This Gawker item about the Facebook redesign offers a useful phrase for thinking about Twitterification generally: We are expected to be, or become, "omnivorous consumers of momentary trivia." Not only that, but we are expected to produce that trivia ceaselessly and eagerly. This calls to mind Foucault's ideas about power exercising itself not as repression -- that is, as forbidding us to speak or to act in certain ways -- but as permission, as a kind of broad encouragement to speak (albeit through discourses that constitute our identities along certain prescribed lines). Our participation lets power work through us, which we can experience as being exciting -- as being part of the action; we are all under surveillance, but we understand that emotionally as "Hey, we're all celebrities!" Foucault calls it "control by stimulation." This is why people seem to feel compelled to use Twitter. We want to participate, want to be counted, want to count.
I assume someone out there is working on a dissertation (or has at least posted a really incisive blog entry -- maybe among these) that does a Foucaldian analysis of social media (which I would be eager to read actually) -- it fits so well with his predictions of a panoptic society. We are spying on each other (that's certainly how it feels when someone tags me in a high school photo), and confessing ourselves to everybody else (in hourly 140-character broadcasts), and mistaking it all for entertainment consumption, ordinary leisure activities.
Social media tends to be understood as a kind of freedom to express ourselves in a new way; interactivity liberates us from one-way communication and affords us the opportunity to speak and participate. But this "freedom" can function as a kind of compulsion, as part of what Baudrillard et al. called the "fun morality." Foucault insisted that power is both decentralized (not a matter of some authority telling you what you must do) and productive (it allows more things to have a kind of social being, not fewer; creates more data, not less). In an interview in Power/Knowledge, he says, "What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse." Various modern technologies have brought about what he calls "a new economy of power" that allows "the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted, and 'individualized' throughout the entire social body." In other words, there is no way to sneak around power because we are basically bathing in it, breathing it in and out at all times. Twitter-style discourse is the latest instance of a social discourse that functions this way, reinforcing the compulsion to confess. The "effects of power" Foucault is talking about, I think, is a matter of our being available -- power makes us available to various social institutions so that are efforts can be harvested and our behavior channeled accordingly without our even conceiving of resistance.
Showing posts with label false presence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label false presence. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
Foucault's Facebook (18 March 2009)
Labels:
facebook,
false presence,
foucault,
fun morality,
identity,
social media,
surveillance,
twitter
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
God bless text messaging (14 Oct 2008)
Like Ezra Klein, I'm puzzled by this cranky screed by Louis Menand about text messaging in the New Yorker. It's enough to reaffirm the magazine's "public image as a parochial, old-World-wannabe bastion of upper-income hauteur," as Vance Lehmkuhl puts it in a slightly different context, discussing the magazine's baroque copy editing style.
The piece is triggered by the review of a book about texting, Txtng: The Gr8 Db8 by linguist David Crystal, which seems to have been written to reassure those grammar pedants who worry about language being "destroyed" by people using it in new ways. Crystal's conclusion seems to be that of any sane descriptive linguist -- language will be fine. Nothing is worse for the health of a language than dogmatism about usage.
Menand, though, seems so utterly clueless about texting, I almost expected him to defend voicemail: "In some respects, texting is a giant leap backward in the science of communication. It’s more efficient than semaphore, maybe, but how much more efficient is it than Morse code? With Morse code, to make an “s” you needed only three key presses." The point of comparison for texting is not Morse code, but talking, which is highly inefficient, not only because it carries with it requisite codes of politeness that slow communication down but also because conversation allows for all sorts of back-channel feedback and non-semantic cues (tone of voice, etc.) that clutter the message. Texting allows people to relay information without having to talk, and frankly, I don't understand who wouldn't prefer that in most mobile situations. I like to text not because it's a "game" or because it imposes formal compositional constraints on my expression (two things that Menand emphasizes in Crystal's account) but because it preserves the sanctity of real conversation. Menand notes that "People don’t like to have to perform the amount of self-presentation that is required in a personal encounter," but then fails to draw the conclusion that texting liberates us from the burden of all sorts of unnecessary performance. Not every act of communication needs to be so personal and performative. It's not the Algonquin round table every time we have something to communicate. Sometimes you just want to confirm that you are meeting at 8:00. And when Menand claims that "Texting is so formulaic that it is nearly anonymous" he reveals his lack of experience with the medium or the witlessness of his texting correspondents. Many text messages I've received have made me laugh out loud, and they often reveal a great deal about the person sending them.
Conversation is a practice best reserved for face-to-face encounters; texting helps restore conversation to its natural habitat by making the phone conversation necessary only in rare circumstances. I suspect lots of people share that view, which is why virtually all phones will have a keyboard in a few years, and the only phones without them will be held by the preliterate and technophobes who haven't got over their resentment of cell-phone culture altogether.
I used to be one of those haters, and I still resent the idea that I should be accessible at all times. But in practice, it hasn't worked out that way; texting allows me to be not present but still communicating -- which is actually quite refreshing. Menand thinks that the appeal of texting is speed, but that's not how it is for me, anyway. It's about escaping the hassles of reciprocity in communication. Something is certainly lost in this; much is communicated incidentally in conversation as people wend their way to what they want to say and react to the seemingly extraneous information that enters in to the exchange. But much is gained in the way of emotional efficiency when you can broadcast your intentions and proceed. This seems like a main shift in the way we communicate -- social networks and cell-phones and such encourage us to broadcast information about ourselves without particular concern for reciprocity or the particular context our audience might be dealing with. It grants us the gift of impersonality, which is not the same as anonymity -- it's instead a heightened performativity; the posture of a writer toward a public. It requires us to assume a certain self-centeredness, to be sure, but it also respects the audience as well, in that it doesn't demand their immediate attention. So I think Menand is totally wrong when he claims that "delay is the only disrespect." The whole point of texting is that delay is your prerogative. You are not required to hold this radiation-emitting device to your ear waiting for a response.
The piece is triggered by the review of a book about texting, Txtng: The Gr8 Db8 by linguist David Crystal, which seems to have been written to reassure those grammar pedants who worry about language being "destroyed" by people using it in new ways. Crystal's conclusion seems to be that of any sane descriptive linguist -- language will be fine. Nothing is worse for the health of a language than dogmatism about usage.
Menand, though, seems so utterly clueless about texting, I almost expected him to defend voicemail: "In some respects, texting is a giant leap backward in the science of communication. It’s more efficient than semaphore, maybe, but how much more efficient is it than Morse code? With Morse code, to make an “s” you needed only three key presses." The point of comparison for texting is not Morse code, but talking, which is highly inefficient, not only because it carries with it requisite codes of politeness that slow communication down but also because conversation allows for all sorts of back-channel feedback and non-semantic cues (tone of voice, etc.) that clutter the message. Texting allows people to relay information without having to talk, and frankly, I don't understand who wouldn't prefer that in most mobile situations. I like to text not because it's a "game" or because it imposes formal compositional constraints on my expression (two things that Menand emphasizes in Crystal's account) but because it preserves the sanctity of real conversation. Menand notes that "People don’t like to have to perform the amount of self-presentation that is required in a personal encounter," but then fails to draw the conclusion that texting liberates us from the burden of all sorts of unnecessary performance. Not every act of communication needs to be so personal and performative. It's not the Algonquin round table every time we have something to communicate. Sometimes you just want to confirm that you are meeting at 8:00. And when Menand claims that "Texting is so formulaic that it is nearly anonymous" he reveals his lack of experience with the medium or the witlessness of his texting correspondents. Many text messages I've received have made me laugh out loud, and they often reveal a great deal about the person sending them.
Conversation is a practice best reserved for face-to-face encounters; texting helps restore conversation to its natural habitat by making the phone conversation necessary only in rare circumstances. I suspect lots of people share that view, which is why virtually all phones will have a keyboard in a few years, and the only phones without them will be held by the preliterate and technophobes who haven't got over their resentment of cell-phone culture altogether.
I used to be one of those haters, and I still resent the idea that I should be accessible at all times. But in practice, it hasn't worked out that way; texting allows me to be not present but still communicating -- which is actually quite refreshing. Menand thinks that the appeal of texting is speed, but that's not how it is for me, anyway. It's about escaping the hassles of reciprocity in communication. Something is certainly lost in this; much is communicated incidentally in conversation as people wend their way to what they want to say and react to the seemingly extraneous information that enters in to the exchange. But much is gained in the way of emotional efficiency when you can broadcast your intentions and proceed. This seems like a main shift in the way we communicate -- social networks and cell-phones and such encourage us to broadcast information about ourselves without particular concern for reciprocity or the particular context our audience might be dealing with. It grants us the gift of impersonality, which is not the same as anonymity -- it's instead a heightened performativity; the posture of a writer toward a public. It requires us to assume a certain self-centeredness, to be sure, but it also respects the audience as well, in that it doesn't demand their immediate attention. So I think Menand is totally wrong when he claims that "delay is the only disrespect." The whole point of texting is that delay is your prerogative. You are not required to hold this radiation-emitting device to your ear waiting for a response.
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Feeling sorry for sex (13 March 2008)
This essay by Lauren Berlant at The Nation, about how we denigrate sex in the public sphere, is a good example of something I sort of agree with but the way it's expressed makes me want to repudiate it and come up with a counterargument.
If her point were that sex scandals reveal how social attitudes about sex are used to control what sorts of relationships people think to create for themselves, I would be on board completely. But she is claiming that sex scandals are at root about erotophobia, the fear of sexuality because of its alleged ickiness. And that just seems flat-out wrong. First of all, prostitution may not even be a primarily a sexual matter, anymore than pornography is about sexuality -- they are both expressions of power and control through sexual means, with the sexual overtones serving only to make the thrills of power seem more salient.
And people are not scandalized by Spitzer's having sex. If anything, they are excited and titillated by the sex in the story. Sex scandals make good press because people love having an excuse to talk about sex in a public forum. If the public is offended by anything, it may be by his breaking the law in a highly hypocritical fashion and spectacularly violating the social contract he entered into by getting married. In the coverage of scandals such as these, sex itself is not made to seem morbid and unnatural, as Berlant argues, but instead it's the rejection of approved forms for intimate relationships -- that one would dare to ignore the strictures of the nuclear family -- that is pathologized. That is where the shame is, not in sexual activity itself. Berlant makes it seem as though the problem is that people aren't having enough sex; but it's the use of sex as a social tool to control the sorts of relations people can have or even consider having.
This is the graf that annoys me particularly:
That last line could describe a beer or a cigarette or Wii. What about the sexuality that's not conceptualized as a reified product to be maximized quantitatively? What of sex that's not a part of the experience economy -- which is what prostitution is simply the ultimate expression of -- but is instead a lived-in process that has no rigid boundaries, that expresses the curiosity that fuels an active attitude toward life's constructive possibilities, that isn't just something you do to distract yourself from work or everyday hassles?
Anyway, society approves certain modes of sexual expression precisely because the power of sex is so respected. In fact, that power is cultivated -- that's what Foucault seems to be arguing in The History of Sexuality. The power of the sex drive allows it to be an extremely useful tool in structuring social institutions and systems of control. Sexual morality is not an expression of a "fear" of sex; it's a honing of sex's power to dictate the shape of people's lives. And many welcome this -- they are following these scandals carefully not out of horror but out of the satisfaction of seeing sex's cultural power reiterated. To oversimplify a bit, prohibitions make sex more intense and exciting. It reaffirms that we are right to be thinking of sex so much and that it's appropriate that sex appeal is used ubiquitously to sell products.
That's why it's hopelessly utopian and likely counterproductive to wish for a "world that saw [sex] basically as a good. A weird good." It's too powerful an impulse to be ignored in the formation of social institutions. It will always be structured, and therefore regarded instrumentally, not as some end-in-itself, some independent good. For it to be "playful" in the way Berlant yearns for, it must exist within a game with rules. "Who knows what sex could be if people were encouraged to enjoy it as play rather than as a drama," -- but isn't drama a form of play? -- "a genuine test of recognition or tool of unwanted control over selves and others." I don't know, but I'd venture this guess: To wish for a world that left sexuality unstructured socially would be to yearn to see sex stripped of its power and made into a mundane, natural and inevitable, strictly personal process, akin to going to the bathroom. And then it truly would be icky.
If her point were that sex scandals reveal how social attitudes about sex are used to control what sorts of relationships people think to create for themselves, I would be on board completely. But she is claiming that sex scandals are at root about erotophobia, the fear of sexuality because of its alleged ickiness. And that just seems flat-out wrong. First of all, prostitution may not even be a primarily a sexual matter, anymore than pornography is about sexuality -- they are both expressions of power and control through sexual means, with the sexual overtones serving only to make the thrills of power seem more salient.
And people are not scandalized by Spitzer's having sex. If anything, they are excited and titillated by the sex in the story. Sex scandals make good press because people love having an excuse to talk about sex in a public forum. If the public is offended by anything, it may be by his breaking the law in a highly hypocritical fashion and spectacularly violating the social contract he entered into by getting married. In the coverage of scandals such as these, sex itself is not made to seem morbid and unnatural, as Berlant argues, but instead it's the rejection of approved forms for intimate relationships -- that one would dare to ignore the strictures of the nuclear family -- that is pathologized. That is where the shame is, not in sexual activity itself. Berlant makes it seem as though the problem is that people aren't having enough sex; but it's the use of sex as a social tool to control the sorts of relations people can have or even consider having.
This is the graf that annoys me particularly:
Nonetheless, I'm just saying, I really like sex. We have no idea what sex would be like in a world that saw it basically as a good. A weird good. A good that can tip you over and make you want to do strange things. A good that can reveal your incoherence, your love of a little disorder, your love of a little control (adjust the dial as you like). A good that can make you happy, for a minute, before the cat starts scratching the corner of the bed, or the phone rings, or the kids mew, or you're hungry and sleepy, or you need another drink or the taxi comes.
That last line could describe a beer or a cigarette or Wii. What about the sexuality that's not conceptualized as a reified product to be maximized quantitatively? What of sex that's not a part of the experience economy -- which is what prostitution is simply the ultimate expression of -- but is instead a lived-in process that has no rigid boundaries, that expresses the curiosity that fuels an active attitude toward life's constructive possibilities, that isn't just something you do to distract yourself from work or everyday hassles?
Anyway, society approves certain modes of sexual expression precisely because the power of sex is so respected. In fact, that power is cultivated -- that's what Foucault seems to be arguing in The History of Sexuality. The power of the sex drive allows it to be an extremely useful tool in structuring social institutions and systems of control. Sexual morality is not an expression of a "fear" of sex; it's a honing of sex's power to dictate the shape of people's lives. And many welcome this -- they are following these scandals carefully not out of horror but out of the satisfaction of seeing sex's cultural power reiterated. To oversimplify a bit, prohibitions make sex more intense and exciting. It reaffirms that we are right to be thinking of sex so much and that it's appropriate that sex appeal is used ubiquitously to sell products.
That's why it's hopelessly utopian and likely counterproductive to wish for a "world that saw [sex] basically as a good. A weird good." It's too powerful an impulse to be ignored in the formation of social institutions. It will always be structured, and therefore regarded instrumentally, not as some end-in-itself, some independent good. For it to be "playful" in the way Berlant yearns for, it must exist within a game with rules. "Who knows what sex could be if people were encouraged to enjoy it as play rather than as a drama," -- but isn't drama a form of play? -- "a genuine test of recognition or tool of unwanted control over selves and others." I don't know, but I'd venture this guess: To wish for a world that left sexuality unstructured socially would be to yearn to see sex stripped of its power and made into a mundane, natural and inevitable, strictly personal process, akin to going to the bathroom. And then it truly would be icky.
Labels:
false presence,
sexuality
Sunday, January 2, 2011
Phoning it in (13 Feb 2007)
Several bloggers have recently noted a dread of having to talk on the phone. Matt Yglesias wonders if this is "a common psychological profile to blogging's early adopters" and Amanda Marcotte argues that "the phone simply fails to live up to the internet as a form of remote communication. The advantages of the internet are that you have more control over when you speak to someone. In chat, if they’re online, sweet, you can talk to them. If you’re busy or distracted, log off and no feelings hurt. Email is casual but can be performed on your time. The telephone has none of the convenience or privacy of the internet, but it doesn’t really have the intimacy of in-person conversations."
I also hate the phone; it's ringing jangles my nerves like nothing else, particularly because I've saddled myself with a principled opposition (loosely based on Kant's categorical imperative) to letting it ring through to the answering machine. I can fully relate to Marcotte's point that phone conversations are not sufficiently immersive enough to stop one from, say, playing Freecell at the same time and missing two out of five words the other person says. Maybe being overly habituated to getting information through reading augments that problem; it may take words on a page to get me to really concentrate and focus, and it takes an interlocutor being in the room with me to enforce my attention. Phone conversation also rewards arbitrary space filling; getting a call can sometimes feel like being a television that a bored person's turned on, looking for distraction.
The problem with phone conversations, I think, is that they promise presence but produce absence. Phone talk is pseudo-intimacy that mocks real intimacy. A phone conversation delivers another's unique voice to you, but it's a faint shadow of really hearing them. With other forms of immediate long-distance communication available, what the phone as a medium now communicates (and with such force it tends to drown out whatever is being talked about) is the specificity of the person's voice, and how that voice is not there in the room with you. This prompts me to want to use the phone exclusively for making plans to see people in person in the very near future. Otherwise the fungible written word will have to suffice.
The phone can easily and unfortunately be deployed as a means to control other people.
But perhaps online communication may end up providing us too much control over conversation, making it something that is so completely on-demand that it will eventually become solipsistic. No one will ever be able to force you to discuss something you are not interested in, but perhaps should be -- instead you may be able to use online communication as a screen, tossing off postponing or superficial e-mails that seem to attend to such matters without really bearing down on them. "Real" interpersonal communication may require some actual sacrifice at some point, some reciprocation and compromise (for better or worse, the phone demands these). These are perhaps the building blocks of commitment to a specific audience. But online presence management seems to promise the eradication of these nuisances. You'll be able to have conversation only when it suits you, and you will pop online and be content to talk to whoever happens to be out there. The online population is so vast as to provide any number of people who might relate to you, or at least hold up the mirror in which you want to see yourself. The specificity of the other person may come to be fully irrelevant, leaving you typing for your own sake, for the pleasure it gives you to read your own words regardless of who it is prompting them. Hell, at that point you may as well be blogging.
I also hate the phone; it's ringing jangles my nerves like nothing else, particularly because I've saddled myself with a principled opposition (loosely based on Kant's categorical imperative) to letting it ring through to the answering machine. I can fully relate to Marcotte's point that phone conversations are not sufficiently immersive enough to stop one from, say, playing Freecell at the same time and missing two out of five words the other person says. Maybe being overly habituated to getting information through reading augments that problem; it may take words on a page to get me to really concentrate and focus, and it takes an interlocutor being in the room with me to enforce my attention. Phone conversation also rewards arbitrary space filling; getting a call can sometimes feel like being a television that a bored person's turned on, looking for distraction.
The problem with phone conversations, I think, is that they promise presence but produce absence. Phone talk is pseudo-intimacy that mocks real intimacy. A phone conversation delivers another's unique voice to you, but it's a faint shadow of really hearing them. With other forms of immediate long-distance communication available, what the phone as a medium now communicates (and with such force it tends to drown out whatever is being talked about) is the specificity of the person's voice, and how that voice is not there in the room with you. This prompts me to want to use the phone exclusively for making plans to see people in person in the very near future. Otherwise the fungible written word will have to suffice.
The phone can easily and unfortunately be deployed as a means to control other people.
But perhaps online communication may end up providing us too much control over conversation, making it something that is so completely on-demand that it will eventually become solipsistic. No one will ever be able to force you to discuss something you are not interested in, but perhaps should be -- instead you may be able to use online communication as a screen, tossing off postponing or superficial e-mails that seem to attend to such matters without really bearing down on them. "Real" interpersonal communication may require some actual sacrifice at some point, some reciprocation and compromise (for better or worse, the phone demands these). These are perhaps the building blocks of commitment to a specific audience. But online presence management seems to promise the eradication of these nuisances. You'll be able to have conversation only when it suits you, and you will pop online and be content to talk to whoever happens to be out there. The online population is so vast as to provide any number of people who might relate to you, or at least hold up the mirror in which you want to see yourself. The specificity of the other person may come to be fully irrelevant, leaving you typing for your own sake, for the pleasure it gives you to read your own words regardless of who it is prompting them. Hell, at that point you may as well be blogging.
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