Showing posts with label housing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label housing. Show all posts

Friday, August 12, 2011

Denouncing Deadbeats As Political Strategy (14 July 2010)

Via Ezra Klein comes this chart from Daniel Indiviglio:
That depicts the gap between available job openings and the number of unemployed people -- both the official measure and the more comprehensive U5, which includes "discouraged" and "loosely attached" members of the prospective workforce (i.e. upstanding members of the reserve army of the unemployed). It appears quite obvious that many unemployed people would struggle to get a job no matter how hard they tried, and the resulting discouragement would make them feel worse about themselves and their skills than if they did go in for a stint of funemployment. So extending jobless benefits would seem like a humane and sensible thing for the U.S. government to do, especially considering it would function as economic stimulus to put money in the hands of those who urgently need to spend it.

But humanity and sensibility are not what mediated politics are about. Steve Benen calls attention to "the ways in which Republican lawmakers and candidates seem to actively dislike -- on a personal level -- those who've lost their jobs in the recession" -- that is, the Republicans' apparent eagerness to campaign on a theme of "to hell with the deadbeats." Benen cites, among other examples, Pennsylvania gubernatorial hopeful Tom Corbett, who claims that "if we keep extending unemployment, people are just going to sit there," as well as Sharron Angle, the Senate candidate in Nevada, who believes the unemployed are "spoiled."

How could such a strategy succeed, particularly when the data is plainly against such notions and such assertions seemingly come across as heartless? Part of the calculation probably involves writing off the vote of the unemployed, who may be too discouraged or congenitally unlikely to vote in the first place. Then one can factor in the consolation such rants provide those who managed not to lose their jobs and who may be suffering from survivor guilt. There's solace in the message coming from ostensibly respectable candidates that those others had it coming it some obscure way that has been borne out by their willingness to remain unemployed.

And there is even the chance the deadbeats line will resonate among the deadbeats themselves. Inherent in the argument is an insistence on the relevance of individual agency, that one really can get a job if they try. The chart suggests that isn't true, that individual agency matters only insofar as one can outcompete an ever growing number of competitors for a position, and for the losers no amount of agency will secure them a nonexistent position. But faith in the illusion of individual agency is hard to do without, especially in a society already so insistent about the glory of individualism. Who wants pity and reaffirmed powerlessness?

Republicans thinking strategically probably figure they can eke out a small majority by cobbling together those groups under the bogus banner of individualism and the respect for "hard work," though their rhetoric in practice is negated by their policies of transferring the inherent risks of business on to workers and rendering the worker's level of effort somewhat beside the point outside the realm of ideology.

Conservative class warfare (12 July 2010)

It appears that NYT columnist Ross Douthat also has class war on his mind after reading that article about strategic defaults on jumbo mortgages mentioned in the previous post. He begins with the proposition that "The rich are different from you and me. They know how to game the system." Another way of putting that is that they know the system is set up for their benefit, so they need not concern themselves with its mores.

What to do about this? Douthat suggests we need "conservative class warfare" -- an oxymoron if ever there was one -- "which would force the million-dollar defaulters to pay their own way from here on out." Much of what he then proposes sounds pretty good to me, and it would be great of conservatives signed on to this sort of conservatism: eliminating the federal subsidy on mortgage-interest payments, which are tax deductible; eliminating corporate subsidies; "attacking Washington’s wasteful spending on the well-connected." (He also wants means-testing for Social Security, a supposed solution for a nonexistent problem with the system's solvency.) He urges conservatives "to recognize that the most pernicious sort of redistribution isn’t from the successful to the poor. It’s from savers to speculators, from outsiders to insiders, and from the industrious middle class to the reckless, unproductive rich."

Agreed. But being "well-connected" by definition means that Washington doesn't take away any of your favors. And the ethos of conservatism tends to regard well-connectedness as some sort of deserved state of exception worth preserving for the overall stability of society. If there must be corruption,the implication often seems to be, let's at least make sure only the right people can get away with being corrupt. And the right people are the ones who already have been getting away with it for longer than anyone can remember.

Strategic Defaults of the Rich and Famous (10 July 2010)

Here is what class warfare and ideology are all about: this NYT article by David Streitfeld looks at the strategic-defaulting practices of the rich, after data the paper commissioned revealed that "the rich have stopped paying the mortgage at a rate that greatly exceeds the rest of the population." I know you must be shocked that the wealthy would do something so heinous as dishonor a financial contract that is not in their best interests to uphold. No one ever got wealthy by not following the rules, which is why the wealthy are always as fastidious about paying their taxes as the little people are.

What caught my attention in particular in the article was this:
The rapper Chamillionaire is a plain-talking exception. He recently walked away from a $2 million house he bought in Houston in 2006.

“I just decided to let it go, give it back to the bank,” he told the celebrity gossip TV show “TMZ.” “I just didn’t feel like it was a good investment.”

The rich and successful often come naturally to this sort of attitude, said Brent T. White, a law professor at the University of Arizona who has studied strategic defaults.

“They may be less susceptible to the shame and fear-mongering used by the government and the mortgage banking industry to keep underwater homeowners from acting in their financial best interest,” Mr. White said.

Apparently being vulnerable to shame and fear-mongering is for the little people too. The middle classes are obliged to think of the social fabric when trying to puzzle out what their best interests are -- as the broad base of society they are expected to take into concern ethics, and what others think, and what is morally considerate and will contribute to the general good. We are expected to worry about what's "right." Rich people are under no such obligation. They are in position to in effect dictate what is right. Our moral concern is the opposite of practical power and is possibly the empty consolation for our lacking power.

UPDATE: For some reason I can't add a comment, but Anton: I know. It's enough to make one a nihilist. What is best in life, to feel proud of oneself for having done the "right thing" or to feel like one has been the victor for convincing others to do the "right thing" you thought of?

Saturday, August 6, 2011

Subsidized homeownership (9 March 2010)

Economist Robert Shiller's recent NYT op-ed takes a look at homeownership subsidies.
Federal subsidies for housing essentially began in the Great Depression with, among other things, the creation of the F.H.A. in 1934 and Fannie Mae in 1938. It all started for a simple reason: more than a third of all the unemployed were identified, directly or indirectly, with the building trades. At the time, there seemed to be no way to reduce unemployment without stimulating housing, and much the same is true today.
But consider what will happen once the economy is again operating at full capacity. Basic economics tells us that when Americans, over all, spend more on housing, they must ultimately spend less on something else. Why should housing consumption be better than other consumption, or investments that people might choose?
This time, the best answer isn’t found in traditional economics but rather in American culture: a long-standing feeling that owning homes in healthy communities is connected to individual liberties that embody our national identity. Historically, homeownership has been associated with freedom, while renting — often in tenements or mill villages — has been linked to the oppression of a landlord.
Shiller poses a good question, but then equivocates, supplies what seems like the wrong answer. I wonder whether homeownership is really a "core value" and not a ruse that stems from the hyperfinancialization of the economy. It gets people involved with borrowing that shouldn't be, paying interest payments instead of rent with the idea that they are building equity -- no sure thing, as we have learned lately. I tend to agree with Ryan Avent that the idea that homeowners are better citizens is quai-racist hogwash. And I also think James Kwak is right that rather than make everyone pretend homeowners with big mortgages and fiscal sweeteners, we should attempt to remove the stigma from renting, as Shiller himself suggests. This seems a far better course than encouraging poor people to buy homes on credit so they can feel like respectable members of society -- that was part of Bush II's "ownership society" propaganda, an ideological rebranding of the caveat emptor society, and an alibi for what Jacob Hacker has described as the great risk shift.

Kwak also emphasizes Shiller's point that homeownership is not the best way to save:
The key point, which Shiller makes, is one that I’ve made to many of my friends thinking of buying houses: buying a house is colossally stupid investment according to the investing textbook, because you are taking on a high degree of leverage and putting more than your net worth not only into a single asset class, but into a single structure on a single piece of land. What makes it sensible, sometimes, are the mortgage interest tax deduction (an extremely regressive subsidy) and the fact that in many places you may want to live there are few viable rental alternatives, so you have to buy.

Maybe I need to move to Switzerland. Shiller:
Switzerland, for example, is a country with strong patriotism, a fighting spirit of national defense, a commitment to freedom and tolerance, and a low crime rate. Yet its homeownership rate is just 34.6 percent, versus 66.2 percent for the United States, according to the two countries’ 2000 censuses.
Swiss national identity doesn’t depend on homeownership. Instead, Riccarda Torriani, a historian at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, links the country’s sense of identity to such things as its system of direct democracy, which enforces popular participation in government; the idea that its citizens are frontier people (living in or near the rugged Alps); and a history of collective courage in defense of freedom, even when outnumbered.
Interesting, though the idea that you would call up a bureaucrat and get her to define the national character seems strange to me. The idea of a prescribed "national identity" seems part and parcel with ethnocentric nationalism. Despite all the rah-rahing about American exceptionalism, the most exceptional thing about America may be that it's a place where the national identity is that we have no specific national identity (like how the Pixies image was supposed to be that they had no image). You are supposed to be free to live how you want, which is why all those disdained religious sects came here in the 17th century, etc., etc.

On a related note, I found this argument (video) for eliminating Fannie and Freddie, by Raj Date, convincing.

But What About the Tract Homes? (2 Feb 2010)

Suburbia (not this one, alas) seems to be in the news, prompted by Joel "New Geography" Kotkin's essay claiming that the Obama administration (aka "the president’s cadres") is inveighing a "war against suburbia." This is so ridiculous it almost needs no comment. Atrios sums it up well: "This is completely idiotic for mostly obvious reasons, including the hundreds of billions devoted to propping up single family home prices." (I think Kotkin needs to watch Over the Edge is he wants to see what a war on suburbia really looks like.)

Mike Konczal puts some specific numbers behind some of the other obviousness, the idea that money for Obama's high-speed-rail initiatives threatens pro-suburban transportation policy.
From the ProPublica Stimulus Spending List:
Highway infrastructure investment $26,725,000,000
Highway infrastructure funds distributed by states $60,000,000
Highway infrastructure funds for the Indian Reservation Roads program $550,000,000
Highway infrastructure funds for surface transportation technology training $20,000,000
Highway infrastructure to fund oversight and management of projects $40,000,000
Additional capital investments in surface transportation including highways, bridges, and road repairs $1,298,500,000
Administrative costs for additional capital investments in surface transportation $200,000,000

High speed rail capital assistance $8,000,000,000
Check that out: Over $28 billion dollars allocated to highway spending, with over $26 billion allocated to “Highway infrastructure investment.” That’s over three times the amount spent on the $8 billion for “high speed rail capital assistance.”

Factor in all the ongoing support and tax breaks for mortgages and single-family homes, and it's safe to say that the suburban way of life is going to remain heavily subsidized and under no particular threat from the current regime. No one is planning to run rails in place of the highways. And as Amanda Marcotte points out "some of the biggest beneficiaries of public transit by rail are the very suburbanites in middle American cities that Kotkin claims to fiercely defend."

Kotkin goes to great lengths to sell his bill of goods: he quotes right-wing economics writer Robert Samuelson, he evokes Europe as a boogeyman, uses the "elitists hate it, so it must be okay" argument, and deploys insinuating rhetoric, as in this passage:
These efforts will be supported by an elaborate coalition of new urbanist and environmental groups. At the same time, a powerful urban land interest, including many close to the Democratic Party, would also support steps that thwart suburban growth and give them a near monopoly on future development over the coming decades.
Yes, there is a vast left-wing conspiracy implementing the urbanist agenda and unleash its "deep-seated desire to change the way Americans live" behind the backs of voters, who are nonetheless so outraged that they voted for Scott Brown.

Kevin Drum, who seems to think it is glib to remind suburbanites of their subsidies, argues that these suburban voters are waiting for some more explicit and unwarranted handouts, mainly because they are too myopic to see the ways existing policies already benefit them. Drum writes that "there's a real tension between good policy and good politics" and seems to imply that we must inevitably surrender the former to the latter. What has happened over the past few years gives us no reason to think about things less cynically, I suppose, but I would hope there is still something useful in arguing the merits of policy, in acknowledging that suburbanization is unsustainable in the form it has taken up to now. Why give respect to Kotkin for providing an ideological smoke-screen for suburban-voter selfishness? Marcotte also makes a good point about the ideological cover Kotkin provides for suburban racism of the sort that apparently animates a good portion of the Republican party: "You can really tell what the agenda behind this article is when author Joel Kotkin puts 'white flight' in square quotes, implying that liberals made it up because of our irrational hatred of the suburbs." (I always thought they were "scare quotes," though they are sort of for squares, as well.) It always seemed to me that suburbs are about the fantasy of escaping from the presence of poverty or any feelings of social responsibility over inequality. You move somewhere where "those people" don't exist. Then you can practice a me-first, NIMBY-style politics as if it's rational and "natural."

Of course suburbanites don't like the idea of having to change their lifestyle. Ideally economic, demographic and environmental realities will end up driving the change, not a government cabal. Incidentally, it's at least as plausible to argue that zoning restrictions, various state-funded incentives and the relative underinvestment in cities that forcibly "changed the way Americans live" in the past 60 years. Ultimately, ideology and habitus shape where and how people choose to live more than any explicit raft of social-engineering programs -- in a class-inflected society, residential spaces will mutate to continue to reflect and reproduce the various distinctions.

Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Rent revolt (4 Nov 2009)

A useful myth took definitive hold in the Reagan years about taxes: the government steals our income through taxes and helps the lazy poor with massive transfer payments. Liberals have never managed to effectively counter this nonsense, perhaps in part because they are bought off by actual massive subsidies of their own, which arguably come at the expense of the poor. (Dean Baker and James Galbraith each have good books on how this works.)

Home-owning subsidies are maybe the worst of these. Justin Fox linked to this Congressional Budget Office report about the government subsidies in housing, which estimates that (as Fox notes in his post's headline) that only 20 percent of the federal housing aid goes to renters. The remaining 80 percent goes to homeowners, mostly in the form of mortgage-interest tax deductions. Another way of putting this is that America uses policy to create a rentier society, subsidizing landlords and creating property bubbles for their short-term benefit. And meanwhile, the report tell us, "The burden of housing’s costs is more pronounced among renters than among owners: In 2007, 45 percent of renters (compared with 30 percent of owners) paid more than 30 percent of their income for housing."

The alibi for these subsidies to those who are already relatively privileged is that homeownership is an inherent good in its own right, a widely disputed claim. It is neither economically efficient, environmentally sustainable, nor the facilitator of more livable communities. (America's fixation on single-family homes gives us anomie and exurbs.)

I wonder what renters like me can do about this. I have no interest in home owning, but feel like a chump for missing out on the gravy train. I'm like a middle-class person who insists on riding the bus instead of buying a car like society seems to be insisting I must. It grows tiresome to go against the grain of what society tells you someone in your class should do; to persist in it we probably need to link isolated individual behavior to an organized movement. Otherwise it seems like pyrrhic self-importance.

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Why did people think house prices can't fall? (7 July 2009)

When I was looking to find a new apartment, I was in the office of a parasitic bloodsucker -- whoops, I'm sorry, a real estate broker -- in my neighborhood (brokers have locked down the apartment market in my corner of New York pretty tightly, largely because of immigrant and absentee landlords). This particular broker also showed houses for sale, and his office was decorated with a cartoon that depicted a broken-down old couple hobbling along in the street, above a caption that mocked them: "They are waiting for home prices to drop." I thought of that cartoon while reading this Mark Thoma post about what caused the housing bubble, which takes as its jumping-off point this post at the NYT economics blog by Ed Glaeser. Glaeser admits that "The housing price volatility of the last six years has been so extreme that it confounds conventional economic explanations," and agrees with housing economists Case and Shiller that "housing bubbles were fueled by irrationally optimistic beliefs about future housing price appreciation." He uses the Las Vegas bubble as his example:
I once thought that the Las Vegas housing market was so straightforward (vast amounts of land, no significant regulation) that no one could be deluded into thinking that prices could long diverge from construction costs, but I was wrong. I underestimated the human capacity to think rosy thoughts about the value of a house.
My father lived in Las Vegas in the mid 1990s, and when I would visit, I would be astounded by the exponential growth along the I-215 corridor. It seemed utterly senseless -- shopping centers that hadn't existed on my previous visit would be filled to capacity with virtually full parking lots (I'm thinking of the Eastern Ave. exit circa 1998), while the centers a few exits back toward downtown would be nearly empty. The fetishization of the new shopping centers was indicative of the insanity that was free-floating through the region then. The new housing developments would already be started before the road grid even reached them. Planners had a difficult time coming up with all the new names for all the new cul-de-sacs being created. And the new homes were presumably being purchased by the new arrivals to the area, who by and large were construction workers in the home building business. It didn't take a genius to figure out that pattern was unsustainable.

The key question, that Glaeser declines to try to answer here, is why did people think such "rosy thoughts"? Thoma quotes Shiller, who argues that housing bubbles have happened because "people believed that both land and building materials were becoming relatively more scarce over time," which is plainly false. Still, how come people in Las Vegas and Henderson believed houses would continue to go up, against the obvious evidence in front of their face of the utter lack of land and materials scarcity? Thoma suggests people assume a long-term premium on their "investment" in a home, because they make a semi-conscious connection between buy-and-hold investing in the stock market (presumed to bring surefire 8 percent returns over the long haul) and home ownership. But buying a home is a consumption purchase, not an investment.

The question then is why people were so quick to view housing as a great investment and all those renters out there as "suckers" who were "just throwing their money away." The answer, I think, is straight-up propaganda. Consider how often the NAR economist is cited in the press as an objective expert on the meaning of housing data. Consider how much blather we hear from politicians about the ownership society and the sanctity of home owning. Think of the tax breaks and subsidies that homeowners get and seem to believe they deserve. Think of the whole parasitical class of real estate agents and the relentless advertising on their behalf and on the behalf of the mortgage lenders and banks.

In the U.S. an ideology about homeownership has become entrenched that seems guaranteed to produce irrational (by economists' standards) views about home owning. So it's hardly surprising that this ideology yielded a housing market full of deluded buyers and sellers who had little understanding of the true value of what they were bargaining over. Sadly, very little has been done, even now, to dismantle this erroneous view of housing. Perhaps because of the vested interests -- I doubt my neighborhood broker has taken down his cartoon.

Thursday, July 21, 2011

Using consumers for housing bets (13 May 2009)

This post from Mike at Rortybomb is the most lucid explanation of what banks got out of making loans to people who obviously had no chance of keeping up with their payments. As long as prices were rising, it worked out better for the banks if borrowers were subprime, fell behind on their payments, and had to refinance, paying fees and prepayment penalties to the banks.
Let’s assume that the bank thinks house prices will rise. If house prices rises 10% during that 2-year time period, the homeowner now has ~12% equity in the home, ~3.5% (4%, adjust for the new house cost) of which is transfered to the bank in form of the prepayment penalty. In addition to a high interest rate, they get a jackpot 4% every time this crap loan is recycled.
So this loan has value for the bank if housing rises, and lower value if housing decreases. Because of the quick recycling of these loans, where they refinance every two years, it is direct exposure. Instead of providing consumers with loans so they can buy homes, they are instead taking bets on house prices, using consumers as people who sit in and look after the homes they are betting on. The purpose is less to get consumers to build good equity but rather find ways to transfer equity from the home to the bank itself.
As Mike explains, the upshot of this is that banks were actually looking for bad borrowers -- they weren't forced by the Community Reinvestment Act. And the idea that the banks were performing some kind of civic service by expanding the pool of homeowners is now exposed to be the bogus alibi that it always was.

Banks are generally in the brokering business, matching investment funds to worthy investments and managing the risk associated with that to earn their keep. They aren't supposed to be in the business of making bets themselves -- their advantageous position when it comes to accessing capital comes at the cost of not putting themselves in risk's way themselves. The sort of thing that Mike describes in the post exemplifies how banks inflated the housing bubble and expanded the percentage of the profits that went to the financial industry. We have yet to see any regulatory changes that would put a stop to it. Mike recommends reinstating the ban on prepayment penalties -- that seems a good place to start.

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

The Yes Man and financial hubris (9 April 2009)

This is obvious and probably has been commented on many times, but the Jim Carrey movie The Yes Man is a pretty good encapsulation of the pre-economic-depression mentality in America. In the film -- which, admittedly, I saw in a semi-delusional state on a flight yesterday -- Carrey plays a low-level loan officer in a California bank. The opening scenes set up the idea that his character is too guarded, too careful, too risk-averse and is therefore missing out on the opportunities life presents us with. One of his friends -- played I think by the actor who played the cop at the car pound in The Big Lebowski ("Leads? Yeah I'll just check with the boys down at the crime lab.") -- takes him to see a motivational speaker who persuades him to say yes to everything. As part of that program, we see Carrey dutifully okaying all sorts of absurd small-business loans without so much as an inspection of the paperwork. Now, obviously, that sounds a bit like what they were doing at Countrywide and Washington Mutual, not to mention the fly-by-night brokers who brought us Ninja and liar loans -- extend credit to anybody and everybody and let the chips fall where they may. The difference, though, is that most would-be borrowers are not entrepreneurs; they are somewhat instinctively risk-averse, and it required massive targeted marketing efforts to encourage ordinary people to borrow more, to ignore the common-sense skepticism of free money and say yes to the opportunity that perpetually rising home equity was said to provide.

So the opportunity is there for the film to play as a satire to the easy credit of the bubble years, but viewers must read it against the grain. The film itself isn't satirical at all and has nothing to say in favor of prudent risk management. Its big message is that when we say yes to everything, it's hard to know when we really mean it, or rather, it's hard for others to judge our sincerity and know which of our desires are "real". It verges initially on the somewhat subversive message that we have no real desires at all, only circumstances and opportunities. During the film's build-up, when the rate at which Carrey is agreeing to do things is building momentum, his character becomes pointedly schizophrenic, and other characters comment on how unpredictable he is. He starts to have no fixed identity at all and slips toward the post-structural ideal of moving beyond subjectivity to some existence of unbounded free play. But then, of course, the film's main lesson kicks in: that this identity-free state is utterly unacceptable. His love interest -- a sort of phony free spirit played by Zooey Deschanel; she is in a Flight of the Conchords-type band, rides a scooter, and isn't hung up, as she says at one point, with being "mainstream" -- shuns him because she can't know if his love is real. Love, of course, is always the primary bait for the identity trap, but in films like these, it always seems like a punishment, defined by upholding dreary, rote responsibilities defined by social expectations that often reflect the consumer-society prerogatives of buying the right gifts or experiences to prove love. This is the quintessential set-up for comedies -- it's fun to vacation from responsibility, but ultimately we should crave the return to stability, typically figured and symbolized as heterosexual love, with the strong implication that raising a family will be next. We have to reproduce the status quo, after all.

That traditional theme of reaffirming the reality principle is now overshadowed by the light the financial crisis now sheds on the film's historicity. The peculiar delusions of the decade -- that no one ever really defaults, that all loans can be made good, that a lack of optimism is a kind of character defect -- now show up in sharp relief, because paradoxically enough, the films' producers seem to have taken them so much for granted. In the movie, the idea of "Getting to yes" gets supplanted by a much more convenient negotiation strategy (just say yes) that is blithely presented as sound. No one has to compromise or put forth any effort, and everybody wins! Carrey's character is even praised by one of his bank's higher-ups, who interprets the lack of risk management as the introduction of a profitable microlending program. These touches are now local color from a tour through the zeitgeist of 2006.

Saturday, July 16, 2011

Happy talk (26 Feb 2009)

Over the weekend, economist Robert Shiller argued in an NYT op-ed that we basically need a stimulus package of happy talk. Distilling the thesis of his recent book, Animal Spirits, co-authored with George Akerlof, Shiller claims that "the Depression narrative could easily end up as a self-fulfilling prophecy." The idea behind this is basically the same as the one that causes economists to fret over consumer-confidence surveys. Economic behavior is guided by people's expectations, which are shaped not by rational assessments of their prospects but by their feelings (Shiller identifies these as including confidence, the ability to trust, and a faith in an economic system's fairness) which in turn are shaped, presumably, by the narrative driven by the media. If people invest, or spend, not out of strict need or want, but in accordance with how they feel about wanting, then the implication is that the media owes society some happy talk about the economy to keep up the "animal spirits" -- Keynes's term for the irreducible ambition that drives entrepreneurs regardless of their probability of success. As Chris Dillow puts it, in a review of Shiller and Akerlof's book,
given that the private benefits of innovation are low, and the probabilities of success in many arts and industry small, it might be only animal spirits that give us artists and entrepreneurs. As Richard Nisbett and Less Ross wrote years ago: "We probably would have few novelists, actors or scientists if all potential aspirants to these careers took action based on a normatively justifiable probability of success. We might also have few new products, new medical procedures, new political movements or new scientific theories."
Rational motivations are insufficient to explain entrepreneurialism. (Marx, for what it's worth, argued that technological innovation was a requirement of capitalism, which shapes would-be capitalists in its image. "Animal spirits" might be considered a ideological, pseudo-naturalistic account of that otherwise contradictory process in which insecurity and confidence merge to produce ambition.)

According to the "fragile animal spirits" thesis -- the idea that at any given moment, a culture bears responsibility for bolstering these tenuous entrepreneurial impulses -- not only do we need happy talk, but the state must take action -- passing a big stimulus package, for instance -- to try to change the public mood. As Akerlof put it in this interview with Conor Clarke of the Atlantic Monthly:
one of the things is that one of the roles of the government is to offset the animal spirits. So that when animal spirits are high -- and people are too trusting and they engage in investment projects that they shouldn't engage in -- one of the roles of the government is to offset them. More should have been done to curb the over-exuberance and excesses in the housing market. That's one. But at the same time, if the confidence then dries up, it's the role of the government to stimulate the demand that's fallen because of the lost confidence.

This sort of thinking has apparently been driving Will Wilkinson nuts. He seems to regard it as voodoo macroeconomics. "It now seems pretty plainly true that the thrust of prescriptive macroeconomics is propaganda." He adds in another post:
I’m extremely suspicious of what strike me as intellectually contentious, ad hoc interventions into the economy aimed at expectation management. Countercyclical economic mood-control initiatives seem to me inconsistent with the maintenance of a general framework of stable rules — that is, they don’t take the importance of expectations seriously enough — while also smacking of illiberal state propaganda.
Elsewhere, he cites another stimulus skeptic, economist Greg Mankiw, who writes
The sad truth is that we economists don't know very much about what drives the animal spirits of economic participants. Until we figure it out, it is best to be suspicious of any policy whose benefits are supposed to work through the amorphous channel of "confidence."

Moreover, Wilkinson argues that it's incoherent to use Depression fears to marshal support for stimulus spending: By the logic of fragile animal spirits, scare tactics hurt confidence while trying to garner support for a policy that will boost it. "The economics says we need confidence. But political reality says we need panic. So we try to induce panic so that we can later induce confidence. This seems an extremely awkward and implausible approach, but that doesn’t keep anyone from trying it." Well, now that the stimulus bill has passed, it's intellectually consistent, at least, that Shiller would take to the media to address the panic problem.

But the deeper problem here, of course, is that talking up the necessity of happy talk seems to lend support to the idea that the press should be censored for the economy's sake. Wilkinson: "If the thoughts and feelings of the population are the issue, then maybe the real problem is that the mass media are unduly scaring people. Wouldn’t it follow, then, that good economic policy would have at least as much to do with controlling the media as controlling the money supply? If the problem with handing Maria Bartiromo a script of state-mandated talking points is that it wouldn’t work, how do we know that? It would be pretty interesting if it turned out that manipulating the money supply is what an efficient state turns to when it can’t more directly manipulate 'animal spirits' through propaganda."

If reality is too scary for our fragile animal spirits, and helicopter drops and massive fiscal spending don't work to shift that reality, will we lose our scruples about the Potemkin option? Economic data could come out along the lines of how the Soviets would present data on their five-year plans. Politicians would then lie about conditions (Herbert Hoover style, as Shiller pointed out) until the populace begins acting against their instincts to hunker down as unemployment and hardship afflicts them or the people they know.

Delusional thinking about credit risk got us into this mess, so now the only thing to get us out is more widespread and more doggedly institutionalized delusional thinking? All right then! Not sure how this would help the "trust" and "faith in the system" components of animal spirits, but oh, well. Maybe if we perfect the dissemination of these delusions, we'll be free at last from those ultimately irrelevant real economic conditions, and the state can just drop in to tell us what condition our animal spirits should be in.

Reinflating the housing bubble (5 Feb 2009)

Georgia senator Johnny Isakson's amendment to the stimulus package, which passed the Senate yesterday, is a stupid idea -- call it the Realtor Creation Act, and heaven knows we need more Realtors. The amendment doubles the existing unnecessary subsidy to new-home purchasers from $7,500 to $15,000, and intends to encourage more activity in the housing market and speed recovery in that sector, which remains afflicted with a massive inventory overhang -- we built too many houses, and the vacancy rate is at a record high. Of course, in practice, this is a tax giveaway to the upper middle classes -- the sort of people who already can afford to buy houses rather than rent -- and encourages the same sort of dangerous real estate speculation that helped create the recession we're in.

Calculated Risk is skeptical that the historical precedent for this -- a 1975 giveaway to home buyers that supposedly boosted sales -- holds water. And economist Dean Baker explains that the proposal is probably going to be far more expensive than advertised:
Isakson puts the cost of his tax break at just $19 billion. Let's break the Washington rules and try a little arithmetic. Even with weakness in the housing market, it is still virtually certain that we will sell close to 5 million homes in 2009. The overwhelming majority would qualify for the full credit. So, we get 5 million times $15,000. That sounds a lot like $75 billion. And this is before we get to any gaming. It's hard to see why tens of millions of people wouldn't figure out a way to buy a house from a friend or relative and get their $15k. If we can get one-third of the country's homes to change hands (lots of jobs for realtors) that would be good for $375 billion.

Economist Tyler Cowen says "boo to the Republicans" for generating the proposal, arguing that "the supply of homes is relatively elastic right now. The tax credit will subsidize the new buyers without propping up the price of homes. Demand will go up, supply will go up, price will stay more or less on the same trajectory, and banks won't be any healthier. The subsidy goes to new home buyers and why should we be helping them above all others?"

Brian Beutler laments that this sort of policymaking is the "benefit" of bipartisanship:
I suppose if we wanted to, we could build upon the Isakson amendment by suspending environmental regulations and setting aside money for construction workers to build more Kaufman & Broad communities, and coal-fired power plants. That might even technically count as great stimulus, but with Democrats fully in charge the hope was that the money could be spent both in great quantity and in ways that, at the very least, didn’t help entrench the habits that got the country in this mess in the first place. But I guess that’s bipartisanship for you.
Those who thought Obama would usher in a new regime of ideas and end the pandering to the suburban bourgeoisie are finding out they were wrong, and really, this should be no surprise. Obama didn't campaign as a progressive urbanist, even if his life experience suggested he might govern as one.

Anyway, housing economist Ed Glaeser (no progressive -- you can find him on today's WSJ editorial page calling for more tax cuts) in this TNR book review, details the distortions of the subsidized lending schemes that Isakson wants to extend:
The popularity of subsidizing borrowing has led some to advocate a new round of federally subsidized lending, perhaps at an interest rate of 4.5 percent, aimed at pushing housing prices back up. But nothing is going to bring back the boom days of 2006. On average, housing prices go up between 3 percent and 5 percent when interest rates fall by 1 percent. A big loan program that pushes lending rates down to 4.5 percent would probably lead to a price boom of less than five percent. Such a modest impact would be barely noticeable in markets that have lost more than one-fifth of their value in the last year. It certainly would do little stem the tide of foreclosures. Housing in America is a $20 trillion market. It is no more plausible that the government will be able to bring housing prices back to bubble-like prices than it was for Herbert Hoover, or Franklin Roosevelt, to bring stock prices back to their 1929 levels.
I doubt that the government should try to make housing more unaffordable to ordinary Americans, even if it could manage that trick. Higher prices would just mean more overbuilding in places such as Las Vegas, which already have a glut of homes. In almost all cities, prices are still far above 2000 levels. Why is unaffordable housing now a national desideratum? The most recent housing boom made some of America's most economically dynamic and beautiful places unaffordable to ordinary Americans. Higher housing prices made it difficult for young and middle-income families to get by in America's costly coastal regions. There is much to like about housing's return to reality, not least its increased affordability, and much to dislike about artificially trying to make homes expensive.
Moreover, credit subsidies can be quite regressive. The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction is poorly targeted toward lower-income Americans who are on the margin between renting and owning; its benefits go mainly to the rich. In markets where housing supply is more or less fixed, subsidizing borrowing just pushes up prices, which means capital gains for existing homeowners, not increased housing affordability. In more flexible markets, the deduction encourages over-building and over-borrowing.
In the midst of today's housing crash, certainly, subsidizing borrowing looks particularly foolish. The government essentially encouraged Americans to leverage themselves to the hilt and bet on housing markets. Now a lot of those erstwhile owners have lost everything. Why exactly does it make sense to subsidize gambling on home prices?
Glaeser then details how homeownership subsidies basically mean that the government is encouraging us to live in single-family homes. That means when we make attempts to expand home ownership, it leads to more inefficient, energy-wasting, low-density development, perpetuating the stranglehold of suburban anomie for yet another generation.

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Lend to everyone, let the government sort it out (18 Dec 2008)

Reading this post in whcih Adam Levitin recounts credit-card lenders' abuse of behavioral finance -- key excerpt:
The card lender often isn't looking to get the principal repaid. Instead, the interest rate and fees returns are high enough that they cover the cost of the principal. The principal remains outstanding, and the ideal consumer makes minimum payments forever, making enough new charges to keep the balance from ever amortizing. In effect, the consumer becomes an annuity.
-- right after this post about the potential incentive to voluntarily participate in a Ponzi scheme if you are expecting a bailout -- key excerpt from a paper by Utpal Bhattacharya:
We argue in this paper that if agents correctly believe in the possibility of a partial bailout when a gigantic Ponzi scheme collapses, and they recognize that a bailout is tantamount to a redistribution of wealth from non-participants to participants, it may be rational for agents to participate, even if they know that it is the last round.
-- led me to this question: If credit-card companies can expect a bailout if a critical mass of borrowers default, do they become aware of point at which it becomes more prudent to lend to everyone and encourage them to charge up a storm rather than perform due diligence on the risks various individual borrowers represent? They can collect their fees from customers until the whole thing collapses, hopefully with a loud enough crash that the state will restore much of the principal. A related question: Did mortgage lenders reach that point a few years ago? Is this how investors' cupidity led them to interpret the implicit government backing of Fannie and Freddie?

Problems with preventing foreclosures (13 Dec 2008)

I have this sense that I should be cheering on the efforts of FDIC chair Sheila Bair, who is seeking to ensure that more TARP bailout money goes toward helping prevent foreclosures. I am probably supposed to be glad that she's fighting for the little guy against Wall Street bankers and other undeserving beneficiaries of socialism for the rich. But instead, the idea of helping homeowners out with their mortgages makes me angrier than helping out irresponsible industries. Haven't home buyers had enough help already on their mortgages in the form of tax breaks and Fed-orchestrated interest rate adjustments? Helping keep or put people into homes they couldn't afford is what has caused much of the economic mess we're in to begin with. Continuing down that road seems foolhardy -- solving the problems of a burst bubble by reinflating it.

And mortgage modification programs -- hard enough to implement since securitization has made it near impossible to figure out who owns the loans -- often don't work. People who have their mortgage rejiggered to prevent foreclosure often end up redefaulting.

But what stokes my anger about foreclosure prevention is that I can relate directly to the decisions that got underwater homeowners where they are. Many of them were making poor decisions at my level, accepting the sorts of deals that were available to me but that I didn't pursue. They took advantage of the housing bubble while prudent (or timid) people like me didn't, and now that they are facing consequences, part of me -- the vindictive, reptilian-brain part -- wants them to suffer. Instead society is poised to reward them for their poor decisionmaking at the expense of chumps like me who didn't follow the herd into McMansions in the exurbs.

Thanks to an apotheosis of various ideological strains prevalent here -- rugged individualism, fetishized private property, the freedom of open space, the need for consipcuous consumption and identity display through possessions -- American society has a tendency to make homeownership seem like the ticket to legitimacy and adulthood, as if it's the only way to mark a seriousness about belonging to your community. This tends to discourage other forms of community organization as well as making homeownership appear more of a boon than it often proves to be. Felix Salmon cites recent research into the pleasures of home ownership that yielded results that seem almost unbelievable, considering the prevailing attitudes:
I find little evidence that homeowners are happier by any of the following definitions: life satisfaction, overall mood, overall feeling, general moment-to-moment emotions (i.e., affect) and affect at home. Several factors might be at work: homeowners derive more pain (but no more joy) from both their home and their neighborhood. They are also more likely to be 12 pounds heavier, report lower health status and poorer sleep quality. They tend to spend less time on active leisure or with friends. The average homeowner reports less joy from love and relationships. She is also less likely to consider herself to enjoy being with people... The results are robust after controlling for reported financial stress.
Homeowners use their homes to retreat from society and lessen their awareness of their true interdependence with it. To a degree, people focus on their houses to the exclusion of the surrounding community -- building good fences, making good neighbors, that sort of thing. This apparently can become an unhealthy withdrawal. So maybe I shouldn't be so angry -- resisting the mantra of homeownership has saved me a lot of psychic misery.

Anyway, I completely agree with Salmon's reaction:
It's idiotic. I don't expect Americans to all go to Germany and realize how happy people are when they don't need to worry about all the stresses which accompany homeownership. But I do think that substantially all of the upside to homeownership in recent years has been a function of rising house prices. Now that's come to an end, it's hard to see why anybody would want to buy.
In fact, if Americans could be persuaded that rent payments aren't "wasted money" and that owning often makes less financial sense than renting, I think the rate of homeownership might, happily, drop substantially. But it's not going to happen. The ideal of homeownership is deeply embedded in the American psyche, and any datapoints which don't fit into that ideal are automatically discarded.

Rent is not "throwing money away" anymore than buying food at the grocery store is "throwing money away" since you didn't plant your own garden and raise your own livestock. Shelter is something you consume; it's not an investment. Bailing out homeowners is rewarding the people who treated housing as an investment and not a consumption good, a fulfillment of personal need. Preventing foreclosures is often a matter of rescuing people from their failure to properly assess risk, not from some unforeseen natural disaster. Let's not pretend this is any different from bailing out imprudent or inept investment bankers.

Vive Tanta (1 Dec 2008)

A few weeks ago, Nicholas Carr wrote a post about the end of the blogosphere as an independent, open field in which new writers can bypass the need for vetting by corporate media and rise in popularity through sheer merit.
While there continue to be many blogs, including a lot of very good ones, it seems to me that one would be hard pressed to make the case that there's still a "blogosphere." That vast, free-wheeling, and surprisingly intimate forum where individual writers shared their observations, thoughts, and arguments outside the bounds of the traditional media is gone. Almost all of the popular blogs today are commercial ventures with teams of writers, aggressive ad-sales operations, bloated sites, and strategies of self-linking. Some are good, some are boring, but to argue that they're part of a "blogosphere" that is distinguishable from the "mainstream media" seems more and more like an act of nostalgia, if not self-delusion.
He's probably right about that, but we should be grateful the old blogosphere was around long enough for Tanta at Calculated Risk to find a wide audience. She was absolutely one of the most lucid and engaging writers on the housing bubble and the mortgage industry, without whom even fewer people would have much of an idea of what happened to our economy in recent years. Tanta, whose name was Doris Dungey, died over the weekend, and will be sorely missed.

Wednesday, July 13, 2011

When countries go bankrupt (19 Nov 2008)

Paul Kedrosky linked to this FT article describing life in Iceland after their banking system completely collapsed. The whole thing makes for some unsettling reading, unless you hate Sigur Ros or something and can extract some schadenfreude from the whole situation.
The Icelandic krona’s freeze in the capital markets had now spilled over into the day-to-day transactions of Icelanders abroad. Holidaymakers and business travellers venturing “til Útlanda”, as it is called, found their credit cards refused, and those wishing to buy foreign currency could not find willing sellers, aside from one or two who limited their purchases to €200.
Trust in the banks had evaporated and people were trying to find a safe haven for their cash. One man had waited for six hours in a bank while his life savings, more than £1m in kronur (at IKr200 to the pound), were counted out in cash in front of him. “I feel like an innocent man dragged from his bed, put in a barrel and hurled over Gullfoss!” wrote one journalist that morning.
This is why people used to stuff money into mattresses.

Naturally, Iceland (just like the U.S.) had an irresponsible housing boom alongside its overleveraged banking system.
Easy access to 100 per cent mortgages has seen a change to the traditional pattern of young Icelanders living with their parents until their mid-twenties. The suburbs of Reykjavik have grown by a third in the past decade, most of it housing for first-time buyers. Whole new neighbourhoods have emerged. New streets house young couples, many with children, most with two cars in the drive and furnished with the best that Ikea can provide. All bought with 100 per cent loans, many in foreign currencies.
Also mentioned are the "viking raiders" -- brash Icelandic bankers like Jon Ásgeir who have now destroyed their nation.
One of the most telling images was the departure of Jon Ásgeir’s private jet on news that the government had nationalised Glitnir Bank (in which his investment vehicle Stodir was a leading shareholder), wiping out his shareholding and rattling the debt-burdened house of cards that is his Baugur business empire. Painted black and as sleek as a Stealth bomber, the aircraft was photographed taxiing from its hangar by Morgunbladid, a daily newspaper. Like the last helicopter out of Saigon, the departure of Ásgeir’s jet symbolised the end of an era, the last act of Iceland’s debt-fuelled spending spree.

An article from Spiegel also explores what happens when nations go bankrupt. It highlights Argentina's experience, when people scurried to Uruguay with suitcases full of dollar bills and others slept in front of ATMs waiting for a chance to withdrawal money, if any was left. And it looks at Hungary, the first European nation to be bailed out by the IMF.
Much of the blame for Hungary's current debacle lies with the failings of the past. The once-successful nation of 10 million people lived beyond its means for years. With government finances spinning out of control, the national debt ballooned to two-thirds of the country's GDP. "The funding for our excessively high standard of living came from other countries," admits András Simor, the governor of the central bank, not without a dose of self-criticism.
The Hungarians have always been considered shopaholics. Hundreds of thousands bought themselves big cars and went on shopping sprees in the chic boutiques on Váci Utca in Budapest -- all on credit. The real estate market boomed, turning close to 90 percent of Hungarian apartments are privately owned.

This all sounds very familiar. How long will it be before we have to say, "We are all Hungarians now"?

Planet Finance (8 Nov 2008)

In Vanity Fair, Niall Ferguson has a long article tracing the history of our current financial crisis. None of it will surprise you if you have been following things for a while, but it's a good overview of the roots of the crisis if you haven't (though the bit about goldbugs being "vindicated" in their crusade against fiat money seems a bit crackpot to me). All the bases are touched: the Chinese savings glut, Fannie and Freddie, financial derivatives gone wild, S&L deregulation, delusional quant models, etc., etc. His main conceit is that thanks to unprecedented leverage and a kind of blind faith, operations in the financial world (Planet Finance) had come to dwarf the goings-on in the actual world. As investors recognized there was no ground beneath their feet, that Planet began to self-destruct.

Interestingly, Ferguson connects the rise of leverage to stagnating wages.
By the 1980s, in any case, more and more people had grasped how to protect their wealth from inflation: by investing it in assets they expected to appreciate in line with, or ahead of, the cost of living. These assets could take multiple forms, from modern art to vintage wine, but the most popular proved to be stocks and real estate. Once it became clear that this formula worked, the Age of Leverage could begin. For it clearly made sense to borrow to the hilt to maximize your holdings of stocks and real estate if these promised to generate higher rates of return than the interest payments on your borrowings. Between 1990 and 2004, most American households did not see an appreciable improvement in their incomes. Adjusted for inflation, the median household income rose by about 6 percent. But people could raise their living standards by borrowing and investing in stocks and housing.
Throughout the bubble, right-leaning economists tended to argue that wage stagnation didn't matter for this very reason: people were garnering tax-advantaged gains in assets and shrewdly borrowing against them, so wages were an outdated way of measuring how well-off people were. Better to judge that by their consumption, because as we all know, spending is a proxy for feeling good, and more stuff equals more joy. And consumers were not flagging at all in their spending through the bubble period, and they new better than any fancy economic analyst what they could comfortably afford.

It's a much different picture now, with retail sales "collapsing" according to this NYT headline, and the credit supply all but dried up for many would-be borrowers. The NYT article offers this choice anecdote about glum shoppers:
Two stylishly dressed friends spending time in Midtown Manhattan on Thursday said they used to enjoy shopping. “I want to impulse-buy again,” said a wistful Louise Van Veenendaal, an actress. But these days, economic anxiety is prompting the women to steer clear of stores. They refuse even to look at sales circulars.
“I’m much poorer than I’ve ever been,” said her friend, Kate Pistone, also an actress, who makes ends meet by working at a restaurant. Sales there have been declining. “I made $5 last night,” she said.
Analysts who spend time prowling the nation’s stores to track trends say that consumers are simply shell-shocked by all the grim financial news.
“You walk the mall and consumers look like zombies,” said Mr. Morris of Wachovia, after visiting a mall last week. “They’re there in person, but not in spirit.”
I have mixed emotions reading such accounts. I want to find something hopeful in people steering clear of shopping, but if the choice is forced by anxiety, than no progress is being made. The idea is for not shopping to make people less and not more like zombies. If we are less preoccupied with acquiring and collecting stuff, the thinking goes, we'll have more energy to devote to actually doing things. (The presumption is that shopping is not quite a real activity but a substitute -- we buy a skiing magazine and imagine going skiing rather than just heading to the mountains.) But such anecdotes as the one in the NYT article remind us that we as a nation are going to experience shopping withdrawal, which most likely will only enhance the allure of the now-rarefied pleasures of impulse buying. We may have forgotten to some scary extent how to enjoy things outside of the structure of a retail exchange. Shopping has become the stage for our pleasurable experiences, making a purchase the trigger for joy. We won't unlearn that immediately simply because it has become economically expedient.

As the wistful waitress-actresses demonstrate, without more money coming in via wages, we have to scale back spending and lose access to the surest pleasures we know. And worse, fewer and fewer Americans are drawing wages at all. This keeps consumer confidence spiraling downward, making it impossible for them to lead a economic recovery.

Paper gains can't supplant wages in sustaining economic growth. In assessing the degree to which the current crisis echoes the Great Depression, historian James Livingston points out that when the share of productivity gains that go to wages falls, consumers can't be counted on to sustain economic expansion:
At the very moment that higher private-sector wages and thus increased consumer expenditures became the only available means to enforce the new pattern of economic growth, income shares shifted decisively away from wages, toward profits. At the very moment that net investment became unnecessary to enforce increased productivity and output, income shares shifted decisively away from wages, toward profits.
And those profits had nowhere to go but into inflating bubbles.

Ferguson connects the reliance on investments rather than wages to the essential problem with the ownership society:
Once upon a time, people saved a portion of their earnings for the proverbial rainy day, stowing the cash in a mattress or a bank safe. The Age of Leverage, as we have seen, brought a growing reliance on borrowing to buy assets in the expectation of their future appreciation in value. For a majority of families, this meant a leveraged investment in a house. That strategy had one very obvious flaw. It represented a one-way, totally unhedged bet on a single asset.
Hence, as housing prices fall, people panic. Housing is better thought of as something you consume, not as an investment, and certainly not your only form of savings. During the housing boom, it was trendy to argue that America's negative savings rate wasn't a problem because it was off-set by swelling asset prices. What we are confronting now shows exactly what was wrong with that thinking.

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

From happy homeownership to the end of our economy (9 Oct 2008)

Promoting homeownership remains a bad idea, as Felix Salmon reminds us here.
The last thing we need right now is a resurgence in homeownership. Too many people own their homes already, including a lot of families who really shouldn't. Let's start thinking in terms of affordable housing, and not in terms of home equity.
Houses are not investment vehicles, treating them as such is pretty foolish and potentially destructive. And the economy as a whole is far less flexible when too many workers are tied down in one spot with a home. And when fringe exurbs are developed to allow for more lower-income families to own, it leads to enormous inefficiencies and a massive amount of energy wasted on extreme commuting. Etc.

Conservatives seem to want to blame Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for the crisis, but though they went broke in part by facilitating the mistaken ideal of the "ownership society," they did not cause the current economic turmoil. Along with a choice quote from President Bush from 2004 in which he promotes "agggressive lending" to first-time borrowers -- how surprising that this hasn't worked out well -- Barry Ritholtz has a good concise explanation of what did cause the crisis:
To repeat my prior arguments, the proximate cause of the Housing crisis were (1) Ultra-low rates; and (2) Abdication of traditional lending standards, thanks to (3) originators ability to resell mortgages for securitization purposes, and hence, (4) not have to worry about loan defaults.
The credit crisis was caused by (1) the above securitized mortgage paper, that was (2) rated triple AAA by Moody's and Standard & Poors, which then (3) Which was then "insured" by credit default swaps (CDS) -- the unreserved for, shadow insurance products (4) whose exemption was made possible by the Commodities Futures Modernization Act. That legislation exempted these derivatives from any supervision or regulation. The lack of reserve requirements is why there is now $62 trillion in CDS, many of which will never pay their counter parties the promised insurance.
Encouraged by the society-wide celebration of home ownership, mortgage lenders believed that their business was exempt from ethics or rational due diligence about the way funds were being distributed. So they lent to people without verifying whether they had any chance to pay off the loan, because that repayment was basically someone else's problem. (In some instances, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which would repurchase mortgages from the negligent bankers who originally made them as long as they "conformed", i.e. were not "jumbo" loans for McMansions and the like, or subprime loans. These restrictions were supposed to protect Fannie and Freddie, only many borrowers turned out to be subprime, in effect, once house prices began to drop and they couldn't refinance. When these people began to default in high numbers, Fannie and Freddie were on the hook, having resold the mortgages as high-rated securities to other, mainly institutional investors who expected them to be guaranteed by the U.S. government -- hence bailout.) All these loans were made into securities, and they were rated highly because the rate of default was presumed to be low, and defaults were supposedly protected by the default-swaps, which provided for some other company to basically pay the mortgages if the lenders didn't. But defaults were much higher than expected, and no funds were reserved to cover the losses by those who provided the insurance -- instead, those insurers were leveraged to the gills. Hence A.I.G. gets nationalized, and banks stop lending to one another (aka Libor jumps astronomically), because they don't know which ones will go broke next. Lots of consumer rates, unfortunately, are pegged to Libor, which ordinarily tracks the Fed Funds rate closely. Right now, though, it's off the chart. So consumers can't afford to borrow anymore, which means the rest of the economy scales down for a recession. Welcome to Great Depression redux, according to economist Nicolas Bloom:
So why is this banking collapse and rise in uncertainty likely to be so damaging for the economy? First, the lack of credit is strangling firm’s abilities to make investments, hire workers and start R&D projects. Since these typically take several months to initiate the full force of this will only be fully felt by the beginning of 2009. Second, for the lucky few firms with access to credit the heightened uncertainty will lead them to postpone making investment and hiring decisions. It is expensive to make a hiring or investment mistake, so if conditions are unpredictable the best course of action is often to wait. Of course if every firm in the economy waits then economic activity slows down. This directly cuts back on investment and employment, two of the main drivers of economic growth. But this also has knock-on effects in depressing productivity growth. Most productivity growth comes from creative destruction – productive firms expanding and unproductive firms shrinking. Of course if every firm in the economy pauses this creative destruction temporarily freezes – productive firms do not grow and unproductive firms do not contract. This leads to a stalling productivity growth.
But at least people got to live in their "own" homes for a few years. It really gave us such a sense of pride while it lasted.

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Fanny and Freddie Got Fingered (14 July 2008)

Okay, that entry title makes no sense for a post about the impending Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae bailout, but I just wanted to make a pun referencing the funniest movie of the 1990s.

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are in the business of guaranteeing residential mortgages, and not an inconsiderable amount of them -- more than half, as economist Jared Bernstein notes here. Freddie and Fannie masquerade as independent companies, but investors have always assumed that they are really government agencies and therefore can never go broke. If a spate of mortgages they had guaranteed went bad, taxpayer money would simply be requisitioned to allow the firms to continue operating, since they clearly don't have the capital on hand to deal with any significant problems. The wisdom of that assumption is now being put to the test, as Fannie and Freddie are spirialing into oblivion.

As mortgages became more and more subprime, they chose to keep up their market share, as Tanta at Calculated Risk details in this comprehensive post. Because of restrictions in their charters, they managed to avoid the worst of the housing bubble's excesses, but, as Tanta argues, they therefore missed the opportunity to use their clout to impose some discipline on the subprime business, and instead it remained the wild west of financing, a place full of dupes, dishonest brokers, and fat profits to reap -- as long as housing prices continued rising. That didn't happen, as many housing bubble skeptics including Dean Baker and Nouriel Roubini had predicted at the time. To ease problems the credit crunch brought to the private-lending market, legislators pushed to expand Fannie and Freddie's operations, a idea that investors are now seeming to recognize is a pretty bad one, likely to make their loan portfolios -- already threatened by sinking home prices everywhere -- become even worse.

With the companies' insolvency looming, the government has to do something (without them, buying and selling houses in America could become well nigh impossible), but the Republicans in charge are loath to admit the necessity of nationalizing them, nor are they eager to stick it to Wall Street by letting all of Fannie and Freddie's investors burn. So Treasury secretary Hank Paulson, confronted by a kind of ideological zugzwang, tried to gain a tempo by making an ambiguous speech (admirably parsed here by Felix Salmon). And that's where things stand currently.

At the FT site, Willem Buiter has the best explanation of what's wrong with all of this: it's "dishonest socialism":
There are many forms of socialism. The version practiced in the US is the most deceitful one I know. An honest, courageous socialist government would say: this is a worthwhile social purpose (financing home ownership, helping my friends on Wall Street); therefore I am going to subsidize it; and here are the additional taxes (or cuts in other public spending) to finance it.
Instead the dishonest, spineless socialist policy makers in successive Democratic and Republican administrations have systematically tried to hide both the subsidies and size and distribution of the incremental fiscal burden associated with the provision of these subsidies, behind an endless array of opaque arrangements and institutions. Off-balance-sheet vehicles and off-budget financing were the bread and butter of the US federal government long before they became popular in Wall Street and the City of London.
The abuse of the Fed as a quasi-fiscal agent of the federal government in the rescue of Bear Stearns is without precedent, and quite possibly without legal justification. The creation of the Delaware SPV that houses $30 billion worth of the most toxic waste from the Bear Stearns balance sheet (with only $1 billion of JP Morgan money standing between the tax payer and the likely losses on the $29 billion committed by the Fed to fund the SPV on a non-recourse basis) is the clearest example of quasi-fiscal obfuscation I have come across in an advanced industrial country. The decision by the Fed to ‘invite’ the primary dealers and their clearers to collude in the (over) pricing of illiquid collateral offered by the primary dealers to the Fed at the newly created TSLF and PDCF (by the Fed accepting the pricing/valuation by the clearers of the illiquid collateral) is another example of the abuse of the Fed as a vehicle for channeling taxpayer-financed subsidies to the primary dealers. This form of socialism for the rich is therefore well-established.

This is how oligarchs prefer the economy to operate: Privatize the gains, socialize the risk. And it seems to me that the obfuscation brought on by the sacredness attributed to homeownership -- that anything is excusable as long as it helps "families" experience the indelible blessing of owning property -- is what enables it.

Thursday, June 30, 2011

The homeownership cult (19 May 2008)

Tanta at Calculated Risk does us the service of dismantling the bizarre recent NYT editorial fretting over the "psychological scarring" brought on by foreclosure by economist Robert Shiller, once a stern critic of "irrational exuberance" who seems to have become an apologist for the homeownership cult and the property buyers who went in over their heads.. Foreclosure is no doubt painful, but I vigorously disagree with the idea that people skeptical of bailouts are "cynics". And this preposterous piece of ownership society propaganda made my eyeballs melt: "Homeownership is fundamental part of a sense of belonging to a country." Really? "People instinctively understand that homeownership conveys good feelings about belonging in our society, and that such feelings matter enormously, not only to our economic success but also to the pleasure we can take in it." Owning a home is "instinctual"? Aarrrgghhh. Not only am I not a real citizen, but I have faulty human instincts. Perhaps I should be interred somewhere to protect the ownership society at large. Then, Shiller wries,
The psychologist William James wrote in 1890 that “a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account.”
Homeownership is thus an extension of self; if one owns a part of a country, one tends to feel at one with that country. Policy makers around the world have long known that, and hence have supported the growth of homeownership.
Apparently Shiller thinks we should adjust laws to help men's Selves feel sure of all their possessions, not just their houses but their women as well. If he owns her, he will feel at one with her, and isn't that a recipe for a good marriage?

As Tanta says:
I'm actually, you know, in favor of some sympathy for homeowners, but one thing that does get in the way of that for a lot of us is, well, the rather disgusting shallowness that a lot of them displayed on the way up. There is this whole part of our culture that has sprung into being since 1890 that takes a rather severe view of conspicuous consumption, unbridled materialism, and totally self-defeating use of debt to buy McMansions, if not yachts. We were treated to a fair amount of that kind of thing in the last few years. In fact, we had Dr. Shiller explaining to us last year that a lot of folks just wanted to get rich, quick, in real estate.
It is undeniably true, I assert, that not everyone was a speculatin' spend-thrift maxing out the HELOCs to buy more toys, and that part of our problem today with public opinion is that we extend our (quite proper) disgust for these latter-day Yuppies to the entire class "homeowner." But it is surely an odd way to engage our sympathies for the non-speculator class to speak of it in Jamesian terms as the man whose self is defined by his Stuff, and whose psychological pain is felt most acutely when he recognizes that he is now just like the riff-raff.
It's worse than odd -- it's downright reactionary -- to then go on to that evocation of homeownership as good citizenship and good citizenship as "feel[ing] at one with [the] country." This puts a rather sinister light on Shiller's earlier insistence that we need to make sure people don't get too "cynical."

Amen.

At Naked Capitalism, Yves Smith also mocks this ludicrous editorial:
This piece illustrates much of what is wrong-headed about the "rescue the homeowner" concept. First, attempting to prop up assets at levels not supported by the underlying economics (in this case, incomes) does not work (see here for an illustration). The prices will in the end revert to a sustainable level, if not trade below them for a while in some (perhaps even many) markets. Japan is an extreme example of the consequences: low growth due to good capital being thrown after bad and delays in clearing out bad loans and recapitalizing the financial system so it could get back to its job of funding productive enterprise.
Second, keeping housing expensive hurts first-time buyers, such as the young and the lower income. It not only makes it more difficult for them to engineer a purchase, but in communities which participated in the housing boom, assures that their housing investment will be lousy, if not a loser. It's unlikely to appreciate from an inflated level; the best outcome would be for it to hold its nominal value for a long time while its real value gets eroded by inflation.

Then, in response to Shiller's call for a salve on the wounded psyches of distressed homeowners, she adds:
Moving if you are a kid sucks. But Shiller wouldn't argue that government intervention is called for to prevent family relocations due to getting a new job, divorce, deciding to be closer to aging parents. Note that other forms of financial trauma that might lead to a residential downsizing also fail to merit government subsidies, such as a renter having to move into even smaller digs (or moving in with parents or children) due to a job loss, high medical bills, or overspending. No, thanks to the sanctity of homeownership, giving up a house you can't afford is a tragedy deserving of Federal aid, while other forms of psychological or financial loss don't cut it.

That's it in a nutshell. Homeownership is seen as something we must protect at all costs, even for people who overreached; poverty, homelessness, health insurance, etc., etc., etc. -- not so much. The cult of homeownership has too many people brainwashed. Economist Tim Duy, looking at how out of whack home prices have become in Bend, Oregon, puts it succinctly in a very concrete context: "the magnitude of the misalignment in Bend is quite remarkable, and in my mind represents a complete failure of social policy. This is especially the case when policy has turned homeownership into a moral imperative, creating a culture that equates renting with failure and granite countertops with success."

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Defying the stimulus (6 May 2008)

According to the logic by which the fiscal stimulus package was passed in February, Americans are supposed to go out and immediately spend the $600 or so we are due to receive over the next few weeks. That way we'll be stimulating demand for American-made goods and services, helping keep the country out of recession. Do your part and shop!

I, for one, will be doing no such thing personally; faulty withholding left me owing that money (and then some) in taxes. And judging by this Bloomberg article (via Yves Smith), I won't be the only one defying the logic.
Consumers are being hit by a triple whammy: rising prices, increasing unemployment and shrinking wealth. Companies have cut payrolls for five straight months, by a total of 326,000 workers.
House prices in 20 metropolitan areas fell 12.7 percent in February from a year earlier, the biggest drop since S&P/Case- Shiller began tracking the data seven years ago.
``We've had a very significant deterioration in the financial position of households in the past year,'' Sinai says. ``Consumers can't tap their housing equity any more.''
Household debt has risen more than 85 percent since the middle of 2001 -- the last time the government handed out tax rebates in a bid to spur the economy. That has prompted some on Wall Street, including David Rosenberg, Merrill Lynch's North American economist in New York, to conclude that consumers will spend less this time, paying down debt instead.
That makes you wonder if this money wouldn't have been better spent on programs meant to reduce mortgage debt; that $125 billion or so could have been used as money to take the sting off government-mandated cramdowns. That way, foreclosures might be forestalled, and the housing market -- the source of much of the economy's problems -- would have a chance to find its bottom. Instead, perhaps out of some notion of fairness, everyone is getting the free money. The ones likely to spend it on consumption are probably those who least need the cash or the items they will buy. That doesn't particularly seem any more fair when you think about it. People like me shouldn't be given flat-screen TVs by the government.

As the article notes, retailers are trying hard to get their piece of the checks: It cites a Sears incentive of offering a 10 percent premium on checks converted entirely into Sears gift cards, and an unspecified plan of Wal-Mart's to lure shoppers. By the logic of the stimulus package, they are doing their patriotic part, trying to encourage citizens to do what they are supposed to with the checks instead of saving them, which would be horribly detrimental to the purpose of the checks. (Maybe the government should have purchased goods and services directly -- start building roads and such, WPA style. Then we could really get deep into the Depression-era nostalgia.)

It all seems insane. When you remove the macroeconomic blinders, it's hard to see the problem with the U.S. economy as being that people don't spend enough. Nonetheless, in order to get debt-ridden consumers to spend even more, the government has handed out money to these overspent people, which has had the effect of ramping up the marketing schemes of some of the largest retailers to get them to continue to ignore underlying economic realities. Wasn't the problem that people spent more than they had, and they went into debt they had no hope of repaying to be able to spend even more? If anything, aren't Americans virtually addicted to shopping, and unable to conceive of any other course of actions to satisfy their needs, which are all supposed to be solved with the act of buying some product? Are we trying to protect the economy or the ideological superstructure of the consumer society, that enshrines such spending as the most essential civic and self-fashioning act? Is the stimulus package an admission that we can't even pretend to separate the economy from the consumerist value system any longer?