"Needing to Be Noticed: Understanding the Market in an Attention Economy," a paper (pdf) by Anthony Olcott of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, raises some interesting questions about the idea of an attention economy, some of which I would rephrase in a more quasi-Foucauldian vein. Olcott wants to know how to measure the return on investment for attention spent, so that individuals could determine how to invest attention rather than merely expend it. But I wonder if our awareness of attention as a quantity to spend is the problem, burdening us with a kind of reflexivity that cannibalizes our experience of being engrossed in an activity.
Some other, related questions: Is attention a currency, a good, or both simultaneously? Is our attention manufactured, produced, by the goods that demand it? In other words, does entertainment produce attention as a fungible quantity in our understanding as well as then absorb that quantity? More broadly, does the discourse about the so-called attention economy structure our attention as currency? Attention is not something we can ever accumulate or store, so to think of it as currency is misleading. It seems more like a product, something that marketers purchase from entertainment media. Attention is not ours to spend; it's instead a state of being that makes us sellable.
Olcott brings up the received wisdom that our sense of the scarcity of our attention is a product of the sudden information surfeit, which has made us aware of how little time we have for the information we want to consume, or -- the same thing -- the elasticity of our curiosity when information becomes cheap. Olcott has even attempted to quantify this: "the flow of information clamoring for attention has been increasing at somewhere between 30 and 60 percent per year for the past two decades, while our ability to absorb information has been growing at only about 5 percent per year (and that primarily through our growing tendency to multitask, or do several things superficially rather than one or two things deeply)."
Our perceived flow of information is, of course, a matter of the effectiveness of the filters in place for us. Many of the filters earlier generations took for granted, the ones imposed by the absence of real-time communications and efficient transmission and storage, have now been eradicated by the advent of internet and digital media. Analog media imposed stringent limits on what amount of information was transmissible and storable. As Olcott puts it, "When technology made the threshold of entry into communication high, the amount of attention relative to the amount of information to which it could be paid was relatively large." That made the limits of our media-consumption time irrelevant. But now the analog limits are gone. We become aware of time as a problem, our attention as bounded, limited -- and then in its palpable scarcity, we realize more fully its potential to be alienated as a commodity. That is, we become aware of its value, and we want that value to be convertible into other forms of value (as capitalism trains us to expect).
Relative to the automatic filtering imposed by those analog limits, the ones we are forced to impose on ourselves seem arbitrary. They require self-discipline; they seem theoretically optional, perpetually negotiable. The open-endedness makes us feel the information flow as "overload" -- it is never simply settled as what it is, and requires continual decisionmaking from us, continual reaffirmation of the filters we've chosen. My RSS feed demands more from me than a newspaper, because I'm responsible at a meta level for what information it brings me; before, my decisionmaking would end with the decision to buy a paper. Now I have to tell myself I have enough, even as the culture tells me that in general, too much is never enough, and "winning" is having more. As a result, I start to feel cheated by time because I can't amass more of it. I become alienated from it rather inhabiting it, which makes me feel bored in the midst of too many options. The sense of overload is a failure of our focus rather than the fault of information itself or the various media. Calling it "attention" in the contemporary sense and economizing it doesn't repair focus so much as redefine it as a shorter span, as inherently fickle and ephemeral.
Brokering my own attention span is my attempt to reassert control. I will spend my attention wisely and get the most out of it by investing it wisely in things that will "reward" it. But I fear that expecting to profit from paying attention is a mistake, a kind of category error. Attention seems to me binary -- it is engaged or it isn't; it isn't amenable to qualitative evalution. If we start assessing the quality of our attention, we get pulled out of what we were paying attention to, and pay attention to attention to some degree, becoming strategic with it, kicking off a reflexive spiral that leads only to further insecurity and disappointment. Attention is never profitable enough, never sufficient.
It seems to me that serendipity is a better attention-management strategy, a more appropriate way to deal with those times when we can no longer focus and become suddenly aware that we need to direct our attention somewhere.
Showing posts with label foucault. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foucault. Show all posts
Thursday, August 18, 2011
Monday, August 15, 2011
Convenience and Neoliberalism (13 Aug 2010)
Jodi Dean makes an interesting point in this post about "neoliberal appetites." At issue is the question of whether the neoliberal regime we are all familiar with now -- deregulated markets and post-Fordist production processes and so on -- allows individuals to assume more responsibility and have more flexibility with regard to how they fit into economic relations. Bosses are less domineering, workers are more autonomous and collaborative, and self-regulation dictates the terms of self-exploitation. This is sometimes discussed in terms of "bioproduction" and "governmentality" -- terms from Foucault's later work. Occasionally, left-leaning types will celebrate this development as empowering a deterritorialized "multitude" that is paving the way for a postcapitalist world.
But the aggressive brand of individualism promoted by neoliberalism -- the sorts of subjects it requires -- doesn't allow for personal development so much as it indoctrinates us into a myopic insatiability. Dean argues:
But the aggressive brand of individualism promoted by neoliberalism -- the sorts of subjects it requires -- doesn't allow for personal development so much as it indoctrinates us into a myopic insatiability. Dean argues:
The very incentive structure that would be necessary for competition to replace something like normalization is missing. The internet, pay for view, video on demand, DVR, instant messaging -- our entire media habitat conditions us to immediate gratification rather than self-discipline, self-control, self-governance. Fast food and convenience -- again, we focus on what we want now, not what we might need or use later. The neoliberal attitude is that markets and competition induce certain behaviors (laws of supply and demand) and that this is sufficient for self-governance on its own. It isn't--as Hegel and Adam Smith already knew.The way I interpret this situation is that neoliberalism necessarily promotes convenience and expediency as its values to accelerate the circulation of commodities, the consumption of goods and services, as a consumerism-based economy requires. Repressive desublimation, to use Marcuse's phrase, characterizes neoliberal subjectivity more than any sort of internalized self-control. Consumers work better for the system when they have outsourced self-control, seek it in further acts of consumption -- buying diet books and exercise books, subscribing to magazines that preach simplifying your life, etc. Dean notes that "the culture of immediacy, of communicative capitalism, dissolves these sorts of mechanisms [of self-governance] and instead provides instant tidbits (lichettes) that entrap us in circuits of drive." My translation: the emphasis on real-time applications and technology short-circuits the possibility of reflexivity; we become too focused instead on updating and refreshing the content available to us instead of governing our own output and intake. As a result, we become to incompetent to be trusted with power, and democracy, as Dean points out, begins to seem impossible.
Wednesday, August 10, 2011
Abstract Thoughts on Identity (7 May 2010)
This Eurozine article by Amy Allen about subjectivity and autonomy got me thinking about identity as site for capitalist development. The frontiers are gone; the new colonies are within the networked territory of the self.
I tend to take it as a given that our sense of individuality - our reflexive identity -- is an effect of the sort of society we live in. It requires a certain sort of society to prompt us to discover our individuality, to make self-absorption a seemingly more valuable activity than losing oneself in engagement with the world. Identity is an effect of power (as Foucaldian theory puts it) that has singled us out for some particular form of scrutiny or flattering attention -- the point is to control us by telling us who we are and having us believe it. For an identity of that sort to develop, we have to be recognized by a force outside of us (marketers, the police, doctors, teachers, bosses, peers) in order to see our own uniqueness, otherwise we would simply be lost in the sensations of our own experience. The outside force becomes the organizing principle for our inchoate sensations, structuring our ideas about which of those sensations and responses are "us" and which are incidental, contingent, irrelevant. The attention we get teaches us which responses and feelings we should regard as authentic, integral to the self, and which we should regard as roles, pretenses, strategies.
The attention we are paid is always motivated by some purpose beyond our self-development; our self-awareness is an effect, a by-product of whatever it is that has led to our being noticed. Retailers want to sell us goods; as a by-product we come to recognize ourselves in the lifestyle that they have ferreted out in us and people like us. Our identity seems to precede the purchase of the lifestyle goods, but it is actually an ex post facto explanation or rationalization. The purchases are organizing our impulses into an identity; a coherent, innate identity isn't prompting the impulses. Allen cites Habermas's claim that individuation develops as a response to our socialization:
But what this suggests also is that self-awareness is at one further remove of alienation from our ordinary consciousness. Self-awareness is not our becoming aware of some intrinsic being we were destined at birth to become -- it is not the discovery of authenticity within. We become individuals only within a social context; it is not some inborn proclivity. We have impulses, social institutions shape them into an identity, and then we react to that alienated identity and call it ourselves. That is to say, it only makes sense to be self-aware of our individuality in relation to what others think of us, which suggests that self-awareness is an internalized form of what we suspect or intuit others are thinking of us, and is distinct from mere consciousness, or our internal monologue that is preoccupied primarily with everything but the self.
Self-awareness is a process that attenuates identity and furthers its development, its "growth" (though its size can't really be measured, even though the data-obsessed wish it could be) or its momentum. I see the whole idea of "growing" an identity and tracking its growth as a ramification of networked consumer capitalism. Instead of an identity that derives from integrating experiences, we are encouraged to conceive of a process of accumulation akin to that of capitalist firms. This takes our critical self-appreciation and turns it into an engine for self-extension, manifesting itself as a craving for novelty, a penchant for growing bored, a general dissatisfaction with oneself. Rather than achieve a "steady-state" self, that sort of identity is roundly derided as abrogation of personal potential; instead we must experience and consume as much as possible to prove that we are continuing to "grow as individuals" -- prove we are "really alive".
Autonomy is not freedom from power relations making us who we are -- instead power enables us to recognize ourselves and thus gives us a way to see what we do as autonomous. Autonomy is a gift from power, not an escape from it. Consumerism permits us to express our autonomy, experience our own autonomy reflected back to us, through a series of purchasing decisions, elevated to the level of ontological referendums. Can you make yourself sufficiently free to dare to buy that new car and take on all the responsibility for the messages it will send? Will you seize control of the discourse constituting you by sending as many symbolic messages by way of consumer choices as possible? The networked society magnifies the import of these decisions and expands their ability to function as symbolic communication -- a mode of communication more authentic than mere language because it carries a material weight, a cost. Identity is not what we say but what we do -- which in a consumer society is buy things. In this recent FT piece Habermas puts that point across in his own inimitable style: "liberal confidence in the idea of an autonomous life is now confined to the individual freedom of choice of consumers who are living off the drip-feed of contingent opportunity structures."
Another example of contingent opportunity structures are social networks, which capture the self but allow that process of capture to feel like liberation, because it gives the self a concrete mode of expression across a broader field. The way our identity can be used instrumentally on the networks seems an elaboration, an enhancement of autonomy even though it is a constriction of what we can do to forms dictated by the platform. (Subjectivity -- there's an app for that.)
I tend to take it as a given that our sense of individuality - our reflexive identity -- is an effect of the sort of society we live in. It requires a certain sort of society to prompt us to discover our individuality, to make self-absorption a seemingly more valuable activity than losing oneself in engagement with the world. Identity is an effect of power (as Foucaldian theory puts it) that has singled us out for some particular form of scrutiny or flattering attention -- the point is to control us by telling us who we are and having us believe it. For an identity of that sort to develop, we have to be recognized by a force outside of us (marketers, the police, doctors, teachers, bosses, peers) in order to see our own uniqueness, otherwise we would simply be lost in the sensations of our own experience. The outside force becomes the organizing principle for our inchoate sensations, structuring our ideas about which of those sensations and responses are "us" and which are incidental, contingent, irrelevant. The attention we get teaches us which responses and feelings we should regard as authentic, integral to the self, and which we should regard as roles, pretenses, strategies.
The attention we are paid is always motivated by some purpose beyond our self-development; our self-awareness is an effect, a by-product of whatever it is that has led to our being noticed. Retailers want to sell us goods; as a by-product we come to recognize ourselves in the lifestyle that they have ferreted out in us and people like us. Our identity seems to precede the purchase of the lifestyle goods, but it is actually an ex post facto explanation or rationalization. The purchases are organizing our impulses into an identity; a coherent, innate identity isn't prompting the impulses. Allen cites Habermas's claim that individuation develops as a response to our socialization:
Habermas views individuals as produced through but not determined by socialization. As he puts it, "identity is produced through socialization, that is, through the fact that the growing child first of all integrates into a specific social system by appropriating symbolic generalities; it is later secured and developed through individuation, that is, precisely through a growing independence in relation to social systems." This is because linguistic and moral development generates capacities for autonomy and reflexivity that enable socialized individuals to take up a critically reflexive stance on their own socialization processes.The presumption is that language (or institutional discourses, etc.) constitutes a self who then learns to master language and reshape the self to suit his own ends. Self-awareness ultimately takes the form of rejecting serially the sort of person our upbringing and social situation has made us.
But what this suggests also is that self-awareness is at one further remove of alienation from our ordinary consciousness. Self-awareness is not our becoming aware of some intrinsic being we were destined at birth to become -- it is not the discovery of authenticity within. We become individuals only within a social context; it is not some inborn proclivity. We have impulses, social institutions shape them into an identity, and then we react to that alienated identity and call it ourselves. That is to say, it only makes sense to be self-aware of our individuality in relation to what others think of us, which suggests that self-awareness is an internalized form of what we suspect or intuit others are thinking of us, and is distinct from mere consciousness, or our internal monologue that is preoccupied primarily with everything but the self.
Self-awareness is a process that attenuates identity and furthers its development, its "growth" (though its size can't really be measured, even though the data-obsessed wish it could be) or its momentum. I see the whole idea of "growing" an identity and tracking its growth as a ramification of networked consumer capitalism. Instead of an identity that derives from integrating experiences, we are encouraged to conceive of a process of accumulation akin to that of capitalist firms. This takes our critical self-appreciation and turns it into an engine for self-extension, manifesting itself as a craving for novelty, a penchant for growing bored, a general dissatisfaction with oneself. Rather than achieve a "steady-state" self, that sort of identity is roundly derided as abrogation of personal potential; instead we must experience and consume as much as possible to prove that we are continuing to "grow as individuals" -- prove we are "really alive".
Autonomy is not freedom from power relations making us who we are -- instead power enables us to recognize ourselves and thus gives us a way to see what we do as autonomous. Autonomy is a gift from power, not an escape from it. Consumerism permits us to express our autonomy, experience our own autonomy reflected back to us, through a series of purchasing decisions, elevated to the level of ontological referendums. Can you make yourself sufficiently free to dare to buy that new car and take on all the responsibility for the messages it will send? Will you seize control of the discourse constituting you by sending as many symbolic messages by way of consumer choices as possible? The networked society magnifies the import of these decisions and expands their ability to function as symbolic communication -- a mode of communication more authentic than mere language because it carries a material weight, a cost. Identity is not what we say but what we do -- which in a consumer society is buy things. In this recent FT piece Habermas puts that point across in his own inimitable style: "liberal confidence in the idea of an autonomous life is now confined to the individual freedom of choice of consumers who are living off the drip-feed of contingent opportunity structures."
Another example of contingent opportunity structures are social networks, which capture the self but allow that process of capture to feel like liberation, because it gives the self a concrete mode of expression across a broader field. The way our identity can be used instrumentally on the networks seems an elaboration, an enhancement of autonomy even though it is a constriction of what we can do to forms dictated by the platform. (Subjectivity -- there's an app for that.)
Thursday, July 21, 2011
Health insurance and personal responsibility (20 June 2009)
Conor Friedersdorf -- currently blogging for the Atlantic's ideas blog -- made an interesting point about this WSJ op-ed about grocery chain Safeway's health-care plan. In the op-ed, Safeway's CEO touted how his company's health-careplan emphasized personal responsibility as a means to control costs:
Friedersdorf says as much, but also points out the downfall of such a plan -- where do you draw the line on what sort of behaviors insurance companies should be permitted to police? Isn't monitoring for "unhealthy" behavior a wedge for introducing Minority Report-style total surveillance? With a note of libertarian alarm, Friedersdorf writes, "Smoking today. Alcohol, downhill skiing, and premarital sex tomorrow? Pricing unhealthy habits means testing for them in ways intrusive enough to reliably detect them. What are your vices? Do you want your employer or your government determining which vices cost you money?" Or do you even want that data, for that matter, cataloged somewhere, becoming an albatross around you worse than a credit report? Instead of prison-inspired panopticism, perhaps the Foucaldian nightmare that awaits us is a medicalized one, along the lines of The Birth of the Clinic. The state derives new power and leverage from its control of the social definition of health.
Of all the arguments against nationalized health-care, this seems to me the strongest: that once taxpayers are footing the bill for the avoidable health risks other citizens take on, it's only a matter of time those taxpayers demand further regulation of those risk-taking individuals' behavior. And whether or not something constitutes a health risk is open to a lot of interpretation (think of the nebulous studies that lead science writers to proclaim the health risks or benefits of caffeine, red wine, etc., etc.) -- it could become a site of ideological struggle, with healthfulness being used as a pretense to prescribe certain standard, predictable ways of life. After all, insurers' main concern is risk that can't be anticipated and controlled. The social pressure toward conformity could become even stronger than it already is now. It's a wonder old-school conservatives -- who want nothing more than to prescribe a "traditional" lifestyle -- aren't more in favor of state-supplied health care.
Perhaps the future of health care will involve private insurers undercutting the cost of the state-offered plan, and a mandate that all individuals be covered. (That's part of what makes the auto-insurance market work.) If you want to pay extra for privacy, you can opt for the national plan. If you are comfortable having your health data monitored to save a few dollars, a private insurer could offer that.
Safeway's plan capitalizes on two key insights gained in 2005. The first is that 70% of all health-care costs are the direct result of behavior. The second insight, which is well understood by the providers of health care, is that 74% of all costs are confined to four chronic conditions (cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes and obesity). Furthermore, 80% of cardiovascular disease and diabetes is preventable, 60% of cancers are preventable, and more than 90% of obesity is preventable.This seems like an expression of a classic conservative position: In the last analysis, individuals can shape their living conditions in a meaningful way and consequently can be held responsible for their own suffering. Charging high-risk people ("fair risk pricing") more for their insurance seems to make good common sense; they should have their insurance coverage supply a sort of moral hazard. Probably no one says to themselves, "Fuck quitting smoking. If I get lung cancer, my insurance will pay for it," but they may not take the sort of precautions to prevent illness because nothing in the structure of their lives provides a incentive counterbalance to the immediate pleasures (such as they are) of smoking, drinking, eating poorly, getting a tattoo, etc. (It's worth noting that currently, in some private plans, certain sorts of preventive care are regarded as elective care and thus are not always covered.) It seems obvious to build an insurance system that rewards healthy behavior in patients and penalizes known unhealthy behaviors.
As much as we would like to take credit for being a health-care innovator, Safeway has done nothing more than borrow from the well-tested automobile insurance model. For decades, driving behavior has been correlated with accident risk and has therefore translated into premium differences among drivers. Stated somewhat differently, the auto-insurance industry has long recognized the role of personal responsibility. As a result, bad behaviors (like speeding, tickets for failure to follow the rules of the road, and frequency of accidents) are considered when establishing insurance premiums. Bad driver premiums are not subsidized by the good driver premiums.
Friedersdorf says as much, but also points out the downfall of such a plan -- where do you draw the line on what sort of behaviors insurance companies should be permitted to police? Isn't monitoring for "unhealthy" behavior a wedge for introducing Minority Report-style total surveillance? With a note of libertarian alarm, Friedersdorf writes, "Smoking today. Alcohol, downhill skiing, and premarital sex tomorrow? Pricing unhealthy habits means testing for them in ways intrusive enough to reliably detect them. What are your vices? Do you want your employer or your government determining which vices cost you money?" Or do you even want that data, for that matter, cataloged somewhere, becoming an albatross around you worse than a credit report? Instead of prison-inspired panopticism, perhaps the Foucaldian nightmare that awaits us is a medicalized one, along the lines of The Birth of the Clinic. The state derives new power and leverage from its control of the social definition of health.
Of all the arguments against nationalized health-care, this seems to me the strongest: that once taxpayers are footing the bill for the avoidable health risks other citizens take on, it's only a matter of time those taxpayers demand further regulation of those risk-taking individuals' behavior. And whether or not something constitutes a health risk is open to a lot of interpretation (think of the nebulous studies that lead science writers to proclaim the health risks or benefits of caffeine, red wine, etc., etc.) -- it could become a site of ideological struggle, with healthfulness being used as a pretense to prescribe certain standard, predictable ways of life. After all, insurers' main concern is risk that can't be anticipated and controlled. The social pressure toward conformity could become even stronger than it already is now. It's a wonder old-school conservatives -- who want nothing more than to prescribe a "traditional" lifestyle -- aren't more in favor of state-supplied health care.
Perhaps the future of health care will involve private insurers undercutting the cost of the state-offered plan, and a mandate that all individuals be covered. (That's part of what makes the auto-insurance market work.) If you want to pay extra for privacy, you can opt for the national plan. If you are comfortable having your health data monitored to save a few dollars, a private insurer could offer that.
Labels:
foucault,
health care,
surveillance
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
Foucault's Facebook (18 March 2009)
This Gawker item about the Facebook redesign offers a useful phrase for thinking about Twitterification generally: We are expected to be, or become, "omnivorous consumers of momentary trivia." Not only that, but we are expected to produce that trivia ceaselessly and eagerly. This calls to mind Foucault's ideas about power exercising itself not as repression -- that is, as forbidding us to speak or to act in certain ways -- but as permission, as a kind of broad encouragement to speak (albeit through discourses that constitute our identities along certain prescribed lines). Our participation lets power work through us, which we can experience as being exciting -- as being part of the action; we are all under surveillance, but we understand that emotionally as "Hey, we're all celebrities!" Foucault calls it "control by stimulation." This is why people seem to feel compelled to use Twitter. We want to participate, want to be counted, want to count.
I assume someone out there is working on a dissertation (or has at least posted a really incisive blog entry -- maybe among these) that does a Foucaldian analysis of social media (which I would be eager to read actually) -- it fits so well with his predictions of a panoptic society. We are spying on each other (that's certainly how it feels when someone tags me in a high school photo), and confessing ourselves to everybody else (in hourly 140-character broadcasts), and mistaking it all for entertainment consumption, ordinary leisure activities.
Social media tends to be understood as a kind of freedom to express ourselves in a new way; interactivity liberates us from one-way communication and affords us the opportunity to speak and participate. But this "freedom" can function as a kind of compulsion, as part of what Baudrillard et al. called the "fun morality." Foucault insisted that power is both decentralized (not a matter of some authority telling you what you must do) and productive (it allows more things to have a kind of social being, not fewer; creates more data, not less). In an interview in Power/Knowledge, he says, "What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse." Various modern technologies have brought about what he calls "a new economy of power" that allows "the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted, and 'individualized' throughout the entire social body." In other words, there is no way to sneak around power because we are basically bathing in it, breathing it in and out at all times. Twitter-style discourse is the latest instance of a social discourse that functions this way, reinforcing the compulsion to confess. The "effects of power" Foucault is talking about, I think, is a matter of our being available -- power makes us available to various social institutions so that are efforts can be harvested and our behavior channeled accordingly without our even conceiving of resistance.
I assume someone out there is working on a dissertation (or has at least posted a really incisive blog entry -- maybe among these) that does a Foucaldian analysis of social media (which I would be eager to read actually) -- it fits so well with his predictions of a panoptic society. We are spying on each other (that's certainly how it feels when someone tags me in a high school photo), and confessing ourselves to everybody else (in hourly 140-character broadcasts), and mistaking it all for entertainment consumption, ordinary leisure activities.
Social media tends to be understood as a kind of freedom to express ourselves in a new way; interactivity liberates us from one-way communication and affords us the opportunity to speak and participate. But this "freedom" can function as a kind of compulsion, as part of what Baudrillard et al. called the "fun morality." Foucault insisted that power is both decentralized (not a matter of some authority telling you what you must do) and productive (it allows more things to have a kind of social being, not fewer; creates more data, not less). In an interview in Power/Knowledge, he says, "What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse." Various modern technologies have brought about what he calls "a new economy of power" that allows "the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted, and 'individualized' throughout the entire social body." In other words, there is no way to sneak around power because we are basically bathing in it, breathing it in and out at all times. Twitter-style discourse is the latest instance of a social discourse that functions this way, reinforcing the compulsion to confess. The "effects of power" Foucault is talking about, I think, is a matter of our being available -- power makes us available to various social institutions so that are efforts can be harvested and our behavior channeled accordingly without our even conceiving of resistance.
Labels:
facebook,
false presence,
foucault,
fun morality,
identity,
social media,
surveillance,
twitter
Sunday, November 7, 2010
Hayekian literary studies (3 January 2007)
I keep suspecting MLA types will eventually seize upon Hayek for fresh philosophical underpinnings sufficient to generate new readings of the lit classics. This would perhaps satisfy increasingly whiny right-wing critics of academia's liberal bias (Michael Berube's dismissal of that myth notwithstanding) and provide a new direction for theory to go now that the profession is "beyond" or "after" theory. Sure enough, Emory University English professor Mark Bauerlein recently published this article in the Chronicle of Higher Education about the alleged liberal conspiracy against Hayek in favor of Foucault (who, strangely enough, in his latter days actually went around encouraging people to read Hayek, whose ideas about spontaneous order resemble Foucault's account of power dispersed in institutions.)
But a familiarity with philosophical underpinnings of modern capitalism -- via classical economists Adam Smith and Ricardo and more recent apologists like Milton Friedman -- to balance the Marxist critiques that often are introduced in literary theory and cultural studies classes would probably be a good thing. It's no good citing Marxist theory without understanding which parts of it are generally held by all credible economists to be bunk. And I think that commercialism and the logic of business has a lot more to do with literary developments than the various romantic mystifications of genius and aesthetic innovation.
Anyway, I had been wondering what the trojan horse might be for smuggling Hayek into cultural studies programs. This essay is a start: Reason's blog points readers to this article by Paul Cantor, which applies Hayek's notion of spontaneous order to television-show development and exemplifies what Hayekian literary studies might look like. (Obviously I'll have my eye out for the forthcoming Literature and Economics: Studies in Spontaneous Order, which Cantor co-edited with Steven Cox as well.) Cantor asserts that falling back on spontaneous order is a good way of skirting the all-too-common (I do it all the time) logical inanity of attributing agency to art works that don't lend themselves to the kind of close reading that ascribes authorial intention to every minute choice -- things like TV shows and Shakespeare's plays, since these were likely shaped in performance and written down later. Spontaneous order can be seen as variation on the Romantic (and New Critical) ideal of organic form, which evolves dialectically in regard to content so that they suit each other perfectly. And better yet, this view demotes the lone genius working in opposition to society and replaces him with a celebration of collaboration, of art-making as not a mystical process reserved for special people (rich, elite, overeducated) but as a quotidian process of ordinary people pooling and specializing their talents. "The idea of spontaneous order always seems counterintuitive to us; as human beings we evidently are conditioned to attribute order to an individual orderer. That is why the ideas of both Smith and Darwin (not to mention Hayek) encountered so much initial resistance and are rejected to this day by many people. But if one recognizes the various kinds of feedback mechanisms at work in popular culture, one begins to see that it is possible for it to lack a centrally ordering agent and yet be self-regulating and self-perfecting." It's the last part that likely causes the most trouble -- not only are we reluctant to grant agency to the workings of an unmanaged system, but we are unwilling to accept that as the best of all possible results on account of there being no self-interest director (or state apparatchik) orchestrating it all. And feedback loops and spontaneous orderings often yield nonoptimal results -- American Idol, for instance. But yet it may be nonoptimal only to my elitist aesthetic. Cantor cites this cautionary advice from literary critic Franco Moretti: "If it is perverse to believe that the market always rewards the better solution, it is just as perverse to believe that it always rewards the worse one!" Actually there is nothing perverse about such a belief: Disdaining what's popular (and what popular taste has shaped via the market) is a sure way of protecting the power that derives from your intellectual capital -- you believe that judging what is best requires that special training that you, fortunately enough, have managed to acquire. Aesthetics are a disguised way of exercising arbitrary power, and markets thus seem democratic because they democratize the aesthetic, or make it something collectively decided. But the market is no panacea; it's distorted by the different advantages (more money, political capital) participants bring to it. You must have the capital (the connections, the money, etc) to get your TV show made before spontaneous order can begin to perfect it, and that capital already embeds decisions that have nothing to do with what might have been spontaneously demanded. In other words, we still fight over control of where to fix the starting points and parameters within which market processes, creative and liberating as they may be, will work.
While Hayek's defense of free markets (for which he won the Nobel prize in economics in 1974) influenced global politics far more than Foucault's analyses of social institutions like psychiatry and prisons, the two thinkers enjoy contrary standing in the liberal-arts curriculum. Hayek's work in economics has a fair presence in that field, and his social writings reach libertarians in the business school, but in the humanities and most of the social sciences he doesn't even exist. When I was in graduate school in the 1980s, a week didn't pass without Foucault igniting discussion, but I can't remember hearing Hayek's name. In those heady days of politically framed cultural criticism, academic intellectuals formed a vanguard of cosmopolitan insight and ideological unmasking (so they said), but their range of reference fell short.Bauerlein concludes that "it would be healthy for everyone if the academic curriculum broadened its scope, if the lineage of conservatism were consolidated into a respectable course of study — that is, if Hayek won one-tenth the attention that Foucault receives." He imagines such a course in conservative thought would build up from Burke and Tocqueville to such contemporary luminaries as Harvey Mansfield (author of much-derided book about manliness), cultural-literacy dogmatist E.D. Hirsch, and Dinesh D'Sousa, whose most recent book blames the "cultural left" for 9/11. Wow, the promise of such a course is almost enough to make me wish I was a graduate student again. (Not really.) When I was in school, my sense was that English department conservatives wanted to teach literary appreciation courses in the established classics and couldn't fathom why students wouldn't want a warm bath in the luxuriance of the great works. These people were against ideas generally (and wouldn't have ever even considered the possibility of praxis) and preferred subjective pronouncements about aesthetic quality backed up by tradition. The entire profession of literature studies for them seemed to be about deciding which works were "great." This led me to think aesthetics themselves were a conservative conspiracy (a view which Eagleton's Ideology of the Aesthetic did much to foster).
But a familiarity with philosophical underpinnings of modern capitalism -- via classical economists Adam Smith and Ricardo and more recent apologists like Milton Friedman -- to balance the Marxist critiques that often are introduced in literary theory and cultural studies classes would probably be a good thing. It's no good citing Marxist theory without understanding which parts of it are generally held by all credible economists to be bunk. And I think that commercialism and the logic of business has a lot more to do with literary developments than the various romantic mystifications of genius and aesthetic innovation.
Anyway, I had been wondering what the trojan horse might be for smuggling Hayek into cultural studies programs. This essay is a start: Reason's blog points readers to this article by Paul Cantor, which applies Hayek's notion of spontaneous order to television-show development and exemplifies what Hayekian literary studies might look like. (Obviously I'll have my eye out for the forthcoming Literature and Economics: Studies in Spontaneous Order, which Cantor co-edited with Steven Cox as well.) Cantor asserts that falling back on spontaneous order is a good way of skirting the all-too-common (I do it all the time) logical inanity of attributing agency to art works that don't lend themselves to the kind of close reading that ascribes authorial intention to every minute choice -- things like TV shows and Shakespeare's plays, since these were likely shaped in performance and written down later. Spontaneous order can be seen as variation on the Romantic (and New Critical) ideal of organic form, which evolves dialectically in regard to content so that they suit each other perfectly. And better yet, this view demotes the lone genius working in opposition to society and replaces him with a celebration of collaboration, of art-making as not a mystical process reserved for special people (rich, elite, overeducated) but as a quotidian process of ordinary people pooling and specializing their talents. "The idea of spontaneous order always seems counterintuitive to us; as human beings we evidently are conditioned to attribute order to an individual orderer. That is why the ideas of both Smith and Darwin (not to mention Hayek) encountered so much initial resistance and are rejected to this day by many people. But if one recognizes the various kinds of feedback mechanisms at work in popular culture, one begins to see that it is possible for it to lack a centrally ordering agent and yet be self-regulating and self-perfecting." It's the last part that likely causes the most trouble -- not only are we reluctant to grant agency to the workings of an unmanaged system, but we are unwilling to accept that as the best of all possible results on account of there being no self-interest director (or state apparatchik) orchestrating it all. And feedback loops and spontaneous orderings often yield nonoptimal results -- American Idol, for instance. But yet it may be nonoptimal only to my elitist aesthetic. Cantor cites this cautionary advice from literary critic Franco Moretti: "If it is perverse to believe that the market always rewards the better solution, it is just as perverse to believe that it always rewards the worse one!" Actually there is nothing perverse about such a belief: Disdaining what's popular (and what popular taste has shaped via the market) is a sure way of protecting the power that derives from your intellectual capital -- you believe that judging what is best requires that special training that you, fortunately enough, have managed to acquire. Aesthetics are a disguised way of exercising arbitrary power, and markets thus seem democratic because they democratize the aesthetic, or make it something collectively decided. But the market is no panacea; it's distorted by the different advantages (more money, political capital) participants bring to it. You must have the capital (the connections, the money, etc) to get your TV show made before spontaneous order can begin to perfect it, and that capital already embeds decisions that have nothing to do with what might have been spontaneously demanded. In other words, we still fight over control of where to fix the starting points and parameters within which market processes, creative and liberating as they may be, will work.
Instilling the fear of success (26 December 2006)
Few people in America experience the direct application of power -- in other words, they generally don't have people telling them what to do without some semblance of a voluntary contract being in place. Instead power seems distributed throughout society and tends to work without anyone being responsible; everyone seems to be getting their orders from somewhere else, forming a never-ending chain, or they are operating by instinct or from what seems like common sense. This can seem like freedom and may perhaps be a necessary precondition for what we understand as freedom: being left alone by our neighbors and our government.
But it would be wrong to conflate our inability to perceive the ways in which power circumscribes our lives (or to recognize the forces responsible for these limitations) with autonomy. Autonomy, in a culture that fetishizes independence and individuality, is less an ontological condition than an experiential good. Much of our interactions in consumer society involve our attempts to buy the feeling of control; we shop so that we may exercise our freedom of choice, our consumer sovereignty. This compensates for the ways in which our social mobility is, in practice, limited and how class hampers our judgment and dictates the behavior we then assume complete responsibility for.
Foucault's historical studies are basically about this process -- how power comes to reside in social institutions (hospitals, prisons, universities) and concepts (sexuality, gender, mental health) and then exercise itself with no particular agent directing the process. Reading these works tends to leave me heavy with doom, hopelessly trapped in invisible prisons that no one builds and no one can tear down. However, capitalist ideologues usually portray diffused power positively, locating it in the market, which is then virtually deified as a near-flawless system for aggregating and distributing information about what a society wants collectively. Hayek depicts this as spontaneous order, which has the nonpareil benefit of preventing bureaucrats from telling you what you must think and do. And capitalism yields not a iron-clad status system girded with the additional insult of making your class seem like your own fault, but "creative destruction" that allows each generation to remake the social order new, with nothing but merit and efficiency to guide it. If only. Actually the market can be rigged to conserve privilege, to protect class prerogatives that assure that more of what goods and opportunities society produces go to a select few elites, who then retrospectively justify their rewards with specious claims of merit, tradition or divine right. With the market responsible, the beneficiaries can feel as though they have clean hands, while the victims begin to look in the mirror for who to blame for failure in a quasi-meritocracy.
In The Hidden Injuries of Class Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb delineate this process by looking at the aspirations of working-class immigrants in America in the mid 20th century, concluding that workers are both propelled and held back by an ideology of individualism. Being recognized as an individual is a classic positional good; you can only have it and enjoy it if your peers don't. But by claiming it, by making a case for why one should stand out from the mediocre mass and assuming dignity can come only from being recognized as such (for Sennett and Cobb this is the essence of how class societies function), one alienates himself from his peers, depriving oneself of the solace of community without really securing admission to another receptive community. Instead social climbers find themselves out on the limb, alienated and isolated in their aspirational nuclear family unit, taking consolatory pride in their apparent independence or self-sabotaging as they try to reconcile the contradictions foisted on them by a hereditary status system that pretends to be egalitarian.
As Cobb and Sennett argue, this self-sabotage -- the feelings of guilt or confusion or insecurity or inadequacy -- is how class society manages to wound and cripple the lower orders without anyone higher up in the social hierarchy seeming directly responsible. No one intentionally prohibits you from finding success; we end up excluding ourselves, as this proves easier to live with than a rigged system. (Better to feel like you lost the game than to think the refs threw it.)
One way in which this plays out is in the pursuit of meaningful work, glamour jobs that provide status and allow you to indulge your individual talents. Because these jobs often have to do with generating "original" and "creative" product, it's easy to imagine they are distributed according to merit -- the people who do the best work inevitably get the jobs. But this is obviously false; these jobs are scarce and our educational system generates far too many qualified candidates. (Our educational system is perhaps too egalitarian, or from the other perspective, state-supported schools are diploma mills that perpetuate their own existence and funding by lowering standards and processing more and more students.)
When I was getting a graduate degree in English, it became all too apparent to me, going to conferences and seeing all the other eager competitors for those ultrarare tenure track jobs at universities, that there were going to be a lot of unhappy and unemployable PhDs, overqualified for anything but the one job they were acutely trained to perform. It also occurred to me that society almost certainly didn't need this many literature professors, and something had gone horribly wrong in society's allocation of educational resources to produce so many people like me. I probably should have been discouraged from my course at a much earlier juncture than two years into a dissertation. Perhaps I should have listened to the inner voices of failure sooner.
One way to disqualify candidates is to require them to work for free in unpaid internships or to live on subsistence stipends while accruing the necessary certifications in graduate school. This rules out anyone who doesn't have another source of income (inherited from parents, say) to fall back on. Another disqualification method is to require social capital -- make sure they know someone who can recommend them and vouch for them. This requires having the kind of connections that elites take for granted, knowing someone in admissions at this elite school or in HR at this elite employer. Or you have to have the wherewithal to be in the pipeline for job openings (or elite unpaid internships) that aren't publicly advertised but instead are announced through established grapevines. Access to these networks stems from class advantage, and keeping these networks exclusive is how a class polices its borders. But when all that fails to discourage applicants for prestige jobs, society falls back on what sometimes is known in self-help books as "the fear of success" -- we sabotage ourselves because we internalize the belief that we don't deserve to advance.
Cobb and Sennett argue that in a putative democracy with an open social structure, the makeup of the various classes is more or less preserved by baiting lower class people to engage in a zero-sum game for dignity (never seen as secure, a given by virtue of being human), doled out by higher-ups for reasons we can never fully apprehend (Sennett and Cobb write, "What is in you that commands the approval of others? You can't know this, but someone can.... Power in the organization, like the God of Weber's early Protestants, knows about you what you do not know about yourself"). This competition, whose rules continually change and render contestants passive and fatalistic, cripples people with self-doubt and encourages them to remove themselves from the running for high-status positions that are technically open to all, positions they end up feeling they somehow inherently don't deserve. "The psychological motivation instilled by a class society is to heal a doubt about the self rather than create more power over things and other persons in the outer world," Sennett and Cobb assert. Consequently, the idea of agency beyond the boundaries of one's own psyche becomes ever more remote. Passivity becomes common sense, which intensifies the pleasures of spectatorship that make advertising and entertainment function, reinforcing their appeal and the passivity itself in a feedback loop.
This passivity spills over into self-doubt, which further fuels the fear of success -- the unwillingness to assume greater responsibilities, which seem capable of being met by the application of one's natural talents but are actually a matter of class habitus, having a familiarity with social mores and conventions and access to social networks. Combine that confusion of means and ends with the contempt other competitors from their class -- their former friends -- will feel for them if they succeed and you can see why workers disqualify themselves and don't even try for advancement. Instead they try to deflect attention and struggle along independently, while subsisting as spectators of real life, what is going on in celebrity land or in the pages of the newspaper.
It's not hard to imagine scarce goods other than prestige jobs being preserved in this fashion -- consider health care, which is getting scarcer (more expensive) all the time. Society wants to preserve the illusion of universal care it can't afford to provide, so it can enlist the class system and the injured dignity it produces to convince lower class people that they don't deserve the same kind of singled-out attention from their doctors that their betters are accustomed to. Instead they will be treated in second-rate clinics staffed with overworked, underpaid health care providers, and processed as though they were faulty machines in for assembly-line repair. And they will be grateful that they didn't attract unsavory attention from anyone along the way. If I had more time, I could bring this back to Foucault's Birth of the Clinic and suggest this self-defeating class strategy masquerades as elusive independence, skirting the repressive mechanisms of power by losing oneself in the margins, but you get the idea.
But it would be wrong to conflate our inability to perceive the ways in which power circumscribes our lives (or to recognize the forces responsible for these limitations) with autonomy. Autonomy, in a culture that fetishizes independence and individuality, is less an ontological condition than an experiential good. Much of our interactions in consumer society involve our attempts to buy the feeling of control; we shop so that we may exercise our freedom of choice, our consumer sovereignty. This compensates for the ways in which our social mobility is, in practice, limited and how class hampers our judgment and dictates the behavior we then assume complete responsibility for.
Foucault's historical studies are basically about this process -- how power comes to reside in social institutions (hospitals, prisons, universities) and concepts (sexuality, gender, mental health) and then exercise itself with no particular agent directing the process. Reading these works tends to leave me heavy with doom, hopelessly trapped in invisible prisons that no one builds and no one can tear down. However, capitalist ideologues usually portray diffused power positively, locating it in the market, which is then virtually deified as a near-flawless system for aggregating and distributing information about what a society wants collectively. Hayek depicts this as spontaneous order, which has the nonpareil benefit of preventing bureaucrats from telling you what you must think and do. And capitalism yields not a iron-clad status system girded with the additional insult of making your class seem like your own fault, but "creative destruction" that allows each generation to remake the social order new, with nothing but merit and efficiency to guide it. If only. Actually the market can be rigged to conserve privilege, to protect class prerogatives that assure that more of what goods and opportunities society produces go to a select few elites, who then retrospectively justify their rewards with specious claims of merit, tradition or divine right. With the market responsible, the beneficiaries can feel as though they have clean hands, while the victims begin to look in the mirror for who to blame for failure in a quasi-meritocracy.
In The Hidden Injuries of Class Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb delineate this process by looking at the aspirations of working-class immigrants in America in the mid 20th century, concluding that workers are both propelled and held back by an ideology of individualism. Being recognized as an individual is a classic positional good; you can only have it and enjoy it if your peers don't. But by claiming it, by making a case for why one should stand out from the mediocre mass and assuming dignity can come only from being recognized as such (for Sennett and Cobb this is the essence of how class societies function), one alienates himself from his peers, depriving oneself of the solace of community without really securing admission to another receptive community. Instead social climbers find themselves out on the limb, alienated and isolated in their aspirational nuclear family unit, taking consolatory pride in their apparent independence or self-sabotaging as they try to reconcile the contradictions foisted on them by a hereditary status system that pretends to be egalitarian.
As Cobb and Sennett argue, this self-sabotage -- the feelings of guilt or confusion or insecurity or inadequacy -- is how class society manages to wound and cripple the lower orders without anyone higher up in the social hierarchy seeming directly responsible. No one intentionally prohibits you from finding success; we end up excluding ourselves, as this proves easier to live with than a rigged system. (Better to feel like you lost the game than to think the refs threw it.)
One way in which this plays out is in the pursuit of meaningful work, glamour jobs that provide status and allow you to indulge your individual talents. Because these jobs often have to do with generating "original" and "creative" product, it's easy to imagine they are distributed according to merit -- the people who do the best work inevitably get the jobs. But this is obviously false; these jobs are scarce and our educational system generates far too many qualified candidates. (Our educational system is perhaps too egalitarian, or from the other perspective, state-supported schools are diploma mills that perpetuate their own existence and funding by lowering standards and processing more and more students.)
When I was getting a graduate degree in English, it became all too apparent to me, going to conferences and seeing all the other eager competitors for those ultrarare tenure track jobs at universities, that there were going to be a lot of unhappy and unemployable PhDs, overqualified for anything but the one job they were acutely trained to perform. It also occurred to me that society almost certainly didn't need this many literature professors, and something had gone horribly wrong in society's allocation of educational resources to produce so many people like me. I probably should have been discouraged from my course at a much earlier juncture than two years into a dissertation. Perhaps I should have listened to the inner voices of failure sooner.
One way to disqualify candidates is to require them to work for free in unpaid internships or to live on subsistence stipends while accruing the necessary certifications in graduate school. This rules out anyone who doesn't have another source of income (inherited from parents, say) to fall back on. Another disqualification method is to require social capital -- make sure they know someone who can recommend them and vouch for them. This requires having the kind of connections that elites take for granted, knowing someone in admissions at this elite school or in HR at this elite employer. Or you have to have the wherewithal to be in the pipeline for job openings (or elite unpaid internships) that aren't publicly advertised but instead are announced through established grapevines. Access to these networks stems from class advantage, and keeping these networks exclusive is how a class polices its borders. But when all that fails to discourage applicants for prestige jobs, society falls back on what sometimes is known in self-help books as "the fear of success" -- we sabotage ourselves because we internalize the belief that we don't deserve to advance.
Cobb and Sennett argue that in a putative democracy with an open social structure, the makeup of the various classes is more or less preserved by baiting lower class people to engage in a zero-sum game for dignity (never seen as secure, a given by virtue of being human), doled out by higher-ups for reasons we can never fully apprehend (Sennett and Cobb write, "What is in you that commands the approval of others? You can't know this, but someone can.... Power in the organization, like the God of Weber's early Protestants, knows about you what you do not know about yourself"). This competition, whose rules continually change and render contestants passive and fatalistic, cripples people with self-doubt and encourages them to remove themselves from the running for high-status positions that are technically open to all, positions they end up feeling they somehow inherently don't deserve. "The psychological motivation instilled by a class society is to heal a doubt about the self rather than create more power over things and other persons in the outer world," Sennett and Cobb assert. Consequently, the idea of agency beyond the boundaries of one's own psyche becomes ever more remote. Passivity becomes common sense, which intensifies the pleasures of spectatorship that make advertising and entertainment function, reinforcing their appeal and the passivity itself in a feedback loop.
This passivity spills over into self-doubt, which further fuels the fear of success -- the unwillingness to assume greater responsibilities, which seem capable of being met by the application of one's natural talents but are actually a matter of class habitus, having a familiarity with social mores and conventions and access to social networks. Combine that confusion of means and ends with the contempt other competitors from their class -- their former friends -- will feel for them if they succeed and you can see why workers disqualify themselves and don't even try for advancement. Instead they try to deflect attention and struggle along independently, while subsisting as spectators of real life, what is going on in celebrity land or in the pages of the newspaper.
It's not hard to imagine scarce goods other than prestige jobs being preserved in this fashion -- consider health care, which is getting scarcer (more expensive) all the time. Society wants to preserve the illusion of universal care it can't afford to provide, so it can enlist the class system and the injured dignity it produces to convince lower class people that they don't deserve the same kind of singled-out attention from their doctors that their betters are accustomed to. Instead they will be treated in second-rate clinics staffed with overworked, underpaid health care providers, and processed as though they were faulty machines in for assembly-line repair. And they will be grateful that they didn't attract unsavory attention from anyone along the way. If I had more time, I could bring this back to Foucault's Birth of the Clinic and suggest this self-defeating class strategy masquerades as elusive independence, skirting the repressive mechanisms of power by losing oneself in the margins, but you get the idea.
Labels:
autonomy,
class warfare,
foucault,
spontaneous order,
status hierarchy
Friday, November 5, 2010
Youth as authenticity (17 October 2006)
In a consumer society, shopping is never strictly about the goods themselves. Because we by and large define ourselves through consumer choice rather than what we do, we use shopping as a means to answer larger questions than "What can I clean my dishes with?" and "How many pairs of socks do I need to get me through to laundry day?" We try to get at things like "Why I am I here?" "Who am I supposed to be?" and "How can I make sure I seem more important than him?" In other words, shopping becomes the field in which we pursue not just utility but meaning, we pursue objects that anchor reality, give it shape, remind us of our place within it while making us feel as though we have the power to shape it. (When I buy that new widescreen flat-panel monitor for my computer at home, I have in a very tangible way changed the shape of reality as I experience it.) We seek to access the wellspring of authenticity; we want triggers that remind us we are having a real experience.
N+1 editor Mark Greif, in an essay reprinted in the most recent Harper's, suggests that we collectively locate that fountain of authentic experience in sexualized children. He argues that we are socialized to regard our first sexual experiences as our first real experiences -- fumbling and awkward as they often are at the time, they become the core of all our nostalgic yearnings as we grow older, and advertising's efficacy derives from exploiting those forever-lost moments of pure possibility. "The lure of a permanent childhood in America" (and here I think of postcollegiate enclaves like Williamsburg, Brooklyn) "springs from the overwhelming feeling that one hasn't achieved one's true youth, because true youth would be defined by a sexual freedom so total that no one can attain it." Though we never know this kind of libidinal bliss, we acclimate ourselves to the notion we could have had it if only we weren't so stupid when we were young, and by having fleeting images of the erotic elysium repeatedly thrust before our eyes, we can't bring ourselves to let it go. Instead we let these images represent to ourselves what we should have been, what we were in our chrysalis, what we still might be now underneath the wear and tear of age. "From the desire to repossess what has been lost (or was never taken advantage of) comes the ceaseless extension of competition" -- competition for commodified youthfulness, now identified with desirability and authenticity, and conveniently enough, impossible to ever truly possess.
In Greif's view, this leads to sexualizing children, the bearers of youthful sexuality (the lodestone for our fantasies of recapturing authenticity) in its most pungent, concentrated form. "One fears our cultural preoccupation with pedophilia is not really about valuing childhood but about overvaluing child sex" -- the specter of pedophilia occults the images of youth used for marketing and sharpens their appeal. And even a cursory glimpse at Star or In Touch Weekly is enough to confirm the unsavory obsession with teenage celebrities and their budding sexuality. Even if we don't know their names or recognize their specific faces, they are the centrifuges capable of enriching inert consumer commodities with explosive energy. They serve as the matrix from which desires are manufactured and refreshed. They are humans as pure objects, without self-awareness but supercharged with the attention of others, they seem to promise that all the human qualities we yearn for can simply be possessed as objects -- purchased, even, from indifferent vendors -- rather than laboriously and tentatively teased out of rare fortuitous moments of existence after fraught, fragile interactions with those we care about.
This may explain why pedophilia was pointedly invoked with regard to the Foley scandal, which involved pages who were past the age of consent. Some argued this was a way to tar homosexuality, as though it was always a perversion like pedophilia; it may also be an expression of how our culture's instinct is to wish to expand the boundaries of youth, extend its domain and aura and enchant more of our shared experience. Because sexuality has become so bound up with the marketing of youth, it has become, in Greif's term, "a new kind of unfreedom" -- echoing Foucault's argument in the first volume of his History of Sexuality Greif argues that we are compelled to a sexual "liberation" that plays out as a compulsion to confess and be evaluated in terms of sexual standards not entirely our own but the social products of fashionability and novelty (the correlative of youthfulness). We are forbidden from not thinking about it.
Wisely, Harper's pairs Greif's essay with Chinese personal ads from people who aspire to asexuality yet seek the companionship of marriage. I wonder if it represents a specifically Chinese reaction to the encroachment of sexualized marketing that comes with consumer capitalism, or whether similar enclaves exist in America. Has it gotten so bad that asexuality could be the new distinction, the latest way to be cool?
N+1 editor Mark Greif, in an essay reprinted in the most recent Harper's, suggests that we collectively locate that fountain of authentic experience in sexualized children. He argues that we are socialized to regard our first sexual experiences as our first real experiences -- fumbling and awkward as they often are at the time, they become the core of all our nostalgic yearnings as we grow older, and advertising's efficacy derives from exploiting those forever-lost moments of pure possibility. "The lure of a permanent childhood in America" (and here I think of postcollegiate enclaves like Williamsburg, Brooklyn) "springs from the overwhelming feeling that one hasn't achieved one's true youth, because true youth would be defined by a sexual freedom so total that no one can attain it." Though we never know this kind of libidinal bliss, we acclimate ourselves to the notion we could have had it if only we weren't so stupid when we were young, and by having fleeting images of the erotic elysium repeatedly thrust before our eyes, we can't bring ourselves to let it go. Instead we let these images represent to ourselves what we should have been, what we were in our chrysalis, what we still might be now underneath the wear and tear of age. "From the desire to repossess what has been lost (or was never taken advantage of) comes the ceaseless extension of competition" -- competition for commodified youthfulness, now identified with desirability and authenticity, and conveniently enough, impossible to ever truly possess.
In Greif's view, this leads to sexualizing children, the bearers of youthful sexuality (the lodestone for our fantasies of recapturing authenticity) in its most pungent, concentrated form. "One fears our cultural preoccupation with pedophilia is not really about valuing childhood but about overvaluing child sex" -- the specter of pedophilia occults the images of youth used for marketing and sharpens their appeal. And even a cursory glimpse at Star or In Touch Weekly is enough to confirm the unsavory obsession with teenage celebrities and their budding sexuality. Even if we don't know their names or recognize their specific faces, they are the centrifuges capable of enriching inert consumer commodities with explosive energy. They serve as the matrix from which desires are manufactured and refreshed. They are humans as pure objects, without self-awareness but supercharged with the attention of others, they seem to promise that all the human qualities we yearn for can simply be possessed as objects -- purchased, even, from indifferent vendors -- rather than laboriously and tentatively teased out of rare fortuitous moments of existence after fraught, fragile interactions with those we care about.
This may explain why pedophilia was pointedly invoked with regard to the Foley scandal, which involved pages who were past the age of consent. Some argued this was a way to tar homosexuality, as though it was always a perversion like pedophilia; it may also be an expression of how our culture's instinct is to wish to expand the boundaries of youth, extend its domain and aura and enchant more of our shared experience. Because sexuality has become so bound up with the marketing of youth, it has become, in Greif's term, "a new kind of unfreedom" -- echoing Foucault's argument in the first volume of his History of Sexuality Greif argues that we are compelled to a sexual "liberation" that plays out as a compulsion to confess and be evaluated in terms of sexual standards not entirely our own but the social products of fashionability and novelty (the correlative of youthfulness). We are forbidden from not thinking about it.
Wisely, Harper's pairs Greif's essay with Chinese personal ads from people who aspire to asexuality yet seek the companionship of marriage. I wonder if it represents a specifically Chinese reaction to the encroachment of sexualized marketing that comes with consumer capitalism, or whether similar enclaves exist in America. Has it gotten so bad that asexuality could be the new distinction, the latest way to be cool?
Labels:
advertising,
asexuality,
foucault,
youth
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