ups with useful ideas. Virno:
the tasks of a worker or of a clerk no longer involve the completion of a single particular assignment, but the changing and intensifying of social cooperation.... From the beginning, one resource of capitalistic enterprise has been the so-called “misappropriation of workers’ know how.” That is to say: when workers found a way to execute their labor with less effort, taking an extra break, etc., the corporate hierarchy took advantage of this minimal victory, knowing it was happening, in order to modify the organization of labor. In my opinion, a significant change takes place when the task of the worker or of the clerk to some extent consists in actually finding, in discovering expedients, “tricks,” solutions which ameliorate the organization of labor. In the latter case, workers’ knowledge is not used on the sly but it is requested explicitly; that is to say, it becomes one of the stipulated working assignments. The same change takes place, in fact, with regards to cooperation: it is not the same thing if workers are coordinated de facto by the engineer or if they are asked to invent and produce new cooperative procedures. Instead of remaining in the background, the act of cooperating, linguistic integration, comes to the very foreground.
This is essentially what internships are about. As Perlin notes, "the whole point of internships" is that the untrained worker must "come in under the radar, on the cheap, just a bright kid, and then suddenly prove yourself, become somebody worth having." Internships are precisely about teaching interns that they must train themselves and prove their fitness through quick adaptability. The point of most contemporary internships is not what sort of work gets assigned to interns and what specific training they receive from mentors but rather how quickly they learn to create productive work for themselves that their employers can then profit from. Many interns are tacitly expected to figure out how to go beyond what they have been explicitly been directed to do and pitch their own ideas for what they can do.

So it is that internships habituate novice employees to the conditions of the contemporary workplace, where job-specific skills are less relevant than the willingness to cooperate totally with co-workers and managers and make a show of one's perpetual availability and malleability. Much of career training for the postindustrial labor market involves learning to be a weasel, to be one of the cheese-hunting rats of the megaselling 1990s management tract Who Moved My Cheese? Interns learn to become eager self-exploiters. They accept that employers owe no such entitlements as loyalty to employees (superior employees earn favors; all workers shouldn't unfairly be granted rights uniformly); instead the constant demand for self-reinvention is inscribed as an opportunity for self-development, as an investment in one's own "human capital," though ultimately for the company's benefit.

Or to put it in Marxist terms, interns are taught to assimilate to the "general intellect," the wellspring of social productivity that Marx prophesized in the Grundrisse's "Fragment on Machines," and deploy it for capital's advantage. This manifests as an eagerness to show what one can do, to show what one is made of, to show how eager one is -- to show, in short, the quality of one's subjectivity in total and how well that total being can suits the company's needs. "Labor as subjectivity," as Virno, citing Marx, puts it. Interns are given the opportunity to prove that they are well-socialized and have the habitus of the go-getting office worker (or the chance to absorb that habitus quickly). Interns thus develop an entrepreneurial attitude toward their own capabilities and their everyday lives, scouring it all for opportunities to exploit for an employer's sake. Individuals not fortunate enough to inherit it are responsible for equipping themselves with "human capital."

But does this constitute real training? Perlin thinks it doesn't, which would make internships illegal. But enforcing that law wouldn't change the underlying conditions that require that workers adopt such a habitus, which means that interns' legality is something of a sideshow. Whether you are an intern or a mandatory freelancer, the situation is pretty much the same -- you have to constantly hustle. As Perlin notes, the need to supply oneself with human capital (rather than have it be a part of what society supplies to all its members out of an egalitarianism of opportunity) exemplifies how a broadening precarity affects the middle class, rendering its isolated members as responsible for outfitting themselves for social survival as the poor have long been. When internships fall to the nonelites, it still reflects this basic structure, that the intern should be willing to work for nothing because it is an investment in their future. Likewise, secondary education is entirely instrumental, an investment in one's future earning potential rather than an enrichment of one's human capabilities. Though skeptical of the human-capital thesis, Perlin tends to accept this view tacitly, seeing education basically as a mechanism for generating a wage premium.

Perlin's book concludes with a somewhat wide-eyed "Intern Bill of Rights" -- a series of propositions for creating a "common standard by which to evaluate and improve internships." The list seems to suggest that much of the problem with internships is semantic -- the word itself sugarcoats the reality of exploitation with educational pretenses. But why attempt to stabilize a definition of the word? It would seem more constructive to sully the term completely, along with the other euphemisms of the internship racket, like "human capital" and "situated learning," that serve only as tools of opportunistic obfuscation. Under the conditions Perlin advocates in this list, interns are part-time workers, plain and simple, and should be labeled as such. Those in positions that fail to meet those standards he elucidates are best understood as illegals, as scabs, regardless of how prestigious or entitled their upbringing has been. Fighting internships means fighting special favors, denying the personal touches, the exceptionalism of elite colleges -- it means confronting privilege head on and exposing it with contempt. But what we tend to do instead is take advantage of new tools to measure our prestige and figure out ways to leverage it into enduring privileges for ourselves and our friends.

Work Refusal (25 May 2011)

I spent the past weekend at the Post/Autonomia conference, which, fittingly enough, mostly took place in a former anatomical pathology laboratory -- the sessions were held in a room that was apparently once a morgue. At first, I was afraid that the ideas we were about to discuss (derived principally from autonomist writers like Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzaurato, Mario Tronti, John Holloway, Harry Cleaver, etc.) were possibly coming there to die, but I left feeling much more optimistic about the possibility that concepts like precarity and affective labor and decolonialization can escape the lab and actually be effectual in social activism.

Discussions ran the gamut from hairsplitting (to the untrained non-Spinozan) philosophical discussions of ontological accumulation and being-as-becoming to more hard-core Marxist themes like the composition of the working class, the organic composition of capital, and who comprises the revolutionary agent of history to practical assessments of the efficacy of, say, social media to activate the "multitude" (or, if you prefer, to sustain the Badiouian "communist hypothesis"), and it ended with a discussion of whether academia was at all a useful place for the discussion of any of this or whether it was fatally subsumed by capital. (I contributed a paper about social media as sustaining the entrepreneurial neoliberal self, not sure where/when/if it will be published.)

I took lots of notes while I was there; now I am having a lot of trouble deciphering them. Many of them, if I recall correctly, refer to the evolving strategies of work refusal discussed. The term is a bit of a misnomer. The idea of refusing work can seem odd in the midst of widespread unemployment and generalized precarity (indeed, one of the papers that stood out for me was Maria Isabel Casas-Cortes's tracing of the broadening circles of whom precarity could apply to), but it makes more sense if work is interpreted in the broadest sense to include the various forms of self-production, self-exploitation, and affective, digital and free labor that often go uncompensated by wages anyway. Franco "Bifo" Berardi's paper adopted this theme, advocating what sounded like voluntary simplicity, presumably as a means of thwarting the "hypercomplexity" and overload of our accelerated information processing capacities, though possibly also to escape the labor of consumption that reinforces consumerism, "semiocapitalism" (which I think means something like Baudrillard's conception of consumerism as consumption of signs), and individualism. I'm not sold on voluntary simplicity or some sort of hermeneutics of asceticism; more interesting to me was the implication that resistance could be organized and targeted at choice architecture and over-friendly user interfaces, which tend toward quietly normalizing one-dimensionality. Some of the same themes appear in his essay "Cognitarian Subectivation", which I commented on here.

Matteo Pasquinelli's paper suggested, in line with Christian Marazzi's work, that capitalism is moving to a model of rent extraction through financialization rather than exploiting surplus labor more directly. One might conceptualize this shift as a reaction to mechanization reducing the input of "living labor" into production, which would also be a way to characterize work refusal. I thought it fit with what Adam Arvidsson and Elanor Colleoni argue in their paper "Value in Information Capitalism and on the Internet" (pdf, my summary) with regard to Facebook.

Emanuel Rota discussed work refusal in terms of the right to be lazy, à la Paul Lafargue, whereas Stevphen Shukaitis stressed the necessity of "learning not to work," and the different forms work refusal must take according to different class positions and situations. He seemed to argue that we needed to better recognize affective labor so as to refuse it and cataloged the history of "art strikes," or the refusal of cultural labor. I presumed he meant the refusal not of creativity as such but the supplemental labor necessary for making creativity subsumable by capital -- the organizational and infrastructural labor that supports creative labor as a product, makes it packageable, profitable. This would include, as I conceive it, the branding, the marketing, the "getting it out there" work as well as the sort of care work that allows people to create in a self-aggrandizing mode. Shukaitis seemed to want to repartition work from leisure in order to facilitate the time-space for autonomous personal development, though this is easier said than done, considering that social recognition is now bound up with forms of self-commodification more than ever thanks to social media.

Refusing work is thus a matter of recharacterizing work as "ludic activity" -- which is a way of saying "play" without risking trivialization. But that can't collapse into entertaining oneself -- I am not sure that an art strike is needed; it seems like an attention strike is what's wanted, a refusal to get caught up in interactive entertainments that make our pursuit of distraction productive. Instead, we need what Federico Luisetti described during the session Q&A as a right to be bored -- a right to refuse to be entertained or distracted. It's easy to see this idea gaining momentum as information overload continues to worsen. Boredom will become a figure for the repose and replenishing necessary before concentration is possible, or perhaps even as a metonym for concentration itself. When capitalism wants to hurry us through commodified information at ever increasing speeds to valorize it all, boredom becomes a way of slowing things down, of resisting, of holding out for a minimal self rooted not in accumulation of trivia but in a kind of open-ended blankness.

I suppose I understand refusal of work as resisting personal branding, of refusing to be, as one speaker said, "dragged into networks of consumerism" in search of identity but holding out for other kinds of nurturing community that social networks increasingly obscure. It seems to me a matter of defying the injunction to be reflexive, to instrumentalize self-awareness, and try for self-forgetting. Instead of pursuing measurable attention, which induces one to see the self in terms of capitalistic accumulation and expansion, one could seek forms of intersubjectivity that supply a reciprocal recognition without lapsing into exploitable performativity. (I am failing by my own standards of course.)

Thursday, August 18, 2011

Consumerism vs. self-realization (1 April 2011)

I have been reading Alternatives to Capitalism, a collection of essays edited by Jon Elster and Karl Ove Moene. (I can't remember where I got the idea to read it from; possibly because Chris Dillow linked to it in a post.) The collection probably couldn't have been published at a worse time -- in 1989, just as the really existing alternatives to capitalism were collapsing and neoliberals were about to begin citing that collapse as irrefutable proof that there are no real alternatives. But while the discussion of worker-managed factories in Yugoslavia and subcontracting procedures in socialist Hungary are not immediately relevant today, much of the book's more-theoretical material seems as pertinent as ever, dealing with the question of persistent high unemployment and its various ramifications.

Martin Weitzman's essay about "profit-sharing capitalism" discusses profit sharing as a means of redistributing entrepreneurial risk, something that I tend to neglect when I am building my own post-capitalist castles in the air. It's probably fair to say that most workers dislike that sort of risk -- it's essentially the precarity of the freelancer life, having to continually rejustify oneself and one's productivity. Indeed, much of my complaining about social media revolves around how it pushes more and more workers into this condition of having to be entrepreneurial about their livelihood. It's probably an underrated virtue of most jobs, even when they are full of mundanity and unfulfilling tasks, that you don't have to constantly face the prospect of your work going uncompensated on an hour-by-hour basis and you don't have to work on spec. You don't have to invent the work for yourself and convince someone else that it is worth doing. But unfortunately, as recent evolutions in capitalism suggest, this is an inefficient arrangement for capital, and possibly can only be sustained through labor activism, unions, etc. Even then there are problems. Weitzman writes:
Our 'social contract' promises workers a fixed wage independent of the health of their company, while the company chooses the employment level. That stabilizes the money income of whomever is hired, but only at the considerable cost of loading unemployment on low-seniority workers and inflation on everybody -- a socially inferior risk-sharing arrangement that both diminishes and makes more variable the real income of the working class as a whole.
He proposes replacing steady wages with a profit-sharing scheme, which trades a predictable income for full employment,a public good with positive externalities for all of society. I'm not sure that his policy prescription fits contemporary conditions though, which seem to be dissolving firms into smaller units and making more and more employees free agents, who will increasingly have to try to piece together what income they can from various sources; profit sharing seems more likely to take the form of subcontracting from a vast pool of underemployed labor.

And Jon Elster's essay, "Self-Realization in Work and Politics," makes some interesting distinctions with regard to the sorts of activities that lead to "self-realization" -- which he defines as a "state that is essentially a by-product" of other practices but is in fact primary to our experience of the "good life." Market incentives don't necessarily point us to these behaviors, and consumerism often operates on a logic that positively thwarts them. Consumerism presupposes that satisfaction can be purchased, and that we know what we want going into an exchange. But often what we want is this by-product state, the experience of absorption in a task, of doing meaningful work, of surmounting challenges, of losing our self-consciousness. Consumption generally offers convenience, not challenges; opportunities for self-display, not self-forgetting; superficial novelty, not absorption. I don't think consumption becoming a form of production and hipsterism becoming a job function helps mitigate this any; it seems to worsen it. Drawing on Tocqueville, Elster makes the point that "with rapid technical change, the careful attention to detail that characterizes most forms of self-realization is pointless; conversely, pride in craftsmanship may block innovation." Self-realization is not necessarily something that can be made efficient, the way consumerism can be. And what we are incentivized to do economically in capitalism is not necessarily a reflection of what we want or what will be best for us.


Useless Labor and Production of the Self (18 Feb 2011)

Why won't hipsterism ever go away? Consider that technology (facilitated by capitalism's emphasis on efficiency; i.e., consider the assembly line a technology as well as the internet) is stripping people of what has been traditionally defined as "useful" or "legitimate" or "meaningful" work, and thus stripping meaning from their lives. "Nothing productive left to do since the robots came; better make my consumption more flamboyant and self-announcing!"

Ryan Avent, paraphrasing a point made by Steve Waldman in a great post on Tyler Cowen's recent book The Great Stagnation, writes:
The big innovations are all massively labour-saving. Humanity has gotten richer because new technologies have enabled people to wring ever more out of a given level of labour. And so through this long era of rapid technological change, people are constantly being thrown out of work and asked to find something useful to do. Throughout the 20th century, government has been there to provide that something. Governments at all levels have grown, in both absolute terms and as a share of the economy. So, too, has employment in government-like fields like health care and education. Maybe, just maybe, the growth of these fields isn't a drag on output. Maybe those fields have grown to absorb the increasing mass of more or less useless labour in "gainful" employment, and to provide those workers with an income—a share of the surplus generated by the productive sector that they can use to live off and perpetuate the consumption portion of the economy.

One might object that no labor is in fact "useless" if someone is willing to pay for it. If that is so, then we will naturally begin to increasingly locate our self-worth in net worth, since social recognition is not conferred by the quality of our social contribution in these useless fields (though the examples given, heath care and education, are not particularly useless, just somewhat immaterial). But if the "useless" work -- and I am thinking more of designy-ness, creative-class hucksterism, culture industry, etc., than care work -- must be subsidized via the government through a redistribution regime, theoretically something that might look like a negative income tax (Guy Sorman recently defended the idea in City Journal here), then what we make (money or stuff) can't testify to our personal value either. We're doing useless things and collecting the dole like the rest of our peers, so what makes us stand out?

Hence the field of consumption becomes the field of distinction and social recognition as well, and consuming becomes a sort of semiotic labor that absorbs more and more of our natural inclination to do something regarded as socially useful. (And Shop Class as Soulcraft-style retro crafts like carpentry and gardening and Etsy-ism start to register as consumerist hobbies, not "real" production.) Social media supplies the factory and distribution center for this sort of work, as well as the scoreboard in the form of data about just how many people are paying attention to you. We produce content and links to try to "connect" to others, that is, have them regard us as socially necessary the way, say, in the 19th century the village blacksmith was vitally necessary when the horse you were traveling on pulled up lame. (Okay, that was a somewhat far-flung, Downton Abbey-inspired example.) The point is we want to feel useful, and there are fewer opportunities for that in the sphere of production. So consumption becomes production, and the main way that happens is to make what we consume more salient and more socially significant, to have it inflect an ever-shifting language of status signifiers.

This whole set-up, in turn, fuels the view that narcissism and hipsterism are increasing society-wide, since self-production in the mode of marketing copy (developing the personal brand) is more and more what people do, if not for a living, then simply to appear, to be socially relevant.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

The unemployed and the unemployable (3 Dec 2010)

Continuing the theme from yesterday's post, the habitual, ideological association of employment with social and self-worth makes reports like the most recent from the BLS completely unacceptable. This NYT piece by Catherine Rampell details some of the reasons. European data has shown that "people who become disconnected from the work force have more trouble getting hired, probably because of some combination of stigma, discouragement and deterioration of their skills." This leads to their complete segregation from the mainstream of life. Rampell's piece ends on this cheerful note:
“After a while, a lot of European countries just got used to having 8 or 9 percent unemployment, where they just said, ‘Hey, that’s about good enough,’ ” said Gary Burtless, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “If the unemployment rates here stay high but remain relatively stable, people may not worry so much that that’ll be their fate this month or next year. And all these unemployed people will fall from the front of their mind, and that’s it for them.”
That's "it" for them? What does that even mean? They just become a permanent disenfranchised derelict class, ghosts among us reminding us of our doom if we fall afoul of the nation's HR departments? (Because we certainly want the warm, compassionate people in "human resources" controlling our social destiny.) And who are these people? Via Twitter, Mike Konczal (@rortybomb) notes that in the latest report, unemployment for people with a bachelor's degree jumped 0.4% over last month to 5.1%. Maybe these people will come to resemble the Japanese "herbivores" Rebecca Allen describes in this Semionaut post. The opposite of the self-reliant entrepreneurial ideal, these are passive Japanese men noted for their extreme narcissism, their fussy grooming habits, and their paralyzing risk aversion. Perhaps there will be hipster Hoovervilles in America once unemployability becomes an even more common outcome for those just graduating. Maybe this is already happening.

As Chris Dillow points out here, job insecurity is something of a constant, and recessions just amplify the volatility slightly. But this doesn't mean we should accept the fact that "even in the best of times, many of those in work are living lives of fear and insecurity" as the natural order of things. Dillow argues that "macroeconomic policy alone is a weak tool for reducing the individual, idiosyncratic risks that workers face," which means tinkering at the fiscal edges is an extremely roundabout way of trying to massage unemployment figures. Different kinds of action in a different realm of policy are perhaps required.

If the current level of unemployment in the U.S. is "structural" and is truly going to be persistent and cannot be ameliorated by state action, then other efforts must be made to shift ideological notions about the unemployed to ease the psychological damage -- to shift to a post-work welfare state that is justified by technological improvements that have made more jobs superfluous. (This is not so far-fetched; Gluskin Sheff's David Rosenberg points out that already "a record near 20% of personal income is now being derived from government transfer payments" in the U.S.) But it just doesn't seem to be the case that there is an actual shortage of tasks that we would want done as a society; it seems more that the economy has fallen under the direction of those who see more profitability in maintaining a reserve army of the unemployed than in finding new goods and services to produce. And everybody ultimately suffers then as the country inevitably stagnates. Think I'll take a cue from the herbavores and go pout in a mirror somewhere.

Dignity and Work (2 Dec 2010)

These are some tentative thoughts about convolutions in the ideology of work. Should the point of our lives be found in escaping work or finding meaningful work? Is our answer to that question inescapably predetermined by the existing economy? How does society assign work to individuals in a way that allows the individuals to seize upon it as meaningful, fulfilling, and does consumer capitalism inevitably militate against that?

At Interfluidity, Steve Waldman recently wrote about his frustration over technocratic Keynesian economists' efforts to advance policy without framing their case in moral terms, as the advocates of austerity so eagerly do. Despite the patronizing insistence of Krugman, DeLong, etc., "human affairs are a morality play," Waldman writes, "and economics, if it is to be useful at all, must be an account of human affairs." To make the case against austerity and the "hangover theory" of recessions (that after the party there must be a sober time of deprivation) and the sense that government stimulus efforts help the "undeserving poor" (those who, conservatives like to argue, were too stupid or lazy to acquire skills the economy needs, and those who defaulted on their debts), one should stress the ethical irresponsibility of creditors and lenders during bubbles and argue for their carrying their appropriate share of the post-bubble burden -- i.e. they should suffer losses rather than be bailed out. Waldman argues that "ethical lending for yield always involves risk-sharing: lenders must understand if the enterprise to which they lend fails badly, costs will be borne by both borrower and lender."

Waldman clarified his argument in a follow-up post:
My evaluation is based on a view of how human beings regulate social conduct. I think we do so primarily via moral heuristics. Those heuristics both shape and are shaped by reason. But our moral intuitions are more durable than reasoned conjectures, and more pervasive in guiding how we actually behave. Importantly, I think that moral heuristics are socially determined and malleable. I think we all become very different people when we immerse ourselves in different communities, and that individually and collectively our moral heuristics do change over time.
"Moral heuristic" seems to be econospeak for ideology: The point he is making here mirrors that which social theorists try to articulate when talking about how ideology functions: as a decisionmaking mode that preempts rational calculation (arguably an ideology itself, but that's a different question) and relies on what we reflexively identify as common sense without questioning why. Because of the social-class climate we are raised in and the institutions that structure our everyday life and the prevailing "relations of production" and so on, certain moral ideas will feel instinctively right, and biases in our reasoning, in what we choose to argue or assume as postulates, often derive from these unexamined principles. These intuitions can change, but that process is usually obscure, semiconscious -- it requires changes in one's milieu, in those institutions in which we are embedded, as well as some recognized personal volition to think and believe differently, to resist what had been common sense. It is a social and individual process simultaneously, and those changes are in dialectical tension, etc., etc.

I suppose some people continue to regard ideology as mainly political and something that is explicit. This merely hides the way ideology actually works to situate our perceptions, color our thoughts with what seem like moral intuitions, to make contradictions cohere as the expectations of us change as we shift between contexts and roles. To change policy, as Waldman suggests in his most recent post, a "better approach would be to understand the way in which the theory might in fact be true and useful, and to craft a morality tale that both captures what is accurate in the story and leads to more productive and just intuitions about how we should behave."

That post focuses on ideological notions about work and prosperity and how production is valued. Lots of ideological questions in economics can be resolved into ideas about value -- how it is defined, created, measured, justly distributed. It seems like common sense (something somebody wants has value, right?), but Marx, for one, wrote several tomes trying to get to the bottom of it (Theories of Surplus Value, Grundrisse, Capital) that seemed only to make the issue more obscure. (See this article by Anders Ramsay for more on Wertgegenständlichkeit vs. Verausgabung.) Usually it just gets postulated as equivalent to GDP, to growth, which raises the issue of whether GDP captures public well-being. Growth is only as good for society as the distribution of it is held to be just. That's the substance of another endless ideological battle over what are fair returns to various kinds of property and labor.

The debate about what the financial industry produces is about whether they create value/growth, or merely shift money around to their own benefit. And who needs to be coddled to help the economy create more value -- capital or labor? Further questions arise when you look at how value changes as goods circulate. Does consumption create value in any socially meaningful way, or does it destroy it, as the word consumption implies? What is the relation of value to price? Is work valuable in and of itself to workers?

These ideological questions obviously shape the macroeconomic story that gets told. Conservatives tend to tell a story about the economy that stresses "structural unemployment" (unemployment is the result of skills mismatch, not a cyclical lack of aggregate demand for goods and services) and overconsumption during bubbles (the wrong sorts of people spent too much on things they didn't deserve to have). They extend no pity to those overconsumers who suffer (losing their jobs, homes, etc.) in recessions they regard as necessary to clear the debt overhang and forestall inflation.

Economist Karl Smith points out that it makes no sense to punish overconsumption with unemployment but goes too far, in Waldman's view, when he suggests, as many liberals tend to, that prosperity is a matter of full employment, the most people making the most stuff.

Waldman, attempting a sort of synthesis of Austrian and Keynesian views, responds by basically questioning the nature of the "value" of work: is it in the products they make, or is it a matter of keeping people busy and allowing them to feel as though what they do is socially meaningful? "We should never, ever measure prosperity in terms of consumption, but always in terms of production, weighted, importantly, by the strength of financial arrangements that allow us to convert unconsumed production into credible options to consume later." That is, production that can be turned into and out of savings without losing too much value. (This relates to the issues of overproduction or miscalculation, of an economy making stuff people don't want down the road.) Waldman continues, "However, we do not measure prosperity in terms of how much work people are doing. That is a terrible error and the most vulgar form of Keynesianism. Make-work is not a path to prosperity, and effort is not production." Effort has to make something that can be exchanged to qualify as production -- it has to be "socially necessary" in some sense. Someone must want to consume it. (The question usually debated is whether the government can be that someone.)

Then Waldman gets to what I see as the crux of the matter:
Employment is a more complicated issue than output. Under current (foolish) institutional and ideological arrangements, for most people, employment is our main source of claims on current or future production, and also a measure of our respectability and value as human beings.... The degree to which the production of any given thing is tethered to traditional employment is variable and technology dependent, and the ability to confer value through purchase could be distributed via means other than employment. Employment and prosperity are different things.
We measure prosperity by production, not by work, and we measure production by value, by what people are willing to pay for what is produced.
What's revealed here is a sort of neutron-bomb mentality built into our received ideas of prosperity. We measure prosperity in prices, which stem from buying, not making or even consuming things. Value is ultimately assigned not but what people do or use but by what they are willing to pay for. Human effort, human being, has nothing to do with value -- despite our sentimental moral attachment to hard work, and our hedonistic delight in consumption.

That seems to vindicate the worst aspect of consumerism, that what we buy is more important to the grand scheme of things than what we do, which is important only insofar as it it gives us purchasing power. But this is the implicit ideology of the wage system, which makes all forms of work commensurable; this is the "foolish arrangement" that makes employment the "main source of claims on production." Consumerism -- a society devoted to circulating goods for the sheer sake of their circulation, which produces "value" (where Marxist "valorization" occurs) -- inevitably follows from a system that abstracts labor from its context, from the satisfactions it supplies to the worker and from the needs it ultimately satisfies. Consumerist values -- novelty, convenience, daydreaming, vicariousness, passivity, obsessive collecting -- all follow from this.

When Waldman suggests that "the ability to confer value through purchase could be distributed via means other than employment," he seems to be hinting at the possibility of a social wage, of something akin to universal welfare payments -- an idea almost unthinkable in the current ideological environment. But it may be the only way we escape a system that reduces all forms of value to expressions of individual consumer preference and that allows us to conceive of prosperity without people doing anything.

Friday, August 12, 2011

Worker = Hipster (15 July 2010)

Following up on the blogospheric/op-ed page discussion about job creation in America and the need for more "good" manufacturing jobs, Ryan Avent analyzes the dichotomy between manufacturing and services in this post, well worth reading in its entirety. Echoing this Matt Yglesias post, he basically claims that the distinction is irrelevant (arbitrary is the word Yglesias uses), arguing that...

economic activity isn’t about satisfying the demand for objects; it’s about satisfying demand, period, and people demand many things that have little to do with assembly lines and smokestacks — haircuts, mixed drinks, financial advice, dentistry, and so on.

Yglesias, likewise, suggests that all work could conceivably be seen as manufacturing:

The important thing is to not get too caught up in the words “making” and “things.” A farmer makes plants. A cook makes meals. A chef makes recipes. A restaurant investor makes business plans. A marketing specialist makes brand loyalty. A salesman makes sales. A personal trainer makes muscle mass.

Incidentally, this is why critics of capitalism sometimes complain about reification -- because capitalism encourages us not to be too hung up about the concept of the "thing" and "thing-ification." At the level of ideology we are expected to regard our social practices as a constant process of production of alienated things that can be separated from the context of their origin and exchanged, and to see this is simply natural, inevitable. What gets called a "good" and what gets called a "service" is always in flux, varying according to the amount of reification required by economic conditions.

But the point Avent and Yglesias seem to want to make is that it's more or less nonsense to argue, as Andy Grove does here, that the U.S. needs to recommit to manufacturing. We're always already "manufacturing," in some broad sense of the word, as long as people are getting paid to do something. The critical necessity, they suggest, is to be able to make goods and services cheaper, so more consumers will demand them. "As we get better at making things, more people can shift into the making of expensive luxury items and then those items become non-luxuries," Yglesias writes, and hence more people can desire and buy them. (He assumes a never-ending demand for "luxuries"; that supply creates its own demand -- Say's Law, which wishes away the problem of effective demand.)

It's important to think about what "getting better at making things" means exactly. Avent asserts that "economic growth ... is about figuring out how to do more with less," that is, improving productivity. Sometimes, technical innovation accomplishes that task. However, the quickest way to improve productivity is to fire people and make fewer workers do the work -- that's what the discipline of "management" and its type of innovation are all about. Hence Avent concedes that "economic growth is often about labor-saving innovation" -- an insight Marx emphasizes in one of the more cryptic portions of Capital, when he starts in on the "composition of capital."

The gist is that the amount of labor that capital needs to absorb in the process of "valorizing" itself -- turning a profit -- varies depending on the economic sector and on conditions, including levels of innovation and productivity. Marx regards productivity improvements at the expense of wage-paying jobs as a fundamental contradiction in capitalism. Value, in his view, stems from human labor, not productivity improvements like machines or management strategies, so when capital seeks to get more work done with less labor, they reduce the human input that makes the output have value. Such productivity enhancements may increase output but over the long term they also devalue that output, making it sell cheaper. As George Caffentzis explains Marx's logic (pdf):
Machines’ weakness – the fact that they cannot create value – has enormous consequences for the whole capitalist system. Industries that employ a large amount of machinery and a relatively small amount of labor cannot create within their production process the surplus value necessary to constitute an average rate of profit for the inconstant capital (machinery, for the most part) and variable capital (wages).
Profits then shift to the sectors with more human input. As labor intensive industry moves to places where labor is cheap, the U.S. faces the dilemma of how to keep people employed when much of its industry has become reliant on constant capital (machines) rather than variable capital (humans). It has moved away from traditional manufacturing, meaning more of America's workforce must shift into making other things -- including ideas and services. This would seem to require retraining. Avent argues that "what is really important is the level, supply, and transferability of skills. And it is here that we seem to have run into problems. We’re not producing enough skilled workers to keep up with the demand for skills, and we’re producing too many unskilled workers. Many of today’s jobs require a great deal of specialized knowledge, which takes a long time to acquire." That line of thinking often leads to a concern with improving education so we produce more engineers and computer programmers and the like.

But Avent also makes the more compelling claim that developing human capital is a primarily a matter of guaranteeing a certain level of "human input to economic activity, which, like it or not, we need to maintain." In that sense, the skills themselves are arbitrary as long as there are socially necessary (or socially demanded) production processes that make use of them, whatever they are. Maybe retraining isn't as necessary as a collective reconceiving of what can be considered a skill. Could it be possible that we've reached a point at which the requisite skills don't follow from specific needs, but instead skills easily acquired in a leisure-oriented society drive the creation of leisure-oriented labor processes that then invent social demand? Work and leisure would thereby become harder to differentiate, along with production and consumption. (This fits Baudrillard's assessment of the consumer society, as well as the "immaterial labor" thesis popularized by Hardt and Negri.) The nature of compensation also changes as wages start to take the form of fame, attention, recognition, credibility, autonomy, free time (since necessities in these societies come cheaply or are included -- in theory, anyway -- in the standard social safety net).

Increases in the standard of living may thereby have the paradoxical effect of turning "living" itself into a ceaseless work process. The more leisure eliminates work in the traditional sense, the more it becomes work itself in the immaterial sense. By making traditional types of skills irrelevant, productivity innovations are making us reconceive our leisure time activities as a skill set.

Another way of looking at structural shifts in the economy -- at the changes in the things we manufacture -- is that capitalists, in order to find profitable ways to employ the workforce in the U.S. (that is, to preserve the "human input"; to alter the "organic composition of capital"), have had to increasingly turn taken-for-granted practices and customs and beliefs of everyday life into "services" -- that is, into products. Reification has had to be intensified. With basic needs sated by goods made cheaply abroad or with minimal labor input, new needs have to be systematically invented. That means things people were comfortable with have to be turned into problems for them -- they need new desires and new anxieties. Thus life becomes a lifestyle that is sold to us and which grants us our identity, now an ongoing construction project.

The nature of the "skills" being reproduced in U.S., the ones that we can still incorporate into production, are oriented more and more toward lifestyle making. The sector of "productive jobs" in the U.S. seems to be in those areas sometimes decried as inessential if not corrosive to the human spirit -- cultural meanings, identity tokens, marketing, etc. Given the proclivities of our workforce, the U.S.'s comparative advantage is in manufacturing desires and refining them in the realm of language and feeling, as opposed to making things. These jobs can seem frail and frivolous, the work not socially necessary and therefore not psychically rewarding in the same way. It commercializes the process of making one's social world, emptying it of trust and the feeling of authenticity. The approval we seek to stabilize our sense of self is suddenly explicitly bound up in public, commercial enterprise.

Correspondingly, production is more and more a matter of cultural reproduction -- making selves in lifestyles, enhancing identity-oriented pursuits. As a result, we come to see more of our identity-shaping activities as work -- they are subsumed under capital. We can't help but regard our self-fashioning in capitalistic terms, as building our personal brand. So, on our current path, more and more U.S. workers are likely to be turned into knowledge workers, meme generators, hype merchants, identity mongers -- making "cool" while transforming their social life into a stream of branded idea-products. Soon, if that trend continues, worker = hipster.

Making Bad Jobs Good (9 July 2010)

More on the jobless future. In the FT yesterday, Richard Florida of creative-class fame had an op-ed called "America needs to make its bad jobs better". By bad jobs, Florida doesn't mean non-creative ones; he means low-paying ones. The gist of the editorial is that we need to make the low-skill, service-sector jobs that still get created by the U.S. economy pay better.

The problem is that on average, service workers earn only half of what factory workers make – and only a third of what professional, technical and knowledge workers are paid. The key is to upgrade these jobs and turn them into adequate replacements for the higher-paying blue-collar jobs that have been destroyed.

It would seem that the obvious way to achieve that goal is with unions, but Florida is hesitant to call for a new round of labor unrest. Instead, he asserts that when it came to manufacturing jobs becoming "good" jobs, "most of it was because of the enormous improvements in productivity wrought by improved technologies and management techniques." So better bosses and magic machines, not worker organization and struggle, made manufacturing jobs "good." Once bosses decide to do the same for the service sector and pass along all the "benefits" of improved productivity to the squeezed and harassed workers, everything will be hunky dory again. "Service jobs are the last frontier of inefficiency," Florida writes, "providing abundant low-hanging fruit for the innovation and productivity improvements that can undergird higher wages." Feeding and cleaning the elderly, for example, will be a great job once it it is more efficient. (Perhaps they can be placed on a conveyor belt that will usher them through a mechanized bathing apparatus run by well-paid knowledge workers?)

Setting aside the fact that efficiency doesn't make jobs "good" in the sense of their becoming more intrinsically rewarding, bosses haven't been passing along productivity gains to workers in the form of higher wages like they should in theory. In fact, wages have been stagnant for decades. As Felix Salmon notes in his response to the op-ed, "productivity improvements don’t necessarily result in higher wages for the less-skilled: they’re just as likely to result in greater returns to capital, as owners extract more profits from the business, or else to result in the jobs going to better-educated workers instead."

It seems that service workers need to unionize to secure their share of any productivity gains, but the general idea of bargaining on equal terms may hamper part of what service workers are selling with the labor time, that is, the creation of a certain affect for their clients, that of their being the master. Service work is often a matter of selling an experience (it's "immaterial labor"), and often the experience includes a feeling of superiority at commanding the labor of others with your money. Unionizing would rightfully mitigate that but may make some less interested in their services, particularly if they can be construed as luxuries. Also, as service work becomes more and more of creating types of emotions in a very specific context, it may become less amenable to the kinds of cooperation among workers that generate solidarity. There may even be a refusal on the part of the worker to recognize that they are part of an affect-manufacturing process. And certain service work, in becoming more "productive" may become more autonomous and voluntary, conducted in the midst of everyday life processes that have become networked and dispersed and can be harvested after the fact by companies seeking to profit from it. Such laborers in the social factory don't even know they are working, let alone have the impetus to unionize. In other words, it's worth wondering whether the structural shift to a service economy rooted in immaterial commodities and ad hoc work spaces requires a different definition of "job".

Michael Hardt argues (pdf) that immaterial labor is becoming "hegemonic" -- that its "qualities tend today to be imposed over other sectors of the economy and over society as a whole. Industry has to informationalize; knowledge, code, and images are becoming ever more important throughout the traditional sectors of production; and the production of affects and care is becoming increasingly essential in the valorization process." This, he claims, leads to a shift in emphasis on "immaterial property" -- ideas -- which are harder to monopolize and extract profits from.
If you have an idea, sharing it with me does not reduce its utility to you, but usually increases it. In fact, in order to realize their maximum productivity, ideas, images, and affects must be common and shared. When they are privatized their productivity reduces dramatically – and, I would add, making the common into public property, that is, subjecting it to state control or management, similarly reduces productivity. Property is becoming a fetter on the capitalist mode of production.
His point is that the economy increasingly consists of ideas made from other ideas, and these ideas (nonrival goods) need to be widely shared or networked together in order to fulfill their potential to create value.

But a shift toward the common as the basis for production would not only upset capitalist assumptions about property, it would disrupt our assumptions about jobs, which would increasingly cease to "belong" to anyone but could be autonomously performed by whoever feels qualified and entitled to do it. This is what seems to be happening to journalists and reporters right now.

A good deal of service work may be too contingent on local circumstances to ever be generalized in that way (e.g., you need to be there to cut someone's hair), but those are the sorts of things that will remain resistant to productivity enhancement. The manufacturing of meanings and affects and entertainment and so on may become more productive mainly by becoming more a product of the common -- produced by a flexible, dispersed nonlabor force of volunteers in a near-realtime response to evolving trends and dispositions. This essay (pdf) by Adam Arvidsson illustrates this tendency: He argues that the creative class "are not the primary producers of creativity. Rather they owe their class position to their ability to poach and appropriate creativity produced elsewhere, in networks of (mostly) unsalaried immaterial production that unfold in the urban environment." He thus "emphasizes the contribution of the unpaid ‘mass intellectuality’ of the urban arts, design, music and fashion scenes."

As the networked economy continues to flourish, productivity gains can be had by eliminating the poacher middlemen, poaching the ideas directly from the "creative proletariat". So it seems that the more these immaterial products (which tend to be the output, ironically enough, of the creative class Florida extols) constitute the U.S.'s slice of the global economy, the more our future here appears jobless.

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

Assessing the Jobless Future (27 April 2010)

I found this Matt Yglesias post pretty inspirational, even though I can't bring myself to agree entirely with it. He writes that "it’s more possible than ever for people’s non-commercial labors to have a meaningful impact on the world," an idea that is basically the driving force behind my writing this blog.

Though I think the future he envisions is fairly attractive, I wonder about the process he sees as getting us there. Basically, he argues that capitalism's progress is slowly producing more time for nonmarket production and clearing space for nonmarket relations -- an almost counterintuitive claim considering how technology has tended to blur the distinction between work and leisure, between public and private, between friendship and networking and so on.

It turns out that welfare state capitalism just is the alternative to capitalism. After all, if you look at how life in the developed countries has changed from 1930 to 2010 what you see is that people spend more and more time in school, more and more time retired, and more and more time on vacation. In other words, people are step-by-step liberating themselves not from market capitalism as a means of obtaining consumer goods but from wage slavery in the worker-capitalist relationship.

We'll do less meaningless work for bosses and more meaningful work for ourselves. Sounds great. Dalton Conley puts this same idea slightly differently in Elsewhere, U.S.A.: "The very rhythms of most professionals today could be clearly seen in the natural light of the artist live-work lofts of 1960: an integration of home and work; odd hours; individualized, nonsalaried work; status insecurity; and so on. We are all artists now." Another way to put this is to argue that we are all being forced into the gig economy.

Whether one views that trend positively or negatively hinges on whether you regard the nonsalaried life as liberating or insecure. Yglesias seems to imagine a robust welfare state supporting us to produce on our terms at our leisure. Others imagine chronic unemployment producing civil disorder and urge a fight to preserve jobs that may be economically moribund. Yglesias, in this post, regards the chief ideological fight as contesting the terrain of leisure -- pundits want us to hew to something like the Protestant work ethic to combat the pernicious income effect. Yglesias writes sarcastically: "Don’t people know that they were put on this planet to work! How dare we, as a society, take some of our increased productivity in the form of an increased measure of liberation from our employers rather than more material possessions?" But he doesn't articulate what drives people to argue for more work and more consumption -- the need to sustain economic growth and capital accumulation. The way to square the circle, resolve the ideological argument, is to develop ways to capitalize on immaterial labor -- people's unmanaged, voluntaristic work in self-actualization becomes a resource for capital (self-disciplined workers who don't require management) even if the leisure-laborers don't notice and/or get paid in attention rather than wages. By these means, "nonmarket production" gets sneaked back into consumer capitalism, though the social relations of production are changed or obscured. The boss-worker relation is transformed; hierarchical, centralized management gets dispersed into a cloud of peer-to-peer relations. But consumerism remains, as does the alienation of regarding oneself as a firm or a brand.

It's also worth noting here that arguments about the "jobless future" that productivity and technology would bring us have been kicking around for a while; the Left Business Observer's Doug Henwood was casting a skeptical glance at them back in the mid 1990s, when books like futurist Jeremy Rifkin's The End of Work were being published. Henwood observes that "Throughout history, capitalism has constantly drawn new people into paid labor, though the demand for jobs always outstrips the system's capacity to provide them." This tenuous balance is a defining quality of capitalism: maintaining enough job growth to make wage labor the norm while preserving a reserve army of the unemployed to keep those wages low enough to protect the exploitative arrangement. If wages being paid in the form of leisure are growing, it may be because capital has discovered a new mode of exploitation. Building on Marx's oft-quoted passage on machines in the Grundrisse, Henwood writes, "the social knowledge and coordination behind technological production could make possible a more leisurely and humane way of life, but instead is used for the accumulation of money." That seems a pertinent rejoinder to Yglesias's hopeful view.

It also seems like there is something missing from Yglesias's wrap-up:

For rich countries—productivity growth, social insurance, and efforts to improve public health all aiming at allowing people to live more and more of their time outside the bonds of commercial work. For poor countries—capitalism, to get the process of prosperity and social betterment rolling. At the interface between the two—a generous and humane approach to migration issues so that people can have the freedom to escape bad situations, and a trade regime that aims at facilitating the exchange of goods rather than coercing poor countries into adopting the preferred policies of rich world companies.

The problem of de facto imperialism -- of rich countries exploiting the opportunities provided by the poverty of poor countries (as a cheap labor pool mainly) -- must be accounted for. What if the prosperity of rich countries depends to a degree on the poverty of poor countries, and inequality is structured into the global economy? Capitalism works by finding competitive advantages -- i.e. weaknesses or conditions of uneven development to exploit. In theory, by finding these weaknesses, they will be exploited away -- the way arbitrage is supposed to eliminate profit opportunities in finance. (Emphasis on supposed to -- this paper by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (pdf) discusses the limits to arbitrage). But in practice, effort can be invested instead in preserving the uneven development to protect the vested interests in a given situation. The "interface" between rich and poor countries may be set up to preserve that distinction -- perhaps what Yglesias is saying is that political activism should be directed toward making sure that isn't the case and instead assure that the interface works to dismantle its own necessity as all countries presumably become rich.

So anyway, yes, by all means, more shared prosperity, more non-commercial production and meaningful work and social relations not determined wholly by capitalist production. I'm just not sure that the self-branding that has developed with the networked society is delivering all that or moving us in that direction; it seems that it may be yielding something more mixed, something that demands (like so much else) our concerned ambivalence.

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Real men use their tools (4 July 2009)

I'm all in favor of championing meaningful work over bureaucratic paper-pushing or assembly-line tedium, but nonetheless, I was a little skeptical of Matthew Crawford's thesis in this New York Times magazine essay, adapted from his book, Shop Class as Soulcraft. (A more philosophical version of the essay's ideas is here.) He certainly has a point in detailing how mechanics are presumed to be less intelligent than office workers and information workers, but he tends to err on the other side of the equation, painting those who don't work with their hands as deracinated half men. In championing "real" work as tinkering with tools and fixing engines and rewiring houses and that sort of thing, Crawford seems to have in the back of his mind the supposed threat of boys being neutered and pussified by modern education techniques -- namely they are being medicated so that they won't be aggressive and so that their rambunctious curiosity is stifled:
There is a pervasive anxiety among parents that there is only one track to success for their children. It runs through a series of gates controlled by prestigious institutions. Further, there is wide use of drugs to medicate boys, especially, against their natural tendency toward action, the better to “keep things on track.”
That sounds very reminiscent of this sort of thing: "Consider, for example, the fact that we still expect our six- to-eleven-year-old sons to sit for hours at a stretch, reading and writing, at a time in their lives when adventure calls." Of course, girls can be expected to sit around a school; after all they need to get used to sitting around at home waiting for their men. But boys are special. Crawford tries to be a bit more gender neutral than that, but you can't help but feel that he's motivated by a sense that masculinity is bound up with a certain sort of tactile manipulation of the world. Those without handymen skills are hardly men at all; they are at the mercy of the social order and economic division of labor instead of being rugged individualists.

Crawford is a motorcycle mechanic, so you can throw in the gratuitous machismo of revving engines and indulging dangerous pursuits in search of kicks. His economic exchanges then, instead of being suspect and shamefully interlocking him into the system, are saturated with manliness, trading in a testosterone currency:
Seeing a motorcycle about to leave my shop under its own power, several days after arriving in the back of a pickup truck, I don’t feel tired even though I’ve been standing on a concrete floor all day. Peering into the portal of his helmet, I think I can make out the edges of a grin on the face of a guy who hasn’t ridden his bike in a while. I give him a wave. With one of his hands on the throttle and the other on the clutch, I know he can’t wave back. But I can hear his salute in the exuberant “bwaaAAAAP!” of a crisp throttle, gratuitously revved. That sound pleases me, as I know it does him. It’s a ventriloquist conversation in one mechanical voice, and the gist of it is “Yeah!”
Fuck yeah! Woo-hoo. One bro helping another bro out, just how the world should be. None of that impersonal faceless corporate world or the cash nexus for him.
As is the case with many independent mechanics, my business is based entirely on word of mouth. I sometimes barter services with machinists and metal fabricators. This has a very different feel than transactions with money; it situates me in a community.

That repairmen and such are undercompensated compared with bankers goes without saying, but in many respects this is because of what Crawford points out -- those jobs can't be outsourced, so they are paid in security; and those jobs are absorbing and immediately rewarding (you get to see what your work has wrought), so they are paid in satisfaction and integrity. They are motivated to work for reasons other than money, and thus by the inexorable logic of capitalism, they are underpaid.

Crawford rhapsodizes how the real men who do real work draw not on institutional information but informal networks of semi-arcane lore, sometimes resorted to brute trial and error or a mystified sort of intuition that comes from long practice.
The gap between theory and practice stretches out in front of you, and this is where it gets interesting. What you need now is the kind of judgment that arises only from experience; hunches rather than rules. For me, at least, there is more real thinking going on in the bike shop than there was in the think tank.
Yes, it is thinking, but must he call it real thinking? Real thinking takes place outside of machine shops too. But he tends to be suspicious of any job where knowledge production or dissemination is the purpose, and regards jobs that require coordination as inherently stultifying. Crawford declares, "There probably aren’t many jobs that can be reduced to rule-following and still be done well" -- hoping to put a rhetorical stake in the heart of middle managers everywhere. If only everyone would stop being so insistent on the rules and started generating ad hoc procedures as they went along, then everyone would feel so much more creative and fulfilled. We all would be allowed to reinvent the wheel.

But Crawford's point about the middle manager's moral maze is right on:
A manager has to make many decisions for which he is accountable. Unlike an entrepreneur with his own business, however, his decisions can be reversed at any time by someone higher up the food chain (and there is always someone higher up the food chain). It’s important for your career that these reversals not look like defeats, and more generally you have to spend a lot of time managing what others think of you. Survival depends on a crucial insight: you can’t back down from an argument that you initially made in straightforward language, with moral conviction, without seeming to lose your integrity. So managers learn the art of provisional thinking and feeling, expressed in corporate doublespeak, and cultivate a lack of commitment to their own actions. Nothing is set in concrete the way it is when you are, for example, pouring concrete.
That's a good explanation of weasly corporate-speak, which is not the product of ignorance but instead of the need for plausible deniability. But that also means that they are thinking on their feet, albeit verbally. Crawford assumes there can be no satisfaction in this, that it is automatically born of desperation and squirming. That is the same mistake as assuming that the dirty work of mechanics is stupid.

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Bastiat and the consumer's point of view (13 Feb 2008)

Frederic Bastiat, a 19th-century French free-trade polemicist, is a highly entertaining writer who reaches almost Swiftian heights in ridiculing protectionist "sophisms," and one of his best essays, "A Petition" may have inspired one of the best Simpsons episdoes, the one in which Mr. Burns plans to blot out the sun to help his energy business. Bastiat often refutes protectionism by enjoining us to look at things from the consumer's point of view -- tariffs protect producers at the expense of consumers, impoverishing everyone who would otherwise benefit from the magic of comparative advantage. "Consumption is the goal of all our efforts,' he declares in a typical formulation, "and it is only by adopting the point of view of the consumer that we shall find the solution to all our problems." This is a core idea of neo-classical economics, that the point of production is consumption, and maximizing consumption maximizes well-being. As Bastiat says, "human labor is not an end but a means. It never remains unemployed." The last part of that is to refute the lump-of-labor fallacy; human ingenuity will find new uses for our productive capacity and we can never run out of work. But why? The answer to that runs counter to Bastiat's first proposition, that labor is a means. It is also an end, in that people need meaningful work to perform in order to be personally fulfilled. This notion is at the heart of the early Marxian critique of Adam Smith in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.

So when we are encouraged to fixate on the consumer's point of view to resolve all sorts of labor-related economic issues, what we're essentially being told is: Give up your fantasy of meaningful work and be happy with the range of goods you can consume. Be a shopper, not a maker.