Not long ago I read Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson's "Advertising in the Age of Accelerated Meaning" (pdf), a classic piece of 1990s advertising criticism. (Not everything academics did in the 1990s was superficial junk, notwithstanding this diatribe at Dissent's website about how vapid cultural-studies scholars supposedly were.)
The key point I took away from the article: ad discourse dissolves reality into free-floating signifiers and prompts us to adopt them as the language of self, replacing the identity-making role of tradition in a capitalist world that has eroded all traditional ways and demanded flexibility from its subjects. Design ideology makes that shift more palatable, and social media coincides with our taking a more active role circulating signs the way ads do. With social media we can readily represent ourselves as personal brands, and we shape our identity with that inescapable structuring metaphor in mind. We take the way ads may once have seemed to force us into a particular sort of cobbled-together self out of products and their associated signs and turn it into a positive active procedure, in which we build our personal brand and use our consumption as productive labor building our brand equity.
Some of this essay, from 1996, is dated, mainly because it couldn't have anticipated how the internet would change what they call the "commodity self" -- the identity we fashion for ourselves out of signifiers put into play through advertising discourse. Their key point derives from Baudrillard's idea of the code -- ads detach signifiers from some sort of organic, natural constellation of meaning and make them free-floating; ads marshal and mobilize signfiers and make them attachable to any product or idea. They become a kind of flexible language of images and memes that individuals can apply to their own identity construction; in fact, the chief accomplishment of ad discourse (of all the money put into making ads ubiquitous and their discourse and ideology hegemonic) is to make consumers bathe in ads and adopt its discourse as their own. "Advertising has established the premise that the most gratifying social relations are those associated with the confident, discriminating, sign user." You know, the hipster (the good, on-trend consumer). We hate hipsters because the system, ads as a discourse, is making a promise about what it will be like to be a hipster that actual people who seem like hipsters can't live up to. The prevalence of ad discourse generates outsize expectations of those subjectivated by it. We wish they would stop so we could, but it's not them, it's the entire structuring discourse in all its ubiquity.
Omnipresent ads make us think the language of self should also be the language of ads, which seem by their ubiquity to be the surest way of securing social recognition. Social recognition comes from sounding/seeming like ads, which are manifestly the dominant mode of public discourse. The language of power, measured by exposure, is ad discourse (a consequence of money buying exposure, of commercial media and the leasing of public space to private companies); hence to be powerful, we try to speak of ourselves in that discourse. Of course, ad discourse, as Goldman and Papson point out, "tends to further the hegemony of commodity and market relations" without their being any conscious effort on the part of any evil masterminds ruling from the commanding heights. They "reflect the logic of capital" while they "disguise and suppress inequalities, injustices, irrationalities, and contradictions."
The authors argue that advertising was "in crisis" in the mid-1990s, but that seems to have been a misreading of the significance of advertising's reflexivity and self-deprecation. As Thomas Frank pointed out in Conquest of Cool, this has long been a cyclical strategy for replenishing potency of ad's messages. If anything, the language of ads and branding have become more accepted, almost embraced as a model for one's self-concept -- talk of the personal brand is not at all ironic in contemporary culture, and conceiving of personal goals along the lines of building brand equity are also becoming common as social media turns individuals into mini-media companies with logos/avatars of their own. This amateur population working to detach and recirculate signifiers has forestalled the "sign wars" they anticipated in the 1990s. Instead of advertising eating itself, co-creation and Web 2.0 and productive consumption and the like emerged. We have become the meaning makers and appropriators -- separating things from their ordinary context and allowing them to float free in social media and elsewhere through sharing.
Personal branding and actual product brand managers now complement one another -- we work alongside of advertisers to appropriate and reconfigure and remix signifiers, to generate new meaning possibilities that have value. The intermediate step from being subjected to ads to becoming little ad agencies ourselves lies in the promulgation of design ideology, as epitomized by Virginia Postrel's The Substance of Style, to take one of many possible examples. The insidious creep of design ideology -- that we should choose fonts the express our inner truth, for instance -- works in conjunction with the ideology of advertisements, that magic self-transformation is possible through purchases, no logic required. Both assume that the inner truth can be expressed through manipulation and display of decontextualized signs (in one's appearance, or in one's online presence) rather than through sustained practices. Or rather in replaces all other possible practices with one, the practice of clever sign manipulation. Design ideology rationalizes the overflow of signs pouring in and over us, gives us a protocol for handling the plenitude, for how to slim down and screen some out. It makes the commodity self -- "based on the packaging of self as a collection or ensemble of commodity signs" -- tolerable. Designy-ness is a subjective response to ad culture that accelerates our transformation into a personal brand. It allows us to interpret the ads which saturate our lives as opportunities, as a positive condition, rather than an inescapable blight. Then, armed with design consciousness, we start conceiving of identity explicitly in branding terms.
In a sense, social media is a form of democratized bohemia, extending the design consciousness mentality and the opportunity for commodity-self-nourishing display to everyone, not just hipsters in the right neighborhoods, or not just urban people generally. So social media not only allow for more peacocking personal display (more "sharing") but they also make it more pressing to have more signifiers at the ready, making it expedient to collaborate with advertisers and tolerate them, let them and their detached signifiers into one's intimate life.
Showing posts with label design ideology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label design ideology. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 17, 2011
Tuesday, August 9, 2011
Fashion Coercion (6 April 2010)
I was revisiting the Marginal Utility archive earlier and this entry from a few years ago captured my attention: "Rooting against fashion." It remains true; I still somewhat irrationally want fashion to fail, and most design too. There are, it seems to me, obvious reasons to root against fashion. Beyond being a means for mystifying class distinction (taste naturalizes inequality that is manufactured by social conditions), which is bad enough, fashion sets a social tempo for consumption that seems out of pace with most people's lives, so they experience it as coercive. It compels us to be uncomfortable with ourselves and accept novelty as an inevitable condition of reality, as a positive value. This creates a culture-wide superficiality bias so pervasive, it seems petulant to complain about it. One can belong to society only through an investment in novelty, through caring about arbitrary change and helping establish the illusion that it is not arbitrary and means something more than entropic variation.
Back when I wrote the other post, I wondered why I was cheering against prosperity, the enabling condition for the elaboration of complexity in fashion. And I was cheering against something that seemed to bring other people pleasure -- that let other people feel interesting. What do I have against other people being interesting? Am I threatened by it? Probably. Fashion is a field in which I will never be interested (I am very much a follower and not an early adopter or a trend setter), so from a human capital standpoint, I prefer it when it sinks in cultural esteem. Consciously or not, I'm sure I want people to compete on the fields that I recognize as strengths of mine. I think that I win when fashion and design fail.
Of course not all fashion can fail; something has to occupy the space structurally afforded to fashion trends by our culture. When I root against fashion, I root against this aspect of culture as a whole; it's not as though I wish something else would become trendy. I have the hopeless wish that there weren't any trends at all. But identifying something as a trend is fairly subjective -- the trends that I adopt myself don't seem like trends to me. Only the stuff that other people are collectively doing is recognizable and contemptible as trends. Trends are simply the way people participate in culture without actively making anything -- unless you buy the idea that participation is a kind of production, since consumption of that sort "produces" new and useful information (usually marketing related) about the goods. Our consumption makes meanings, but it isn't necessarily meaningful work, I think. But I waver back and forth about the idea of immaterial labor and consumptive production, wondering about the subjective element in that as well. (Do we have to be aware of the meanings we are producing to consider ourselves productive? Does anyone ever reach the zero degree of passivity? Is one never aware of one's own objective passivity since our consciousness of ourselves is inherently active? Questions in a world of blue.) I tend to think of counter-trend behavior as a more "authentic" way of cultural participation, inherently more active as it functions as an implicit critique and requires conscious resistance. Design and fashion present themselves to consumers as means to avoid critique and resistance in favor of the pleasures of acceptance, the liberty to ignore social critique and simply enjoy the idea of oneself, fitting in and being approved by society at large.
My default interpretation of designy-ness is that it is an attempt at coercion disguised as an effort to please me. I persist in thinking this despite the manifest good intention of most designers, who I don't think are in bad faith about wanting to "help" people or improve their lives with design. Nevertheless, they want to dominate me, and I am supposed to enjoy surrender. (At the New Inquiry, J. Bernstein makes a related point about the politics of reading.) But instead I take pleasure in stubborn resistance. The user-friendliness of, say, Apple's computers strikes me, like many others (not so well represented in the media, it seems) as a prison. I read the convenience as their attempt to predict what I want without my consent or input. If I go along, I won't know if what they wanted me to want was what I really wanted. This attitude gets incredibly counterproductive at times. When autonomy always trumps gratitude, you have to go through life making a point of being difficult to please, and pleasure, if and when it comes, must be private almost by definition.
Back when I wrote the other post, I wondered why I was cheering against prosperity, the enabling condition for the elaboration of complexity in fashion. And I was cheering against something that seemed to bring other people pleasure -- that let other people feel interesting. What do I have against other people being interesting? Am I threatened by it? Probably. Fashion is a field in which I will never be interested (I am very much a follower and not an early adopter or a trend setter), so from a human capital standpoint, I prefer it when it sinks in cultural esteem. Consciously or not, I'm sure I want people to compete on the fields that I recognize as strengths of mine. I think that I win when fashion and design fail.
Of course not all fashion can fail; something has to occupy the space structurally afforded to fashion trends by our culture. When I root against fashion, I root against this aspect of culture as a whole; it's not as though I wish something else would become trendy. I have the hopeless wish that there weren't any trends at all. But identifying something as a trend is fairly subjective -- the trends that I adopt myself don't seem like trends to me. Only the stuff that other people are collectively doing is recognizable and contemptible as trends. Trends are simply the way people participate in culture without actively making anything -- unless you buy the idea that participation is a kind of production, since consumption of that sort "produces" new and useful information (usually marketing related) about the goods. Our consumption makes meanings, but it isn't necessarily meaningful work, I think. But I waver back and forth about the idea of immaterial labor and consumptive production, wondering about the subjective element in that as well. (Do we have to be aware of the meanings we are producing to consider ourselves productive? Does anyone ever reach the zero degree of passivity? Is one never aware of one's own objective passivity since our consciousness of ourselves is inherently active? Questions in a world of blue.) I tend to think of counter-trend behavior as a more "authentic" way of cultural participation, inherently more active as it functions as an implicit critique and requires conscious resistance. Design and fashion present themselves to consumers as means to avoid critique and resistance in favor of the pleasures of acceptance, the liberty to ignore social critique and simply enjoy the idea of oneself, fitting in and being approved by society at large.
My default interpretation of designy-ness is that it is an attempt at coercion disguised as an effort to please me. I persist in thinking this despite the manifest good intention of most designers, who I don't think are in bad faith about wanting to "help" people or improve their lives with design. Nevertheless, they want to dominate me, and I am supposed to enjoy surrender. (At the New Inquiry, J. Bernstein makes a related point about the politics of reading.) But instead I take pleasure in stubborn resistance. The user-friendliness of, say, Apple's computers strikes me, like many others (not so well represented in the media, it seems) as a prison. I read the convenience as their attempt to predict what I want without my consent or input. If I go along, I won't know if what they wanted me to want was what I really wanted. This attitude gets incredibly counterproductive at times. When autonomy always trumps gratitude, you have to go through life making a point of being difficult to please, and pleasure, if and when it comes, must be private almost by definition.
Sunday, August 7, 2011
Useless beauty, etc., etc. (26 March 2010)
Can beauty be separated from domination? That's what this essay about "superbeauty" by Julie Lansky (via Rob Walker) left me wondering. Not that her essay is about that -- it's more of a defense of designing for jouissance rather than for functionality or posturing: "Reclaiming beauty from irony, reclaiming beauty from kitsch — this has been a project of early-21st-century design."
I kept waiting to get mad at the essay -- I have no love for deisgny-ness, and figured it was only a matter of time before I'd want to break out Alfred Loos's Ornament and Crime -- but I was strangely indifferent, largely agreeing with her while pursuing my own tangential thoughts. For example, what does Lansky mean by beauty? That can't be taken for granted, because that is the whole of the ideological stake. Beauty and aesthetics are the time-honored alibi for hierarchical oppression; it is the velvet medium of hegemony. Beauty is defined so as to protect the interest of elites, their cultural and physical capital. Labeling something beautiful is an expression of power; then it's a matter of getting others to either agree or suffer for their disagreement. Lansky comes closest to a definition, I think, in this statement: "Answering the capitalist economy’s call to create and fulfill desire in every corner of life, designers have even entered an age of superbeauty." That is, to assure consumer capitalism's viability and ideological underpinnings, designers assert beauty in novelty, variety and ubiquity, traits suitable to the mandate of continual capital accumulation, and constant expansion of consumer demand. Superbeauty refers to applying aesthetics to mundane objects once considered beneath such attention. That means the logic of distinction, under the pressures of capitalism, is spreading itself over a broader and broader domain. Hierarchy must be articulated in every last corner of the culture; everything must announce "desire," the lack that testifies to the material reality of status, makes it seem a physical inevitability as undeniable as yearning. Nothing can be innocent, nothing can promise a glimpse into an alternative to the logic of capital, and capitalist desire. So I guess I disagree that superbeauty is for "personal delectation" as Lansky argues. That's the classic mystification, that tastes can be personal.
I kept waiting to get mad at the essay -- I have no love for deisgny-ness, and figured it was only a matter of time before I'd want to break out Alfred Loos's Ornament and Crime -- but I was strangely indifferent, largely agreeing with her while pursuing my own tangential thoughts. For example, what does Lansky mean by beauty? That can't be taken for granted, because that is the whole of the ideological stake. Beauty and aesthetics are the time-honored alibi for hierarchical oppression; it is the velvet medium of hegemony. Beauty is defined so as to protect the interest of elites, their cultural and physical capital. Labeling something beautiful is an expression of power; then it's a matter of getting others to either agree or suffer for their disagreement. Lansky comes closest to a definition, I think, in this statement: "Answering the capitalist economy’s call to create and fulfill desire in every corner of life, designers have even entered an age of superbeauty." That is, to assure consumer capitalism's viability and ideological underpinnings, designers assert beauty in novelty, variety and ubiquity, traits suitable to the mandate of continual capital accumulation, and constant expansion of consumer demand. Superbeauty refers to applying aesthetics to mundane objects once considered beneath such attention. That means the logic of distinction, under the pressures of capitalism, is spreading itself over a broader and broader domain. Hierarchy must be articulated in every last corner of the culture; everything must announce "desire," the lack that testifies to the material reality of status, makes it seem a physical inevitability as undeniable as yearning. Nothing can be innocent, nothing can promise a glimpse into an alternative to the logic of capital, and capitalist desire. So I guess I disagree that superbeauty is for "personal delectation" as Lansky argues. That's the classic mystification, that tastes can be personal.
Labels:
aesthetics as ideology,
beauty,
design ideology
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Design Crime (24 Jan 2010)
Please read my most recent column, "Designing Consent," which is up now. I wrote most of it right after I visited the Museum der Dinge in Berlin, which probably intensified my cynicism about industrial design at the time. At the museum was an exhibit called "Evil Things," a collection of bad-taste objects inspired by curator Gustav E. Pazaurek's "Cabinet of Bad Taste" from the early 20th century. Pazaurek attempted to taxonimize bad taste by devising various categories of flaws that he considered morally offensive. All the objects on display in the museum's exhibition exemplified one of these "design crimes" -- which range from objects mixing the organic with the inorganic to their being counterfunctional to their being ostentatiously decorated so as to cloak shoddy workmanship.
The curators expanded the concept from there. This is from the museum's description of the show:
I left the show buoyed by the idea that one could invent a system that would allow us to rule out objects, to serve as another layer of defense against the onslaught of objects, and the various ways industrial designers try to get us to accept more stuff into our lives. Designers seemed like the enemy from that point of view, yet in the film Objectified, which I write about in the column, they tend to present themselves as the moral heroes of our age, practicing their holy arts to simplify the use of things, so that our lives can be completely subsumed in them. Their smug paternalism seems built into the career -- we make objects that make decisions for you about how to use them; we make them point the way to what is proper. User friendliness is conceived as a kind of moral victory; convenience is next to godliness. I appreciated the Evil Objects show because it wanted to return the power of moral judgment to the consumers of objects, not their commercial-minded makers.
The curators expanded the concept from there. This is from the museum's description of the show:
In the age of stylistic pluralism, it seems impossible to establish definitive criteria of "good" or "bad" taste. But a closer look reveals, first, that Pazaurek's categories are applicable without amendment to countless contemporary objects, bringing to light a design practice that is both ludicrous and ironic, and second, that moral criteria are becoming pertinent again in conjunction with a new consumer consciousness. The "crimes" of today's objects, however, are not evident prima facie, because they are manifested not in the design, the material or the decoration, but in the social, economic and ecological context. For this reason, new categories must be added to Pazaurek's catalogue of mistakes.Sadly they don't list the criteria in the description, and I was forgot to write them down while I was there.
I left the show buoyed by the idea that one could invent a system that would allow us to rule out objects, to serve as another layer of defense against the onslaught of objects, and the various ways industrial designers try to get us to accept more stuff into our lives. Designers seemed like the enemy from that point of view, yet in the film Objectified, which I write about in the column, they tend to present themselves as the moral heroes of our age, practicing their holy arts to simplify the use of things, so that our lives can be completely subsumed in them. Their smug paternalism seems built into the career -- we make objects that make decisions for you about how to use them; we make them point the way to what is proper. User friendliness is conceived as a kind of moral victory; convenience is next to godliness. I appreciated the Evil Objects show because it wanted to return the power of moral judgment to the consumers of objects, not their commercial-minded makers.
Labels:
aesthetics as ideology,
art,
design ideology
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
Font Foolishness (16 Nov 2009)
This NYT article about font nerds by Alice Rawsthorn seems to have attracted a fair share of attention.
I am somewhat aware of fonts and will often offer spurious critiques in the spirit of wanting form and function to complement each other. But I have a nostalgia for not knowing, for not having choices in the matter, for there being fewer fonts in circulation. I feel it especially when I see that particular font Chinese companies often use for English -- the one that looks like a poorly kerned cousin of Century. (I think it's Mingliu). It's an expression of my futile wish that words were more transparently understood.
The building fascination with font recognition seems to exemplify that what is said is becoming less important than how it's said. We'd rather think more about how the words look than what they mean. Fonts (and font consciousness) turn words into brands.
Perhaps It's an intermediate step toward abolishing alphabets and replacing them with pictographs to accommodate our graphically minded posterity.
It’s always a pleasure to discover a formally gorgeous, subtly expressive typeface while walking along a street or leafing through a magazine. (Among my current favorites are the very elegant letters in the new identity of the Paris fashion house, CĂ©line, and the jolly jumble of multi-colored fonts on the back of the Rossi Ice Cream vans purring around London.) But that joy is swiftly obliterated by the sight of a typographic howler. It’s like having a heightened sense of smell. You spend much more of your time wincing at noxious stinks, than reveling in delightful aromas.
I am somewhat aware of fonts and will often offer spurious critiques in the spirit of wanting form and function to complement each other. But I have a nostalgia for not knowing, for not having choices in the matter, for there being fewer fonts in circulation. I feel it especially when I see that particular font Chinese companies often use for English -- the one that looks like a poorly kerned cousin of Century. (I think it's Mingliu). It's an expression of my futile wish that words were more transparently understood.
The building fascination with font recognition seems to exemplify that what is said is becoming less important than how it's said. We'd rather think more about how the words look than what they mean. Fonts (and font consciousness) turn words into brands.
Perhaps It's an intermediate step toward abolishing alphabets and replacing them with pictographs to accommodate our graphically minded posterity.
Labels:
design ideology
Smooth-jazzed into submission (27 Oct 2009)
Having spent the weekend in a Hilton hotel in Hartford, Connecticut, this essay from Travel & Leisure by Peter Jon Lindberg, about "bad" music in corporate spaces open to the public, resonated with me (via NYT Ideas). The Hilton was particularly aggressive with the piped-in smooth jazz, which blared in the lobby and the coffee shop and the bar and the elevators and the indoor pool and the fitness center and possibly even the business center, which incidentally was basically an extortion scheme for those poor businesspeople who break their laptops during their stay. (The center offers you the opportunity to rent an old computer at the rate of 99 cents a minute. And don't think you get internet access included with that, or with anything having to do with your stay with Hilton. In fact, the Hilton was out to nickel-and-dime patrons at virtually every level of service. Parking for $18 a night? $15 for the internet? This is not at all how the resort is portrayed on Mad Men.)
Lindberg's essay is an intermittently amusing exercise in fussy snobbery:
Lindberg ends up focusing on Muzak as professionalized aural branding for corporations trying to negotiate the diverse tastes of their clientele, and he even celebrates it, as long as it is "hip" -- that is, suits his indie-rock tastes. That seems like a cop-out, but after all, the piece was published in Travel & Leisure, not Adbusters or something. But along the way, he cites an academic paper by business professors Alan Bradshaw and Morris B. Holbrook, “Must We Have Muzak Wherever We Go?: A critical consideration of the consumer culture,” which argues that the copious deployment of background music "support concerns that culture is degraded by marketers as a means of social control."
By methodically testing the effectiveness of certain types of music to elicit certain behaviors in commercial spaces, canned-music suppliers instrumentalize music, make it "deployable" instead of listenable. Simply schematizing our emotional responsiveness to music may ruin it -- giving credence to the frequent complaint that music criticism kills what it anatomizes. Music is "de-aestheticized": The songs remain the same, but the uses to which they are put (as "retail atmospherics," in the marketing jargon) irreparably alter how we can hear them. We can't pay attention to it with the goal of immersing ourselves in it. It becomes background music everywhere -- it gets iPodded, etc. Further, when music is deployed in this way, we no longer have the option of simply listening to it, of having an unmediated response to it. Music retains its emotional efficacy, but that efficacy is co-opted and used to achieve the ends of those deploying it. When we choose to hear something, we are giving our consent to be moved by it, but when it's foisted on us, we are vulnerable to those properties in music that slip by our conscious defenses. We are moved against our will, to purposes that aren't our own. These include efforts to make us buy more and buy specific things, but more surprising is the suggestion that "less pleasant music" affects our perception of time and theoretically makes waiting in line seem to pass more quickly. Bradshaw and Holbrook, pictures of academic neutrality, put it this way:
If background music can be so effectively instrumentalized, is its ultimate purpose not any particular local effect but a general conditioning of consumer-citizens? Is it subliminal orientation to our role in the totally administered society, or some such? "As we have demonstrated, music plays a complicit role in creating this conveyor-belt style of organized consumption, coaxing customers to travel at suitable speeds through a retail setting dependent on the manager’s manipulation," Bradshaw and Holbrook write. They critique "consumer-culture theory" -- that version of cultural studies that regards consumerism as a form of expression and rejects ideas that social control could be implemented top-down through cultural products. Consumers, to that view, are "more than capable of defending themselves against the onslaughts of commercially-entrenched brain washing." But the efficacy and ubiquity of background music suggests otherwise. Consumers don't transform it; they tolerate or ignore it while it works semi-subliminally. Music helps regulate our internal rhythms and synch them with the necessary flow demanded by capital. Often, we ignore background music, which suggests it's working as it should and we are in that flow. When we notice it, when it galls us, we have become sand in the gears of postindustrial society.
I used to think this meant we should complain loudly and often about piped-in music, to prove that we are still alive. The melodrama helped me regard a gesture that cost me very little effort as something truly revolutionary -- that is where I would take my last stand, against Natalie Imbruglia in the supermarket. But is this a matter of my performing my discontent, which gives me a stake in the persistence of background music, to give me my rebel identity? Bradshaw and Holbrook note how resistance is typically co-opted, and perhaps only registers when it is available for co-optation:
Lindberg's essay is an intermittently amusing exercise in fussy snobbery:
Some people are irked by bad lighting, excessive AC, the reek of European men’s cologne. I’m hopelessly particular about music. Background sound tracks can make or break my impression of a place—and these days every place has one, from wine bars to Williams-Sonoma. Too often it’s employed with alarming incompetence.... I’ve walked out of otherwise appealing shops that elect to blare Maroon 5. I’ve hung up on reservations lines that put me on hold to “Groovy Kind of Love.” I bring earplugs on planes to block out not the roar of the engines but the insipid pabulum of the boarding music.You get the idea. His taxonomy of Muzak is spot-on, though -- Bebel Gilberto, Gypsy Kings, Amadou & Mariam. The idea is to evoke thoughtless, non-intrusive cosmopolitanism, the fantasy that global homogeneity is just one slick programmed beat away. Lindberg reserves special opprobrium for Sade, whose 1984 release Diamond Life was one of the first non-rock cassettes I ever owned. Like Hiltons across America, I believed it would make me seem sophisticated.
Lindberg ends up focusing on Muzak as professionalized aural branding for corporations trying to negotiate the diverse tastes of their clientele, and he even celebrates it, as long as it is "hip" -- that is, suits his indie-rock tastes. That seems like a cop-out, but after all, the piece was published in Travel & Leisure, not Adbusters or something. But along the way, he cites an academic paper by business professors Alan Bradshaw and Morris B. Holbrook, “Must We Have Muzak Wherever We Go?: A critical consideration of the consumer culture,” which argues that the copious deployment of background music "support concerns that culture is degraded by marketers as a means of social control."
By methodically testing the effectiveness of certain types of music to elicit certain behaviors in commercial spaces, canned-music suppliers instrumentalize music, make it "deployable" instead of listenable. Simply schematizing our emotional responsiveness to music may ruin it -- giving credence to the frequent complaint that music criticism kills what it anatomizes. Music is "de-aestheticized": The songs remain the same, but the uses to which they are put (as "retail atmospherics," in the marketing jargon) irreparably alter how we can hear them. We can't pay attention to it with the goal of immersing ourselves in it. It becomes background music everywhere -- it gets iPodded, etc. Further, when music is deployed in this way, we no longer have the option of simply listening to it, of having an unmediated response to it. Music retains its emotional efficacy, but that efficacy is co-opted and used to achieve the ends of those deploying it. When we choose to hear something, we are giving our consent to be moved by it, but when it's foisted on us, we are vulnerable to those properties in music that slip by our conscious defenses. We are moved against our will, to purposes that aren't our own. These include efforts to make us buy more and buy specific things, but more surprising is the suggestion that "less pleasant music" affects our perception of time and theoretically makes waiting in line seem to pass more quickly. Bradshaw and Holbrook, pictures of academic neutrality, put it this way:
Apparently, more distasteful music will make the queue appear to move more quickly. Really loathsome stuff should make the wait breeze by in a jiffy. So can it be that the onslaught of diabolically annoying sounds that typically assaults the unwilling victim on such occasions – the most offensive canned drivel imaginable, epitomized by garden-variety vanilla-flavored squeaky-clean middle-of-the-road bland-as-blazes Muzak – actually makes the time seem to fly?This speaks to Bradshaw and Holbrook's more general point: Background music is meant to manage us, not entertain us. Whether people "like" it doesn't figure in to the decision to pipe it in. They cite Adorno's lament over our loss of the right not to hear music. (This puts a different spin on Keats's verse: "Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter.")
If background music can be so effectively instrumentalized, is its ultimate purpose not any particular local effect but a general conditioning of consumer-citizens? Is it subliminal orientation to our role in the totally administered society, or some such? "As we have demonstrated, music plays a complicit role in creating this conveyor-belt style of organized consumption, coaxing customers to travel at suitable speeds through a retail setting dependent on the manager’s manipulation," Bradshaw and Holbrook write. They critique "consumer-culture theory" -- that version of cultural studies that regards consumerism as a form of expression and rejects ideas that social control could be implemented top-down through cultural products. Consumers, to that view, are "more than capable of defending themselves against the onslaughts of commercially-entrenched brain washing." But the efficacy and ubiquity of background music suggests otherwise. Consumers don't transform it; they tolerate or ignore it while it works semi-subliminally. Music helps regulate our internal rhythms and synch them with the necessary flow demanded by capital. Often, we ignore background music, which suggests it's working as it should and we are in that flow. When we notice it, when it galls us, we have become sand in the gears of postindustrial society.
I used to think this meant we should complain loudly and often about piped-in music, to prove that we are still alive. The melodrama helped me regard a gesture that cost me very little effort as something truly revolutionary -- that is where I would take my last stand, against Natalie Imbruglia in the supermarket. But is this a matter of my performing my discontent, which gives me a stake in the persistence of background music, to give me my rebel identity? Bradshaw and Holbrook note how resistance is typically co-opted, and perhaps only registers when it is available for co-optation:
despite the tendency toward market resistance, the ultimate performed resistance is ironically market-mediated (Kozinets 2002) so that resisting one market discourse of power merely generates another (Thompson 2004). The phenomenon of a countercultural brand community entails a basic paradox.The problem with resisting Muzak is that it plays immediately into self-presentation, how we use our tastes to market ourselves. The critique of background music is always already defused by the fact that the credibility and motives of the complainers can always be questioned. Many things in consumer society seem to work this way. The idea that we are all "brands" engaged in our ongoing identity projects, just like the corporations, levels the moral playing field and preempts resistance.
Monday, August 1, 2011
Functionality as design trope (24 Sept 2009)
At Design Observer, Dmitri Siegel looks at the design of products in ordinary supermarkets -- design not selling itself as "design-y". "To end up here, Design ideas need to trickle down well past the middle-brow and survive extreme pressures of low margins and fast turn," he somewhat snobbishly remarks (and I think the capped D in design is a telling typo).
He points out the ludicrous ergonomic features of grooming products and the ubiquitous easy-pour spouts and remarks that these pseudo-functional additions to packaging are mere ornament. The convenience these things are supposed to supply (but most likely don't) is also, I would add, ornamental. Siegel's conclusion is that the design trades in functionality as a sign rather than anything that is actually useful. Rather than an after-the-fact evaluation of a product's actual ease of use, functionality becomes a design trope. Convenience as a value works the same way, I think -- an appealing idea in the abstract even when it never manifests itself in practice. Our craving for convenience is so inculcated in us that it suffices for a package to evoke the possibility of it for the package to have an added appeal. We can buy "convenience" without experiencing it.
Siegel cites architect Alfred Loos's "Ornament and Crime" (pdf), a manifesto from 1908 that's as insane as you could want any manifesto to be, impossible to tell how serious he is from our irony-saturated point in history. ("One can measure the culture of a country by the degree to which its lavatory walls are daubed," Loos declares in a typical aphorism.) Loos's main argument is that ornament is atavistic, though Siegel emphasizes Loos's claim that approving of ornament "was a tacit endorsement of society’s disregard for the quality of its workers’ lives." Siegel thinks the reverse is now true: "The ornament of today is the complete opposite of that described by Loos — to him ornament symbolized excessive labor, today ours symbolizes pervasive leisure."
He defends that claim with a reference to Veblen's notion of conspicuous consumption. Siegel suggests that the fake functionality of supermarket design allows for a conspicuous consumption of unnecessary utility.
I think there is something to that, but I found Loos's take on this idea more compelling: "Humanity is still to groan under the slavery of ornament," he declares, though as a species we have "progressed far enough to find pleasure in purchasing a plain cigarette case, even if it cost the same as one that was ornamented." This still seems relevant. Products for the wealthy are those that can eschew ornament, transcend it, because the stratospheric prices obviate the need the products to compete on the more mundane level of superficial ornament. The lack of ornament connotes engineering expense, the effort of clean design, the quality of the manufacturing, the pride in the workmanship as it is expressed through the functionality. They are made for those people who don't need to indulge in shopping for leisure, people who don't need to amaze themselves with the unfathomable bounty in supermarkets and 99-cent stores, people who can afford more expensive pursuits and don't want disposable goods to allow to shop more. Shopping provides the lower class the ersatz, compensatory thrills of purchasing power over an array of crappy manufactured goods -- highly ornamented to make them more disposable and to justify the investment of more of our energy in the foibles of retail. But the rich don't have to resort to such cheap thrills.
He points out the ludicrous ergonomic features of grooming products and the ubiquitous easy-pour spouts and remarks that these pseudo-functional additions to packaging are mere ornament. The convenience these things are supposed to supply (but most likely don't) is also, I would add, ornamental. Siegel's conclusion is that the design trades in functionality as a sign rather than anything that is actually useful. Rather than an after-the-fact evaluation of a product's actual ease of use, functionality becomes a design trope. Convenience as a value works the same way, I think -- an appealing idea in the abstract even when it never manifests itself in practice. Our craving for convenience is so inculcated in us that it suffices for a package to evoke the possibility of it for the package to have an added appeal. We can buy "convenience" without experiencing it.
Siegel cites architect Alfred Loos's "Ornament and Crime" (pdf), a manifesto from 1908 that's as insane as you could want any manifesto to be, impossible to tell how serious he is from our irony-saturated point in history. ("One can measure the culture of a country by the degree to which its lavatory walls are daubed," Loos declares in a typical aphorism.) Loos's main argument is that ornament is atavistic, though Siegel emphasizes Loos's claim that approving of ornament "was a tacit endorsement of society’s disregard for the quality of its workers’ lives." Siegel thinks the reverse is now true: "The ornament of today is the complete opposite of that described by Loos — to him ornament symbolized excessive labor, today ours symbolizes pervasive leisure."
He defends that claim with a reference to Veblen's notion of conspicuous consumption. Siegel suggests that the fake functionality of supermarket design allows for a conspicuous consumption of unnecessary utility.
Veblen describes how a rich man’s cane is a symbol of his membership in the leisure class precisely because he will never need to use it. The grip strips on a toothbrush and easy-pour spouts are exactly the same. They symbolize effort we will never have to exert.We want to consume utility we don't need and then laud ourselves for the effort we have been saved from making, that is presumed to thereby be held in reserve and accrues to us. This then becomes a mark of distinction; the product's design allows us to claim for ourselves the effort it saves us from making. The contradiction takes on a signaling significance, in Siegel's view:
The fully equipped chef’s kitchen is a potent symbol of affluence precisely because anyone who can afford it clearly does not need to cook. The $400 Patagonia rain shell and the sport utility vehicle symbolize physical challenges and confrontations with the elements that their suburban owners can easily avoid, and so on.Today's ornament mimics utility so that we can make a show of unnecessarily amassing it. When we have the finest kitchen equipment money can buy, every night we eat out becomes eve more redolent of our wastefulness, and therefore our wealth (if you accept Veblen's logic that gratuitous waste equals a proof of status). The overdesigned products in the store allow the middle class to experience a version of this joyous profligacy.
I think there is something to that, but I found Loos's take on this idea more compelling: "Humanity is still to groan under the slavery of ornament," he declares, though as a species we have "progressed far enough to find pleasure in purchasing a plain cigarette case, even if it cost the same as one that was ornamented." This still seems relevant. Products for the wealthy are those that can eschew ornament, transcend it, because the stratospheric prices obviate the need the products to compete on the more mundane level of superficial ornament. The lack of ornament connotes engineering expense, the effort of clean design, the quality of the manufacturing, the pride in the workmanship as it is expressed through the functionality. They are made for those people who don't need to indulge in shopping for leisure, people who don't need to amaze themselves with the unfathomable bounty in supermarkets and 99-cent stores, people who can afford more expensive pursuits and don't want disposable goods to allow to shop more. Shopping provides the lower class the ersatz, compensatory thrills of purchasing power over an array of crappy manufactured goods -- highly ornamented to make them more disposable and to justify the investment of more of our energy in the foibles of retail. But the rich don't have to resort to such cheap thrills.
Ideology and Aesthetic Pleasure (15 Sept 2009)
At the Valve, Bill Benzon was wondering about ideology and aesthetics:
First, when tastes become reflexive, consciously curated, they become predominantly signaling mechanisms: we want to project a certain identity through the tastes we choose to advertise and by managing carefully to try to conceal the tastes we think are less flattering to us. That's almost self-evident, I think. At the point when we are trying to catalog our own tastes, the sense of it being our "real" taste is gone -- one can't know one's own aesthetic response, for to think it is to destroy its spontaneity. Identity -- if there is such a thing that predates our self-fashioning -- is probably like that too; we glimpse it only by accident, only while we are trying to see something else. It's much easier and much more convincing when others tell us who we are and what we are like and even what we seem to enjoy than for us to know ourselves directly -- our self-knowledge is too distorted by wishes, secret shame, denial, grandiosity, modesty, and a variety of other expectations we are always in the process of juggling.
Our efforts to signal identity through conscious control of our tastes are shaped by ideology. We are guided by what we understand as representing the class to which we think we belong and how much we mean to struggle against that affiliation. Our skill in reading signals and assigning interpretations to them are all inflected by class habitus, which itself is thoroughly ideological -- meant to protect class boundaries and generally speaking, reproduce the existing social order and power structure. That's not to say our tastes are phony to the degree they are calculated. But taste is not ever free of all calculation, an expression of pure spontaneity and of our inner quality -- that is the most ideological position of all: My inner refinement is revealed by my altogether genuine and natural pleasure in Brahms while your innate vulgarity is inevitable and unavoidably revealed by your unthinking joy in Coldplay. We respond to what we have prepared the way for, and that often can be controlled through deliberate planning, i.e., I will read about the French New Wave filmmakers and the associated criticism so that I will understand and "really" appreciate Godard's Week-End, which in turn will make me think that I am cool. If we don't seize upon that preparation process and make it conscious, we will be signaling our contentment with being guided by coincidence, the tastes of our friends and family, marketing information, the zeitgeist, and so on. We probably won't reveal our inner taste so much as become a barometer for prevailing popular taste.
So there is no point in our trying to figure out our "real tastes" so that we can tell ourselves that we have become more authentic. We should forget all about making authenticity to ourselves a criteria for pleasure. Pleasure may or may not be spontaneous, but it is all too frequently rare, so we probably shouldn't spurn it when it comes. But we can't opt out of the ways in which our pleasures are imbricated with class snobbery. Class identity seems to be one of enabling conditions for experiencing many, many forms of pleasure (if not all of them) -- the pleasure of belonging, of excluding, of knowing where you are and what you might become, the pleasure of winning. Pleasure is not necessarily a social good. Likewise, aesthetic pleasure is not virtuous or politically innocent. When I listened to abrasive music as a teenager, it was because in part I hoped it wcould serve as a kind of nonviolent weapon as well as a nonpermanent tattoo -- marking me as a certain type and driving the wrong sort away. IO tried to elevate these desires to feelings -- incontrovertible and irreversible -- by feeling them in the music. Then I could feel as though the music carried me to where I belonged.
Anyway, what is more interesting, I think, is that the tastes we aren't entirely conscious of -- the aesthetic responses we don't guide or manufacture for ourselves, are also ideological, in a more profound and insidious way, shaping the field in which we conceive our identity projects. Eagleton's thesis is that the aesthetic is how we experience the law -- the demands of the state, or of power more generally -- spontaneously, as though it was our own desire and entirely natural, unquestionable. This does wonders for replacing coercion (what repressive socialist states needed to maintain control) with consent (what Western democracies/plutocracies make do with). The category of the aesthetic is how we come to embrace and seem to invent what was already necessary; it is how we love Big Brother while still feeling free enough to work within "free markets" and contribute to the "spontaneous order" they are held to produce. Eagleton:
This sort of logic leads to skepticism of depth psychology as a whole -- all forms of identity making -- as a kind of insidious plot to make us all slaves to an idea of ourselves that really comes from the state. Hence, a particular strain of radical counterattack, which consists of "free play" -- destabilize your identity, embrace sundry forms of anarchic behavior (free love, squatting, drifiterism), and escape into the margins. This seems a bit impractical. Also, this would entail surrendering all the pleasures and comforts of being somebody.
I’ve got a question about people’s expressed aesthetic preferences: Does it reflect their sense of immediate satisfaction with the work, a superimposed identity or ideology, or something else?This is something I've thought a lot about, for better or worse. Most of my ideas about it are derived from Bourdieu's Distinction and Eagleton's Ideology of the Aesthetic.
First, when tastes become reflexive, consciously curated, they become predominantly signaling mechanisms: we want to project a certain identity through the tastes we choose to advertise and by managing carefully to try to conceal the tastes we think are less flattering to us. That's almost self-evident, I think. At the point when we are trying to catalog our own tastes, the sense of it being our "real" taste is gone -- one can't know one's own aesthetic response, for to think it is to destroy its spontaneity. Identity -- if there is such a thing that predates our self-fashioning -- is probably like that too; we glimpse it only by accident, only while we are trying to see something else. It's much easier and much more convincing when others tell us who we are and what we are like and even what we seem to enjoy than for us to know ourselves directly -- our self-knowledge is too distorted by wishes, secret shame, denial, grandiosity, modesty, and a variety of other expectations we are always in the process of juggling.
Our efforts to signal identity through conscious control of our tastes are shaped by ideology. We are guided by what we understand as representing the class to which we think we belong and how much we mean to struggle against that affiliation. Our skill in reading signals and assigning interpretations to them are all inflected by class habitus, which itself is thoroughly ideological -- meant to protect class boundaries and generally speaking, reproduce the existing social order and power structure. That's not to say our tastes are phony to the degree they are calculated. But taste is not ever free of all calculation, an expression of pure spontaneity and of our inner quality -- that is the most ideological position of all: My inner refinement is revealed by my altogether genuine and natural pleasure in Brahms while your innate vulgarity is inevitable and unavoidably revealed by your unthinking joy in Coldplay. We respond to what we have prepared the way for, and that often can be controlled through deliberate planning, i.e., I will read about the French New Wave filmmakers and the associated criticism so that I will understand and "really" appreciate Godard's Week-End, which in turn will make me think that I am cool. If we don't seize upon that preparation process and make it conscious, we will be signaling our contentment with being guided by coincidence, the tastes of our friends and family, marketing information, the zeitgeist, and so on. We probably won't reveal our inner taste so much as become a barometer for prevailing popular taste.
So there is no point in our trying to figure out our "real tastes" so that we can tell ourselves that we have become more authentic. We should forget all about making authenticity to ourselves a criteria for pleasure. Pleasure may or may not be spontaneous, but it is all too frequently rare, so we probably shouldn't spurn it when it comes. But we can't opt out of the ways in which our pleasures are imbricated with class snobbery. Class identity seems to be one of enabling conditions for experiencing many, many forms of pleasure (if not all of them) -- the pleasure of belonging, of excluding, of knowing where you are and what you might become, the pleasure of winning. Pleasure is not necessarily a social good. Likewise, aesthetic pleasure is not virtuous or politically innocent. When I listened to abrasive music as a teenager, it was because in part I hoped it wcould serve as a kind of nonviolent weapon as well as a nonpermanent tattoo -- marking me as a certain type and driving the wrong sort away. IO tried to elevate these desires to feelings -- incontrovertible and irreversible -- by feeling them in the music. Then I could feel as though the music carried me to where I belonged.
Anyway, what is more interesting, I think, is that the tastes we aren't entirely conscious of -- the aesthetic responses we don't guide or manufacture for ourselves, are also ideological, in a more profound and insidious way, shaping the field in which we conceive our identity projects. Eagleton's thesis is that the aesthetic is how we experience the law -- the demands of the state, or of power more generally -- spontaneously, as though it was our own desire and entirely natural, unquestionable. This does wonders for replacing coercion (what repressive socialist states needed to maintain control) with consent (what Western democracies/plutocracies make do with). The category of the aesthetic is how we come to embrace and seem to invent what was already necessary; it is how we love Big Brother while still feeling free enough to work within "free markets" and contribute to the "spontaneous order" they are held to produce. Eagleton:
For power to be individually authenticated, there must be constructed with in the subject a new form of inwardness which will do the unpalatable work of the law for it, and all the more effectively since that law has now apparently evaporated.... Power is shifting its locations from centralized institutions to the silent, invisible depths of the subject itself.Later he calls the aesthetic "no more than a name for the political unconscious," "shorthand for a whole project of hegemony," and he verges close to simply equating "ideology" and "aesthetic" -- "lawfulness without a law" in Kant's formulation.
This sort of logic leads to skepticism of depth psychology as a whole -- all forms of identity making -- as a kind of insidious plot to make us all slaves to an idea of ourselves that really comes from the state. Hence, a particular strain of radical counterattack, which consists of "free play" -- destabilize your identity, embrace sundry forms of anarchic behavior (free love, squatting, drifiterism), and escape into the margins. This seems a bit impractical. Also, this would entail surrendering all the pleasures and comforts of being somebody.
Labels:
aesthetics as ideology,
design ideology,
distinction,
identity,
literary,
novels,
taste
The High Line and claustrophobic design (1 Sept 2009)
At Design Observer, Michael Bierut mentioned the High Line -- an old elevated railway track in New York City that's been turned into an awkward, real-estate-value enhancing gated-park space -- as an example of "when design gets in the way." The case he presents for that struck me as a bit incoherent -- the High Line is so well-designed that it has become too popular for its own good, while the ad hoc utilitarian set-up in Times Square (recently closed to automotive traffic) works just as well to please people. Should the High Line have been made less appealing so it wouldn't become overcrowded? Should it have been renovated on the cheap since people might have used it anyway?
I want to agree that design has indeed gotten in the way, because when I visited it last Friday before I left for the shore it made me very uneasy, but I'm confused. I think his point is that design can be more spontaneous and require less bureaucracy. My point would be that designy-ness itself, whether the product of a well-meaning bureaucracy or a marketing firm, is suffocating; its fastidiousness seems to close off user interaction even when it has seen fit to try to engineer it in advance with various heavy-handed interventions. At the High Line everything seemed so thought out in advance that I could only conclude that I was not invited to do any thinking for myself while I was there. It feels less like a park than a useless piece of installation art meant to impress us with its ingenuity. I half expected to see people walking along applauding. I felt corralled into performing the piece's cleverness by traversing it, but I didn't want to perform (unlike the guys conspicuously doing yoga in the middle of the narrow platform). I just wanted a refuge from what is at street level, which is designy-ness harnessed to marketing purposes. Up on the High Line, there's just a more concentrated form of that deisigny-ness, elevated to civic duty, vindicating all the shop windows down below.
The friend who accompanied me to the High Line thought its design was a little oppressive also -- she pointed to the lack of seats in the shade, and the lack of assembly spaces. Its design -- by necessity I guess, given the constraints -- streamlines away the possibility that it might serve as a public place of protest. It's a park for an orderly, obedient people content to walk in single file and stay within the prescribed boundaries. She noted also the fact it can be locked up to bar undesirables, and the way it seemed to mock the death of manufacturing in the city. In terms of what the city produces, manufactured goods have been supplanted by the dissemination of design ideas -- a transition the High Line commemorates with no consolation for the losers. Once the rails moved actual goods and anchored working-class jobs; now they are purposely overgrown, archaicized, dressed up to make the condos for the wealthy built all around the tracks more aesthetically pleasing. But it seems doomed to feel dated (it's very much of the eco-conscious zeitgeist -- like a Method detergent bottle), and after its vogue fades, it will probably become this weird, depopulated albatross we must continue to maintain, a Christo exhibit that never goes away.
I want to agree that design has indeed gotten in the way, because when I visited it last Friday before I left for the shore it made me very uneasy, but I'm confused. I think his point is that design can be more spontaneous and require less bureaucracy. My point would be that designy-ness itself, whether the product of a well-meaning bureaucracy or a marketing firm, is suffocating; its fastidiousness seems to close off user interaction even when it has seen fit to try to engineer it in advance with various heavy-handed interventions. At the High Line everything seemed so thought out in advance that I could only conclude that I was not invited to do any thinking for myself while I was there. It feels less like a park than a useless piece of installation art meant to impress us with its ingenuity. I half expected to see people walking along applauding. I felt corralled into performing the piece's cleverness by traversing it, but I didn't want to perform (unlike the guys conspicuously doing yoga in the middle of the narrow platform). I just wanted a refuge from what is at street level, which is designy-ness harnessed to marketing purposes. Up on the High Line, there's just a more concentrated form of that deisigny-ness, elevated to civic duty, vindicating all the shop windows down below.
The friend who accompanied me to the High Line thought its design was a little oppressive also -- she pointed to the lack of seats in the shade, and the lack of assembly spaces. Its design -- by necessity I guess, given the constraints -- streamlines away the possibility that it might serve as a public place of protest. It's a park for an orderly, obedient people content to walk in single file and stay within the prescribed boundaries. She noted also the fact it can be locked up to bar undesirables, and the way it seemed to mock the death of manufacturing in the city. In terms of what the city produces, manufactured goods have been supplanted by the dissemination of design ideas -- a transition the High Line commemorates with no consolation for the losers. Once the rails moved actual goods and anchored working-class jobs; now they are purposely overgrown, archaicized, dressed up to make the condos for the wealthy built all around the tracks more aesthetically pleasing. But it seems doomed to feel dated (it's very much of the eco-conscious zeitgeist -- like a Method detergent bottle), and after its vogue fades, it will probably become this weird, depopulated albatross we must continue to maintain, a Christo exhibit that never goes away.
Labels:
aesthetics as ideology,
art,
design ideology,
environmentalism,
travel
Friday, July 29, 2011
Resort Motel Architecture in Wildwood (30 Aug 2009)
I've been on vacation the past week in Wildwood, New Jersey, (North Wildwood to be precise) which is down the shore about 30 miles south of Atlantic City, near the southern tip of the state's coastline. It's long had a reputation as a working-class beach town for immigrants from Philadelphia, and it's still not uncommon to see houses down there with the Italian and Irish flags flying from the awnings alongside the U.S. flag. Like its North Jersey equivalent, Seaside Heights, Wildwood has an extensive boardwalk that retains a carnivalesque atmosphere, where scams and bad bargains of all sorts are made to seem innocuous and where the water-gun-game barkers and snake-handling carneys and iron-on T-shirt makers seem like artisan practitioners of threatened traditional crafts.
I played lots of skee-ball to win tickets (my high-risk, high-reward strategy -- always shoot for the 100s), which I could then trade in for plastic army men, balsa-wood propeller planes, and off-brand candy. I also rode an old wooden coaster that may have concussed me; I got off and wandered the amusement pier punch drunk, in search of place to sit and fortify myself with a lime ricky.
The upper middle classes from the Philadelphia area tend to eschew Wildwood in favor of Ocean City and Cape May, Avalon and Long Beach Island -- similar places by and large that have somehow managed to manufacture class distinction for themselves. The aspirational towns tend to push a contrived family-friendliness and institute measures like charging a fee to use the beach to seem exclusive. Thanks to their protected reputations, real estate values rose dramatically during the bubble years in these towns, which meant that much of the earlier generations of buildings (the boarding houses and one-story "shit shacks") have all been razed in favor of generic aluminum-sided, triple-decker condos and elaborate second-home mansions.
But in Wildwood, this hasn't really happened, making it an architectural treasure trove, at least for me -- I have an inexhaustible fascination with vacation motels of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Wildwood is still filled with hundreds of them, some of them renovated, some run down, some essentially unchanged since their construction in the heyday of democratized leisure. The vendors on the boardwalk are as up to the minute with trends as they can be -- they were selling Michael Vick Eagles jerseys (and "Hide your beagle, Vick's an Eagle" shirts) a week after he was signed. But away from the boardwalk, the town becomes a museum. To walk into Wildwood Crest at night is to enter a hushed Edward Hopper world, haunted with a pensive sense of unfulfilled possibility, all these lido decks and lounge chairs under the orderly rows of subdued lights, devoid of people.
Just as consumption itself was being democratized after World War II, with the working classes experiencing the thrills of purchasing power amidst the sudden flood of mass-produced goods, so was leisure democratized, with similarly mass-produced motels rapidly constructed in déclassé seaside enclaves like Wildwood. This motel build-out mirrored the construction of housing developments for lower-income families in the string of Levittowns outside Philadelphia -- workers could now for the first time enjoy their own detached homes in suburban communities, and they could also expect to enjoy their own private rooms in resorts meant to accommodate them when their week of summer vacation -- another novelty -- came around.
These motels tended to come in two sizes. The first is a two- to four- story motel in a L-shape, nestling a small standard-issue in-ground pool (the sort with a 8-foot deep end that rarely gets built anymore -- the drowning/lawsuit risk has made them infeasible now) surrounded by plastic chaise longues, and with a sundeck dotted with fake palm trees. Here's a few pretty typical examples:
Many of these have since been converted to efficiency condos, which is part of what saved them from demolition.
The deluxe version of these are a little larger and typically sit nearer the ocean:
These are the places that are often billed with the somewhat oxymoronic appellation "resort motels."
I probably photographed 50 of these motels, and I only scratched the surface. And this is after untold dozens had been torn down over the years. (In one vacant lot on Ocean Avenue, the local preservation society had salvaged and displayed a few of the neon signs from motels since demolished.) They are pretty much identical, differing only in location and name, and one would think this would make them depressingly banal and interchangeable. But they struck me as strangely hopeful, and that feeling was reinforced with each new iteration of the same model that I came across. In their sameness came not a refutation of the personal uniqueness of the people who chose to stay in these motels -- an ersatz individuality that is largely oversold ideologically and exploited by marketers as a source of insecurity and misery (are you unique enough? have you discovered the real you? how can you be sure if you are not displaying it at all times through a highly personalized set of belongings and experiences? shouldn't you buy more stuff to become more unique? Hmm?)
Instead they evoked an egalitarian feeling that everyone was confident back then of receiving the same standard treatment; that the worth to the patrons of these places was not rooted in laying special claim to some thing or place but in having the opportunity to partake in the vacation spirit embodied by the town as a whole. The sameness in the environment allowed for actual differences among everyone -- differences taken for granted, the peculiarities that aren't dependent on marketing and goods and identity displays -- to show through. It was simply assumed, I imagine, that such stuff as identity mongering was irrelevant in the face of the opportunity to go on the beach, to swim in the ocean, to confront the ceaseless waves. In other words, these cookie-cutter motels conjure a sense that leisure was once beyond the reach of invidious comparison, that pleasure isn't a matter of differentiating our identities or proving our creativity or individuality at all. There is nothing particularly creative or inventive about enjoying the beach, but it is all the more enjoyable for that. You can do what everyone else does and it's okay. It's even liberating -- at least now, when identity and personal branding is so foregrounded.
But it's hard to be sure the original clients of the motels felt that liberation in the same way. We are at the other end of the transformation of subjectivity that for them had only just begun, so liberation for them may have been precisely that birth into branded identity that we are beginning to experience as a prison. It's the elaborate, now-campy names of these places that make me wonder about this -- especially the accompanying signs, with their neon and their futurama fonts, seem like cartoonish, hyperbolic attempts at branding something that has no particular distinction.
Their superfluousness, the gratuitous nature of these names feels significant. Unnecessary on the face of things (many similar accommodations in other seaside towns are content to have only a street address) the garish names were, at that moment in time when the motels were being built, of critical importance to builders and customers alike presumably. The names were something extra that didn't make the places themselves special, but signified that an effort was being made to market something to a class of people who had been mostly ignored by advertising. In a loud, unmistakable way, the names called out to the new mass-market consumers and sent the message that an expense was being made on their behalf, that unnecessary ideas were being called forth, to amuse them for a moment, to make them feel that they were going to stay somewhere where ordinary rules did not apply: places where, for example, doors were painted sky blue and palm trees had blue leaves.
The names and extravagant signs became requisite amenities, along with heat in the rooms and color televisions.
The ham-fisted attempts at branding seem primitive and quaint now, and seem to preclude the possible of their being aspirational, of generating insecurity. For us, they do the opposite of making us proudly and earnestly self-aware; they conjure a time when branding seemed kitschy and fun, impossible to regard seriously and thus allowing us to transcend it all. But they must have had unironic significance in the 1960s, a resonance similar to the unnecessary but ubiquitous names for housing subdivisions built during the recent real estate boom -- nicely lampooned in this post about Denver's exurbs. Maybe names such as these will seem campy (and not awful) to subsequent generations:
The naming protocols signify a token effort to mask a fundamental contradiction, to make mass-produced "luxuries" come across as bespoke. They are fumbling efforts at establishing social capital where none is to be found, and thus readily strike us as wrong, as embarrassing, as shameful, as violations of some natural order. The faux-pastoral, crypto-aristocratic aspect of the subdivision names exposes what they are trying but failing to do, they indicate how the developments are trying to graft themselves on to a social order that would have forbidden their very existence. The resort motels, at least, attempt something different with their branding, something that to me speaks to the optimism of the era -- each an oasis unto itself in a lush profusion of oases without a desert. They don't try to appropriate a class-inflected language and approximate an old dream of country-club exclusiveness. Instead neon signage is used to invoke an aesthetic never before seen.
(Las Vegas is probably the ultimate example of this style, and Learning From Las Vegas, the manifesto by Venturi, et. al., is the standard reference for its significance.)
The opportunity for a mass-produced aesthetic that is its own thing, outside of the war of class signaling, seems to have passed us by. We can only return to the dawn of consumerism with nostalgia for its promise, mingled with despair for all its wrong turns since then. It promised to indoctrinate us all into the pleasures of owning and belonging and instead made us more conscious then ever before of the many things we can't have, the many places we don't belong, convincing us all the while that there can be no recompense for unfulfilled desire, no vacation from the yearning for more. A week at the Armada by the Sea will never suffice to make us forget ourselves.
I played lots of skee-ball to win tickets (my high-risk, high-reward strategy -- always shoot for the 100s), which I could then trade in for plastic army men, balsa-wood propeller planes, and off-brand candy. I also rode an old wooden coaster that may have concussed me; I got off and wandered the amusement pier punch drunk, in search of place to sit and fortify myself with a lime ricky.
The upper middle classes from the Philadelphia area tend to eschew Wildwood in favor of Ocean City and Cape May, Avalon and Long Beach Island -- similar places by and large that have somehow managed to manufacture class distinction for themselves. The aspirational towns tend to push a contrived family-friendliness and institute measures like charging a fee to use the beach to seem exclusive. Thanks to their protected reputations, real estate values rose dramatically during the bubble years in these towns, which meant that much of the earlier generations of buildings (the boarding houses and one-story "shit shacks") have all been razed in favor of generic aluminum-sided, triple-decker condos and elaborate second-home mansions.
But in Wildwood, this hasn't really happened, making it an architectural treasure trove, at least for me -- I have an inexhaustible fascination with vacation motels of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Wildwood is still filled with hundreds of them, some of them renovated, some run down, some essentially unchanged since their construction in the heyday of democratized leisure. The vendors on the boardwalk are as up to the minute with trends as they can be -- they were selling Michael Vick Eagles jerseys (and "Hide your beagle, Vick's an Eagle" shirts) a week after he was signed. But away from the boardwalk, the town becomes a museum. To walk into Wildwood Crest at night is to enter a hushed Edward Hopper world, haunted with a pensive sense of unfulfilled possibility, all these lido decks and lounge chairs under the orderly rows of subdued lights, devoid of people.
Just as consumption itself was being democratized after World War II, with the working classes experiencing the thrills of purchasing power amidst the sudden flood of mass-produced goods, so was leisure democratized, with similarly mass-produced motels rapidly constructed in déclassé seaside enclaves like Wildwood. This motel build-out mirrored the construction of housing developments for lower-income families in the string of Levittowns outside Philadelphia -- workers could now for the first time enjoy their own detached homes in suburban communities, and they could also expect to enjoy their own private rooms in resorts meant to accommodate them when their week of summer vacation -- another novelty -- came around.
These motels tended to come in two sizes. The first is a two- to four- story motel in a L-shape, nestling a small standard-issue in-ground pool (the sort with a 8-foot deep end that rarely gets built anymore -- the drowning/lawsuit risk has made them infeasible now) surrounded by plastic chaise longues, and with a sundeck dotted with fake palm trees. Here's a few pretty typical examples:
Many of these have since been converted to efficiency condos, which is part of what saved them from demolition.
The deluxe version of these are a little larger and typically sit nearer the ocean:
These are the places that are often billed with the somewhat oxymoronic appellation "resort motels."
I probably photographed 50 of these motels, and I only scratched the surface. And this is after untold dozens had been torn down over the years. (In one vacant lot on Ocean Avenue, the local preservation society had salvaged and displayed a few of the neon signs from motels since demolished.) They are pretty much identical, differing only in location and name, and one would think this would make them depressingly banal and interchangeable. But they struck me as strangely hopeful, and that feeling was reinforced with each new iteration of the same model that I came across. In their sameness came not a refutation of the personal uniqueness of the people who chose to stay in these motels -- an ersatz individuality that is largely oversold ideologically and exploited by marketers as a source of insecurity and misery (are you unique enough? have you discovered the real you? how can you be sure if you are not displaying it at all times through a highly personalized set of belongings and experiences? shouldn't you buy more stuff to become more unique? Hmm?)
Instead they evoked an egalitarian feeling that everyone was confident back then of receiving the same standard treatment; that the worth to the patrons of these places was not rooted in laying special claim to some thing or place but in having the opportunity to partake in the vacation spirit embodied by the town as a whole. The sameness in the environment allowed for actual differences among everyone -- differences taken for granted, the peculiarities that aren't dependent on marketing and goods and identity displays -- to show through. It was simply assumed, I imagine, that such stuff as identity mongering was irrelevant in the face of the opportunity to go on the beach, to swim in the ocean, to confront the ceaseless waves. In other words, these cookie-cutter motels conjure a sense that leisure was once beyond the reach of invidious comparison, that pleasure isn't a matter of differentiating our identities or proving our creativity or individuality at all. There is nothing particularly creative or inventive about enjoying the beach, but it is all the more enjoyable for that. You can do what everyone else does and it's okay. It's even liberating -- at least now, when identity and personal branding is so foregrounded.
But it's hard to be sure the original clients of the motels felt that liberation in the same way. We are at the other end of the transformation of subjectivity that for them had only just begun, so liberation for them may have been precisely that birth into branded identity that we are beginning to experience as a prison. It's the elaborate, now-campy names of these places that make me wonder about this -- especially the accompanying signs, with their neon and their futurama fonts, seem like cartoonish, hyperbolic attempts at branding something that has no particular distinction.
Their superfluousness, the gratuitous nature of these names feels significant. Unnecessary on the face of things (many similar accommodations in other seaside towns are content to have only a street address) the garish names were, at that moment in time when the motels were being built, of critical importance to builders and customers alike presumably. The names were something extra that didn't make the places themselves special, but signified that an effort was being made to market something to a class of people who had been mostly ignored by advertising. In a loud, unmistakable way, the names called out to the new mass-market consumers and sent the message that an expense was being made on their behalf, that unnecessary ideas were being called forth, to amuse them for a moment, to make them feel that they were going to stay somewhere where ordinary rules did not apply: places where, for example, doors were painted sky blue and palm trees had blue leaves.
The names and extravagant signs became requisite amenities, along with heat in the rooms and color televisions.
The ham-fisted attempts at branding seem primitive and quaint now, and seem to preclude the possible of their being aspirational, of generating insecurity. For us, they do the opposite of making us proudly and earnestly self-aware; they conjure a time when branding seemed kitschy and fun, impossible to regard seriously and thus allowing us to transcend it all. But they must have had unironic significance in the 1960s, a resonance similar to the unnecessary but ubiquitous names for housing subdivisions built during the recent real estate boom -- nicely lampooned in this post about Denver's exurbs. Maybe names such as these will seem campy (and not awful) to subsequent generations:
The naming protocols signify a token effort to mask a fundamental contradiction, to make mass-produced "luxuries" come across as bespoke. They are fumbling efforts at establishing social capital where none is to be found, and thus readily strike us as wrong, as embarrassing, as shameful, as violations of some natural order. The faux-pastoral, crypto-aristocratic aspect of the subdivision names exposes what they are trying but failing to do, they indicate how the developments are trying to graft themselves on to a social order that would have forbidden their very existence. The resort motels, at least, attempt something different with their branding, something that to me speaks to the optimism of the era -- each an oasis unto itself in a lush profusion of oases without a desert. They don't try to appropriate a class-inflected language and approximate an old dream of country-club exclusiveness. Instead neon signage is used to invoke an aesthetic never before seen.
(Las Vegas is probably the ultimate example of this style, and Learning From Las Vegas, the manifesto by Venturi, et. al., is the standard reference for its significance.)
The opportunity for a mass-produced aesthetic that is its own thing, outside of the war of class signaling, seems to have passed us by. We can only return to the dawn of consumerism with nostalgia for its promise, mingled with despair for all its wrong turns since then. It promised to indoctrinate us all into the pleasures of owning and belonging and instead made us more conscious then ever before of the many things we can't have, the many places we don't belong, convincing us all the while that there can be no recompense for unfulfilled desire, no vacation from the yearning for more. A week at the Armada by the Sea will never suffice to make us forget ourselves.
Reified design (14 Aug 2009)
The difference between something that is well-designed and something that is merely designy seems pretty self-evident if you base the judgment on functionality. But the difference between the two is always being blurred, usually by marketers trying to gain an edge for a product that's not essentially different from its market competitors. So we get designy bottles of dishwashing liquid, designy stainless-steel appliances, designy retro-looking appliances and other pseudo-novelties. Design improvements that allow us to consume or use a good more efficiently are conflated with improvements that shift our attention away from use to abstract contemplation -- the good becomes a mirror in which we see reflected our own good taste. Designy-ness, like so many consumerist products, lets us consume ourselves.
These efforts to sell products as a vehicle for design combine to create a climate in which design for its own sake is functionality, an aesthetic end that inherently enriches the lives of those who get to handle such "beautiful" objects. Industrial designers like Apple's Jonathan Ive get elevated to the status of artists, as if their aim was not to sell more goods but to create the Good. Consumerism is thereby transformed into a kind of democratized connoisseurship; Target (or, if you are still trying to preserve class distinction, ABC Carpet & Home) becomes a museum from which you can take home the objets d'art.
So what is wrong with that? This may not be a convincing answer, but designy-ness is an ideological sheen on consumerism, redeeming commodification while furthering it, permitting mass-distributed designy-ness to supplant genuine heterogeneity. In genuine heterogeneity is the chance that we might really redeem the promise of individualism -- that we will be able to garner social recognition for being ourselves, and recognition could be separated from being judged or taxonomized. But designy-ness and its off-the-shelf aesthetic (often prepared by lauded gurus) militates against that. However much we enjoy our own tastes in such stuff privately (solipsisticly) we become typecast when we exhibit those tastes publicly.
Terry Eagleton gets at this problem in the Kant chapter of The Ideology of the Aesthetic:
(For more deep thoughts about design, see this post at one of my other venues.)
These efforts to sell products as a vehicle for design combine to create a climate in which design for its own sake is functionality, an aesthetic end that inherently enriches the lives of those who get to handle such "beautiful" objects. Industrial designers like Apple's Jonathan Ive get elevated to the status of artists, as if their aim was not to sell more goods but to create the Good. Consumerism is thereby transformed into a kind of democratized connoisseurship; Target (or, if you are still trying to preserve class distinction, ABC Carpet & Home) becomes a museum from which you can take home the objets d'art.
So what is wrong with that? This may not be a convincing answer, but designy-ness is an ideological sheen on consumerism, redeeming commodification while furthering it, permitting mass-distributed designy-ness to supplant genuine heterogeneity. In genuine heterogeneity is the chance that we might really redeem the promise of individualism -- that we will be able to garner social recognition for being ourselves, and recognition could be separated from being judged or taxonomized. But designy-ness and its off-the-shelf aesthetic (often prepared by lauded gurus) militates against that. However much we enjoy our own tastes in such stuff privately (solipsisticly) we become typecast when we exhibit those tastes publicly.
Terry Eagleton gets at this problem in the Kant chapter of The Ideology of the Aesthetic:
In the aesthetic representation...we glimpse for an exhilarated moment the possibility of a non-alienated object, one quite the reverse of the commodity, which like the 'auratic' phenomenon of a Walter Benjamin returns our tender gaze and whispers that it was created for us alone. In another sense, however, this formal, desensualized aesthetic object, which acts as a point of exchange between subjects, can be read as a spiritualized version of the very commodity it resists.Designy goods, as spiritualized versions of consumer junk, elevate the practice of their exchange to something more seemingly dignified and become the medium for social contact itself. That is, as good possessive individualists molded within capitalism, we are isolated by our tastes and the goods whispering our ersatz uniqueness to us, and we gloat in our transcendence until the loneliness overwhelms us, and we are driven to participate in society, which we can do only on those same terms, at the level of our tastes in everyday goods, in mass entertainments, and that sort of thing. We think we are curators of our own personal museum of tasteful, design-y goods, but in the end it's someone else's institution and we are just the guards.
(For more deep thoughts about design, see this post at one of my other venues.)
Labels:
aesthetics as ideology,
art,
design ideology,
marketing
Saturday, July 16, 2011
Pepsi people power (23 Feb 2009)
Jason Kottke linked to this New York Times article by Stuart Elliott about PepsiCo deciding to reverse course on its rebranding of its Tropicana orange juice line. (AdPulp and Rob Walker noted it also.) I have no investment in the designs at stake here and don't prefer either one. I don't even buy Tropicana juice unless it's the cheapest on offer. (A related but tangential question: Whatever happened to frozen orange juice? It's rarely available and tends to be more expensive than the stuff in the carton everywhere but Aldi. Is this because shipping has become cheaper, rendering concentrated juice unnecessary? I want to feel like a thrifty "new consumer" by reconstituting frozen orange juice, but I am being thwarted!)
But what's interesting about this is the way the internet is being used as a huge marketing focus group by brand managers. This seems cost-efficient (the company says the reversion costs will not be "significant"), as long as companies are willing to be regarded as having made mistakes like this in public. But rather than seem foolish or indecisive, PepsiCo. seems likely to come out ahead from this in a publicity standpoint. The Tropicana brand makes it into the edit pages of publications for free; the company is portrayed as being extremely open and responsive to its customers and somewhat technologically savvy to boot. The article cites a PepsiCo rep, sounding quite pleased with the whole contretemps:
Being open to public comment on packaging changes may in fact be a way of building "brand communities" online, as it gives an inchoate group of unaffiliated consumers something to rally around:
Rob Walker figures that "Probably this story will largely be positioned as an example of the enhanced power of consumers to complain — the NYT story is full of the usual email-and-Facebook examples, etc. And maybe that’s partly true." I agree but think that the power ultimately rests with the companies, not consumers, who after all are still investing their energy in someone else's product. "Activist consumers" who agitate about product design are still consumers, in fact their are even more invested in their roles as consumers. Maybe that is not the worst thing in the world, but my philosophical presupposition is that the "consumer" role is ultimately confining, blinding us to the existential possibilities outside of shopping.
My conspiratorial mind, of course, assumes that these sorts of brand fauxs pas, since they may ultimately serve to be useful for a company, will come to be increasingly staged as a means for facilitating more consumer engagement with brands -- an elaboration of the recent tactic of encouraging consumers to make their own ads. Campbell told the NYT that the logo was changed because criticism came from the company's "most loyal consumers." That they bother to complain is precisely what makes them loyal. Others would probably just buy something else without a second thought. Myself, I would prefer to be one of those others.
But what's interesting about this is the way the internet is being used as a huge marketing focus group by brand managers. This seems cost-efficient (the company says the reversion costs will not be "significant"), as long as companies are willing to be regarded as having made mistakes like this in public. But rather than seem foolish or indecisive, PepsiCo. seems likely to come out ahead from this in a publicity standpoint. The Tropicana brand makes it into the edit pages of publications for free; the company is portrayed as being extremely open and responsive to its customers and somewhat technologically savvy to boot. The article cites a PepsiCo rep, sounding quite pleased with the whole contretemps:
Neil Campbell, president at Tropicana North America in Chicago, part of PepsiCo Americas Beverages, acknowledged that consumers can communicate with marketers “more readily and more quickly” than ever. “For companies that put consumers at the center of what they do,” he said, “it’s a good thing.”
Being open to public comment on packaging changes may in fact be a way of building "brand communities" online, as it gives an inchoate group of unaffiliated consumers something to rally around:
“You used to wait to go to the water cooler or a cocktail party to talk over something,” said Richard Laermer, chief executive at RLM Public Relations in New York.Campbell admitted that there earlier market research had revealed that it wasn't the case that Tropicana buyers "necessarily had a huge connection" to its old packaging. Well, they seem to now.
“Now, every minute is a cocktail party,” he added. “You write an e-mail and in an hour, you’ve got a fan base agreeing with you.”
That ability to share brickbats or bouquets with other consumers is important because it facilitates the formation of ad hoc groups, more likely to be listened to than individuals.
“There will always be people complaining, and always be people complaining about the complainers,” said Peter Shankman, a public relations executive who specializes in social media. “But this makes it easier to put us together.”
Rob Walker figures that "Probably this story will largely be positioned as an example of the enhanced power of consumers to complain — the NYT story is full of the usual email-and-Facebook examples, etc. And maybe that’s partly true." I agree but think that the power ultimately rests with the companies, not consumers, who after all are still investing their energy in someone else's product. "Activist consumers" who agitate about product design are still consumers, in fact their are even more invested in their roles as consumers. Maybe that is not the worst thing in the world, but my philosophical presupposition is that the "consumer" role is ultimately confining, blinding us to the existential possibilities outside of shopping.
My conspiratorial mind, of course, assumes that these sorts of brand fauxs pas, since they may ultimately serve to be useful for a company, will come to be increasingly staged as a means for facilitating more consumer engagement with brands -- an elaboration of the recent tactic of encouraging consumers to make their own ads. Campbell told the NYT that the logo was changed because criticism came from the company's "most loyal consumers." That they bother to complain is precisely what makes them loyal. Others would probably just buy something else without a second thought. Myself, I would prefer to be one of those others.
Labels:
branding,
design ideology,
marketing
Shepard Fairey and notoriety art (20 Feb 2009)
Graphic designer Shepard Fairey, now famous for the "Hope" posters for the Obama campaign (which has kicked up a legal battle about fair use), had a retrospective recently at the ICA in Boston. Peter Schjeldahl, writing in the New Yorker, was not particularly impressed.
That remark is a bit cryptic, particularly if you are skeptical about the dichotomy between pop and art. Around what concepts can that dichotomy be organized, anyway, in our culture? Can you refer to the intentions of the work's creator? And then which intentions are artistic, and which ones aren't? Evaluating how purposefully commercial a work is no longer lets us pigeonhole it along these lines. Art, after all, is big business, an investment category. Artists have become self-conscious businesspeople, producing their work along industrial lines and with a mind to maximizing its market value by controlling its scarcity and promoting it with various stunts. And the nature of the audience has changed, with the democratization of cultural consumption and the ease with which certain sorts of works can be distributed. Whether something is pop or art may depend entirely on the spirit with which it is contemplated by the viewer -- the aesthetic quotient of a particular piece may rely as much on the cultural know-how of the audience as the proficiency of the artist. If we are conditioned to judge visual works by how effective they are in capturing our attention -- the way marketing efforts are judged -- than is it inevitable that artists will move toward catering to that principle?
These are the sorts of questions Rob Walker gets into in an essay he posted to his site about Fairey from a few years ago. At the time Walker was writing, Fairey was working in marketing but also conducting guerrilla art projects, blurring the lines (at least in his own mind) between the two.
Drawing on cultural historian Jackson Lears's Fables of Abundance, Walker contrasts Fairey with Joseph Cornell, another artist who appropriated materials from pop culture and refashioned it into art. But Cornell's work was obsessional, private. It didn't seem to be made with the idea of seeing how far his influence, or his trace, could be spread, as is the case with Fairey's work. At the Cornell retrospective I saw in Salem, Massachusetts, the intimacy of the work was unmistakable; peering at his boxes made me feel a bit voyeuristic, even as I was inspired with a notion of my own potential creativity, the ways I could indulge my own obsessions (whatever I discovered them to be) with certain motifs of imagery, certain juxtapositions. Cornell's art doesn't seem to want to redeem his found objects so much as to render them mysterious, with all the mystery that a specific person's peculiar and ineffable fascination can supply them with. Cornell's work would not make for effective marketing material. The resonance of his designs are too inward and idiosyncratic. They are what no effective advertising can be: creepy.
Advertising is never creepy, always cool. And Fairey's work seems to fit that aesthetic, prompting viewers to respond with the recognition that something hip is happening in Fairey's mode of appropriation. Once you recognize that commercial persuasion has crowded out the space for art appreciation for just about everyone in our culture, the natural response is to try to function within commercial persuasion, adapt its ends to one's own purposes. You can turn yourself into a brand, or you can take personal pride in how effective you shape the image of a product's brand. Or you can work as though influence (cool, or hip, or what have you) was a medium all its own, with a meta-aesthetic beyond a given work's persuasiveness. (You see this when people judge Super Ads in terms of their creativity rather than in terms of how many more people purchase the thing advertised.)
Popularity has become a medium in which artists now prefer to work. Artists can now treat the delineation of their influential scope as the measure and the message of their work; this iss perhaps the most characteristic aesthetic for which contemporary culture can take credit -- the essence of art in the early-internet era. Artists can extend and measure their reach, "subvert" mass persuasion by perfecting it. But the pursuit of such scale, of making notoriety art, corrupts the intimacy that art like Cornell's had succeeded in achieving in the past. Or worse, it permits that intimacy to be refashioned as marketing, so it seems like our closest intimates, those privy to our deepest desires and concerns, those who can give them form that can stir and move us, are advertising copywriters.
Warhol sublimely commodified images of Mao and the hammer and sickle four decades ago, in keeping with an ambition—to infuse subjects and tones of common culture with powers of high art—that has not grown old. Warhol’s revelatory games with the cognitive dissonance between art and commerce have galvanized artists in every generation since. But you can stretch a frisson just so many times before it goes limp. Like the Japanese artist Takashi Murakami, who included a Louis Vuitton boutique in his Los Angeles retrospective, Fairey reverses a revolution achieved by Warhol, along with Roy Lichtenstein. He embraces a trend in what the critic Dave Hickey has called “pop masquerading as art, as opposed to art masquerading as pop.”
That remark is a bit cryptic, particularly if you are skeptical about the dichotomy between pop and art. Around what concepts can that dichotomy be organized, anyway, in our culture? Can you refer to the intentions of the work's creator? And then which intentions are artistic, and which ones aren't? Evaluating how purposefully commercial a work is no longer lets us pigeonhole it along these lines. Art, after all, is big business, an investment category. Artists have become self-conscious businesspeople, producing their work along industrial lines and with a mind to maximizing its market value by controlling its scarcity and promoting it with various stunts. And the nature of the audience has changed, with the democratization of cultural consumption and the ease with which certain sorts of works can be distributed. Whether something is pop or art may depend entirely on the spirit with which it is contemplated by the viewer -- the aesthetic quotient of a particular piece may rely as much on the cultural know-how of the audience as the proficiency of the artist. If we are conditioned to judge visual works by how effective they are in capturing our attention -- the way marketing efforts are judged -- than is it inevitable that artists will move toward catering to that principle?
These are the sorts of questions Rob Walker gets into in an essay he posted to his site about Fairey from a few years ago. At the time Walker was writing, Fairey was working in marketing but also conducting guerrilla art projects, blurring the lines (at least in his own mind) between the two.
When I interviewed Fairey for that magazine article, I of course asked him about the contradictions involved in, say, being someone who has both wheat-pasted the icon face over Sprite billboards – and who has actually done professional design work for the company that owns Sprite. “People make this very black-and-white delineation,” he said. “But I say, ‘How would you feel about it if it were a little more ambiguous? If all companies had marketing materials that didn’t insult the consumer? That were somewhat creative and intelligent and almost like an art piece with a product behind it?”
In other words, instead of responding to the encroachment of evil branding into the supposedly pristine authenticity of the street by withdrawing – why not engage? If the idea of spreading the Obey image is to see how far the Obey image can spread, doesn’t it make a certain sense for it to show up on apparel that is sold in chain stores? If a multinational can put its icons on the street, maybe the street should put its icons into the shopping mall.
Drawing on cultural historian Jackson Lears's Fables of Abundance, Walker contrasts Fairey with Joseph Cornell, another artist who appropriated materials from pop culture and refashioned it into art. But Cornell's work was obsessional, private. It didn't seem to be made with the idea of seeing how far his influence, or his trace, could be spread, as is the case with Fairey's work. At the Cornell retrospective I saw in Salem, Massachusetts, the intimacy of the work was unmistakable; peering at his boxes made me feel a bit voyeuristic, even as I was inspired with a notion of my own potential creativity, the ways I could indulge my own obsessions (whatever I discovered them to be) with certain motifs of imagery, certain juxtapositions. Cornell's art doesn't seem to want to redeem his found objects so much as to render them mysterious, with all the mystery that a specific person's peculiar and ineffable fascination can supply them with. Cornell's work would not make for effective marketing material. The resonance of his designs are too inward and idiosyncratic. They are what no effective advertising can be: creepy.
Advertising is never creepy, always cool. And Fairey's work seems to fit that aesthetic, prompting viewers to respond with the recognition that something hip is happening in Fairey's mode of appropriation. Once you recognize that commercial persuasion has crowded out the space for art appreciation for just about everyone in our culture, the natural response is to try to function within commercial persuasion, adapt its ends to one's own purposes. You can turn yourself into a brand, or you can take personal pride in how effective you shape the image of a product's brand. Or you can work as though influence (cool, or hip, or what have you) was a medium all its own, with a meta-aesthetic beyond a given work's persuasiveness. (You see this when people judge Super Ads in terms of their creativity rather than in terms of how many more people purchase the thing advertised.)
Popularity has become a medium in which artists now prefer to work. Artists can now treat the delineation of their influential scope as the measure and the message of their work; this iss perhaps the most characteristic aesthetic for which contemporary culture can take credit -- the essence of art in the early-internet era. Artists can extend and measure their reach, "subvert" mass persuasion by perfecting it. But the pursuit of such scale, of making notoriety art, corrupts the intimacy that art like Cornell's had succeeded in achieving in the past. Or worse, it permits that intimacy to be refashioned as marketing, so it seems like our closest intimates, those privy to our deepest desires and concerns, those who can give them form that can stir and move us, are advertising copywriters.
Thursday, July 14, 2011
Consumer atrophy (16 Dec 2008)
Rob Walker's column about the "new frugality" nicely skewers the concept.
Walker ends the essay on this faintly hopeful conundrum: "If there’s a deeper shift in our thinking, it’s still to come. And maybe it will. After all, the mere fact that we have managed to characterize consumer shock as frugality chic offers a perverse form of hope: That whatever happens, we’ll never lose our tendency toward optimism — even, it turns out, about our pessimism." But to be honest, this strikes me as all the more reason to be pessimistic, since optimism usually strikes me as ideologically induced naivete. It's better than being miserable, but it licenses our perpetuating in the same self-defeating practices with regard to consumerism all in the name of a dream -- that dream of finding our perfect reflection there in the world of things rather than discover it through the more arduous but more fulfilling route of making and doing. (I can anticipate the objections: Shopping is doing! Consuming is producing! I would argue that they successfully simulate those things while simultaneously promising an escape from them. Shopping has developed the alibi of plausibly passing as "self-actualizing.") I have a hard time reconciling optimism to anything but sunny yes-man-ism, and some critical scrutiny on a society-wide scale will be necessary to uproot consumerist fall-backs.
PSFK linked to this LA Times article that basically epitomizes the new dispensation on consumer behavior. The key goal for service-feature writers in the mass media is to show us how we can maintain the consumer mindset -- shopping with style for self-definition -- only without our having to spend as much (for the time being). This allows us to hold the cherished consumerist attitude in abeyance, keep it well-exercised and prevent it from atrophying while we wait for the economy to turn. Doing away with the mind-set is, of course, unthinkable.
Here, in this article, the formula is simple: Send a celebrity to a closeout discounter and watch him turn junk into magic with his imprimatur! In this case, Philippe Starck.
Starck is also worried about the kids:
In general, the media-appointed style mavens always make an appeal to art and timelessness, which on its face seems ludicrous, since nothing is less enduring than fashion dictates. But the trope is important as an analogue for what is truly timeless from the point of view of the fashion industries -- that is, consumerism. The idea that we'll all reach a point where we don't care about the message we send with the "essence" of our bowls and our Prada green is too terrible for them to contemplate.
We were told our willingness to spend more — on fair-trade coffee, eco-friendly totes, organic dog food — demonstrated a fresh consumer sophistication that would change the marketplace. Now, suddenly, our values are reflected in cheap shirts from Costco.That's a good concise way of getting across something I've been trying to express but have managed only to formulate somewhat inchoately in posts like these.
A new normal that revolves around buying lots of stuff while bragging about our bargain-hunting skills doesn’t seem to reflect changed values.
Walker ends the essay on this faintly hopeful conundrum: "If there’s a deeper shift in our thinking, it’s still to come. And maybe it will. After all, the mere fact that we have managed to characterize consumer shock as frugality chic offers a perverse form of hope: That whatever happens, we’ll never lose our tendency toward optimism — even, it turns out, about our pessimism." But to be honest, this strikes me as all the more reason to be pessimistic, since optimism usually strikes me as ideologically induced naivete. It's better than being miserable, but it licenses our perpetuating in the same self-defeating practices with regard to consumerism all in the name of a dream -- that dream of finding our perfect reflection there in the world of things rather than discover it through the more arduous but more fulfilling route of making and doing. (I can anticipate the objections: Shopping is doing! Consuming is producing! I would argue that they successfully simulate those things while simultaneously promising an escape from them. Shopping has developed the alibi of plausibly passing as "self-actualizing.") I have a hard time reconciling optimism to anything but sunny yes-man-ism, and some critical scrutiny on a society-wide scale will be necessary to uproot consumerist fall-backs.
PSFK linked to this LA Times article that basically epitomizes the new dispensation on consumer behavior. The key goal for service-feature writers in the mass media is to show us how we can maintain the consumer mindset -- shopping with style for self-definition -- only without our having to spend as much (for the time being). This allows us to hold the cherished consumerist attitude in abeyance, keep it well-exercised and prevent it from atrophying while we wait for the economy to turn. Doing away with the mind-set is, of course, unthinkable.
Here, in this article, the formula is simple: Send a celebrity to a closeout discounter and watch him turn junk into magic with his imprimatur! In this case, Philippe Starck.
Famous for putting a modern spin on 18th century French furniture and for creating exquisite environments using expensive materials and craftsmanship, Starck also embraces sensible consumerism. Buy quality over quantity, he says.
"You must be very rigorous," he says, sifting through discounted wares in search of the gems. "Try to find the essence, the most iconic or simple representation of a thing. Look for the bowl that looks most like a bowl. That means we must avoid colors and patterns, and everything that can be trendy."
Starck is also worried about the kids:
"In a crisis, we have to think about our children and especially push their creativity," he says. "If capitalism is failing because it is a selfish system, we can teach them to reinvent society so that it is based on sharing."A nice sentiment -- but what prompted this reflection? Prada green.
Starck is pleased by the store's furnishings and art supplies for kids. He picks out the aforementioned folding table and chairs, as well as sidewalk chalk, a 240-piece paint and marker set, a packet of paper in a color he dubs "Prada green" and a 10-pack of No. 2 pencils. Total: less than $50.
In general, the media-appointed style mavens always make an appeal to art and timelessness, which on its face seems ludicrous, since nothing is less enduring than fashion dictates. But the trope is important as an analogue for what is truly timeless from the point of view of the fashion industries -- that is, consumerism. The idea that we'll all reach a point where we don't care about the message we send with the "essence" of our bowls and our Prada green is too terrible for them to contemplate.
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
Depression modern (27 Nov 2008)
Should we be thankful for the economic turmoil? Recently Drake Bennett wrote a speculative essay for The Boston Globe about what life in the U.S. might be like if a new Depression really took hold. He makes it sound like an anti-consumerist paradise:
Bennett continues:
Bennett addresses the return to use value as it relates to technology.
The impact of a depression, then, will be gauged in terms of how expansive our identities can become. Consolidation, "dwelling," is a matter of retreat to more traditional self-definitions -- family, religion, etc. -- what McCracken dubs "homeyness" and what others would call domestic suffocation. On the other hand, "surging" is embracing the material richness of capitalism as a means to do some freelance self-fashioning along lines dictated by our dreams, or more likely, by what seems to be endorsed in the larger world of mass media. This subjects us to various forms of media manipulation, but at least we are fooled into thinking we are autonomous.
So, the danger in a depression now is not so much that people will starve but that we will be deprived of the usual consumerist tokens we have come to depend on to express our identity. We won't be able to afford to spend on brand distinctions and will in effect feel declassed. Chances are we wouldn't get "homey" or immediately snap into those virtuous behaviors I occasionally tout as replacements to consumerism -- being more active and creating things for ourselves, etc. More likely we just feel disoriented, transformed from a somebody into a nobody without the trinkets that grant us self-knowledge, the things we are accustomed to that let us make manifest and material what we want to believe about ourselves. We would have to learn to make those things for ourselves, and this would be a painful adjustment.
Consumerism lets us participate in a far vaster world than our household by sharing the brands and designs that function as a language of distinction. It's one thing to buy a set of designer measuring spoons at Target and feel classy, another altogether to try to make something equally as polished, with the same immediately apprehensible ability to serve as a social signifier. The spoons tell people you have never met just what you are trying to be; the homemade knickknack speaks a private, most likely incomprehensible language. The sphere into which we can project our identity contracts. Enter domestic suffocation.
two of the basics of existence - food and clothing - are a lot cheaper today, thanks to industrial agriculture and overseas labor. The average middle-class man in the late 1920s, according to the writer and cultural critic Virginia Postrel, could afford just six outfits, and his wife nine - by comparison, the average woman today has seven pairs of jeans alone....I wonder about this comparison, since we now have so many new social contexts that invite different rules about what dress is appropriate. Because I don't have to wear a suit to work, I have only one. I have about five nice shirts and maybe five pairs of pants that are not shabby or casual. Maybe we have more casual, disposable clothes -- a way of chewing up our accursed share. But we probably don't have much more than people from the 1920s did in the way of adult clothes. Beyond a certain point, more clothes is more clutter, creating unnecessary optional paralysis. (Then again, I am an advocate of the stealth uniform.)
Bennett continues:
If we look closely, however, we might see more former lawyers wearing knockoffs, doing their back-to-school shopping at Target or Wal-Mart rather than Banana Republic and Abercrombie & Fitch. Lean times might kill off much of the taboo around buying hand-me-downs, and with modern distribution networks - and a push from the reduce-reuse-recycle mind-set of environmentalism - we might see the development of nationwide used-clothing chains.These already exist, especially if you regard Goodwill and the Salvation Army as franchise for second-hand-store brands. And I've been to Savers from Seattle to Phoenix to Providence to Montreal. The thrift infrastructure has been building up for years, but it is premised on other people not valuing their belongings and giving them away for nothing. When people replace perfectly useful things with new versions out of a sensitivity to fashion or a burning itch to spend, this is even better for thrift stores. But such luxury spending would be cut first, if we are truly rational about cutting back. The fashion cycle could, in theory, slow down. People may suddenly discover all this extra use value in goods they might otherwise have discarded, and only the truly worthless junk would make it to Savers. So it may be that second-hand stores thrive in flush times and stand to be depleted in a downturn, from an initial surge of customers and then a drying-up of quality donations. (In other words, I would no longer be able to find a vintage IBM buckling spring keyboard for $6.)
Bennett addresses the return to use value as it relates to technology.
In general, novelty would lose some of its luster. It's not simply that we'd buy less, we'd look for different qualities in what we buy. New technology would grow less seductive, basic reliability more important. We'd see more products like Nextel phones and the Panasonic Toughbook laptop, which trade on their sturdiness, and fewer like the iPhone - beautiful, cleverly designed, but not known for durability. The neighborhood appliance shop could reappear in a new form - unlicensed, with hacked cellphones and rebuilt computers.The underlying idea here is that gadgetry fulfills our need to express our identity more than anything else. The alleged functionality improvements usually prove detrimental, at least initially, as reliability is surrendered to style. Bennett cites anthropologist Grant McCracken's "surging vs. dwelling" explanation of consumer behavior:
the difference, as he wrote recently on his blog, between believing that the world "teems with new features, new things, new opportunities, new excitement" and thinking that life's pleasures come from counting one's blessings and appreciating and holding onto what one already has. Economic uncertainty, he argues, drives us toward the latter.
The impact of a depression, then, will be gauged in terms of how expansive our identities can become. Consolidation, "dwelling," is a matter of retreat to more traditional self-definitions -- family, religion, etc. -- what McCracken dubs "homeyness" and what others would call domestic suffocation. On the other hand, "surging" is embracing the material richness of capitalism as a means to do some freelance self-fashioning along lines dictated by our dreams, or more likely, by what seems to be endorsed in the larger world of mass media. This subjects us to various forms of media manipulation, but at least we are fooled into thinking we are autonomous.
So, the danger in a depression now is not so much that people will starve but that we will be deprived of the usual consumerist tokens we have come to depend on to express our identity. We won't be able to afford to spend on brand distinctions and will in effect feel declassed. Chances are we wouldn't get "homey" or immediately snap into those virtuous behaviors I occasionally tout as replacements to consumerism -- being more active and creating things for ourselves, etc. More likely we just feel disoriented, transformed from a somebody into a nobody without the trinkets that grant us self-knowledge, the things we are accustomed to that let us make manifest and material what we want to believe about ourselves. We would have to learn to make those things for ourselves, and this would be a painful adjustment.
Consumerism lets us participate in a far vaster world than our household by sharing the brands and designs that function as a language of distinction. It's one thing to buy a set of designer measuring spoons at Target and feel classy, another altogether to try to make something equally as polished, with the same immediately apprehensible ability to serve as a social signifier. The spoons tell people you have never met just what you are trying to be; the homemade knickknack speaks a private, most likely incomprehensible language. The sphere into which we can project our identity contracts. Enter domestic suffocation.
Much of a modern depression would unfold in the domestic sphere: people driving less, shopping less, and eating in their houses more. They would watch television at home; unemployed parents would watch over their own kids instead of taking them to day care.There's no guarantee that this would be transitional -- that the isolating retreat from a society grounded in the shared ability to spend won't totally unhinge us and that a richer vocabulary of selfhood would eventually emerge to supplant brands and hype and gadgets and gear and whatnot. But that's the wager in praising the sunny side of economic stagnation.
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
The consolations of branding (6 Oct 2008)
PSFK linked to this essay from Design Week by Ben Terrett about creating "unproduct," which seems to mean consumer goods that are more idea than substance.
Could brands be adequate consolation for not having actual material goods? Could they be something we could claim a kind of ersatz ownership of to satisfy our innate desire to possess things while our physical stock actually dwindles? It seems plausible, I guess, but would require an exacerbation of identity politics, as we would become far more invested in the symbolism of goods rather than the usefulness we derive from them, since the physical use would be gone and the social-symbolic use would be all there is.
Terrett, who seems primarily interested in making better signage, argues that adding information to existing goods enhances their value and thereby precludes the need to manufacture replacements. This in turn "slows down consumerism":
But the strategy Terrett advocates also evokes a different problem -- if the data applied to already existing goods works to make them appear unique, these goods become positional goods -- goods whose scarcity is irremediable and whose function is generally to exacerbate class differences. The houses with added history do indeed become more expensive, but no utility is added to the economy along with this enhanced value -- houses are worth more, but no more people are housed. Capitalism would be working to distribute more of the stuff available to fewer people (by means of data manipulation), as it will have ceased to make new stuff.
A concept I have been thinking a lot about recently is 'unproduct'. Originally coined by the designer Matt Jones and built upon by the strategist Russell Davies, among others, unproduct is basically maximum idea, minimum stuff. It is an idea that offers some suggestions as to how brands and designers could help combat climate change. You get more value, but you produce less stuff.This seems like an argument for more commercial control of intellectual property, with the logic being that the more capital is tied up in virtual things, the less environmental damage will be wrought in supplying the economy with physical goods. Or in other words, we should pay to participate in brands rather than accumulate goods.
Could brands be adequate consolation for not having actual material goods? Could they be something we could claim a kind of ersatz ownership of to satisfy our innate desire to possess things while our physical stock actually dwindles? It seems plausible, I guess, but would require an exacerbation of identity politics, as we would become far more invested in the symbolism of goods rather than the usefulness we derive from them, since the physical use would be gone and the social-symbolic use would be all there is.
Terrett, who seems primarily interested in making better signage, argues that adding information to existing goods enhances their value and thereby precludes the need to manufacture replacements. This in turn "slows down consumerism":
One important factor in unproduct is data. Because software is now everywhere, you can add and collect data easily and often. We have long realised that adding data to things often makes them more valuable; for example, the way houses become more expensive with added history - from 'this used to be a fruit warehouse' to those ceramic blue plaques. Those little bits of data are increasing the value without creating new stuff, keeping the wheels of capitalism turning while slowing down the treadmill of consumerism.I tend to draw the opposite conclusion about the proliferation of data. I think it works to allow us to consume more quickly, and therefore consume more in a limited amount of time. In our individual lives, we may be aware of environmental limitations to our consumption in an abstract way, but the limit we understand deeply and intimately and react to almost instinctually is the time constraint. We know that there is lots of stuff out there (thanks to marketing's ubiquity and the penetration of entertainment with salesmanship) but we don't have the time to take advantage of it all. But consuming it vicariously through its metadata -- coming to an understanding of it, processing it, whatever you want to call it -- allows us to move on more rapidly to the next thing. Signage potentially cannibalizes on the intrinsic worth of the thing, encouraging us to skim over what is being signed.
But the strategy Terrett advocates also evokes a different problem -- if the data applied to already existing goods works to make them appear unique, these goods become positional goods -- goods whose scarcity is irremediable and whose function is generally to exacerbate class differences. The houses with added history do indeed become more expensive, but no utility is added to the economy along with this enhanced value -- houses are worth more, but no more people are housed. Capitalism would be working to distribute more of the stuff available to fewer people (by means of data manipulation), as it will have ceased to make new stuff.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Visual pollution (20 April 2007)
Via Kottke.org comes this link to an International Herald Tribune story about the ban on outdoor advertising in SĂŁo Paulo. I don't have much sympathy for this line of protest against this:
Billboards aren't about distributing information; they are about reshaping the limits on our thought, so that it includes the advertised product at the expense of what we might learn were we left to our own fact-finding ability.
It's a bit embarrassing to admit, but I'm a bit sympathetic to this:
My sympathy makes me wonder if my culture has brainwashed me, and whether that makes laws such as SĂŁo Paulo's that much more necessary, as much as the paternalism and free-speech implications of it bother me. Should public space remain blank to remain neutral, to remain a public good to the entire public? Or is the brokered colonization of that space adding value to all as well as creating an industry that keeps people employed and others consuming?
Sometimes, in the most feverish moments of my antiadvertising fervor I would dare to dream about such a ban but found it quite impossible to imagine it, in part because as a child growing up in a sleepy semi-rural part of Pennsylvania, I craved much more visual stimulation in the public sphere and was drawn to what seemed to me the de facto excitement of neon. This signified to me the hustle and bustle of commerce, which I had naturally come to think was the essence of "real" life. Nature? Yawn. Reality, as far as I was concerned (though it's not like I was consciously conceiving a philosophical position about it) was the process of exchange, and all the emotions that process inspired. Sometimes I want to blame American culture for instilling this impression in me, but I find I still can't quite shake it. I still get awfully nervous when I find myself "stranded" in the countryside. (In Mediated Thomas De Zengotita has a good passage relating the unnerving quiescence of finding oneself free of media blare, how one can feel strangely orphaned.)
That feeling led me to live in Las Vegas for several years in an attempt to surfeit myself on neon, and on the abstract notion of "action," both visual and propositional. It almost worked. Las Vegas seemed like a blank slate invigorated by huckster energy that manifested as flashy come-ons and temptations, but that impression is part of what the town's vested interests worked to create, the retrospective illusion that there was nothing until they came. But by the time I left there I had grown to have a newfound ardor for "emptiness," for the grandeur of the high sierras, for Death Valley, for the miles of desert surrounding roads that seem endless, roads so featureless that drivers routinely end up in accidents out of boredom. Now, I feel both repulsed and attracted to visual noise and the way it can alter our consciousness and our priorities, the way it signals a falsely triumphant subjugation of nature by humankind. But I wonder whether to live in a place where billboards were taken down but their infrastructure remained would feel like living in an urban ruin, in a dead space where vitality had drained away. How long and how much commitment would it take to eventually dispel that feeling?
"This is a radical law that damages the rules of a market economy and respect for the rule of law," said Marcel Solimeo, chief economist of the Commercial Association of SĂŁo Paulo, which has 32,000 members. "We live in a consumer society and the essence of capitalism is the availability of information about products."
Billboards aren't about distributing information; they are about reshaping the limits on our thought, so that it includes the advertised product at the expense of what we might learn were we left to our own fact-finding ability.
It's a bit embarrassing to admit, but I'm a bit sympathetic to this:
"I think this city is going to become a sadder, duller place," said Dalton Silvano, who cast the sole dissenting vote and is in the advertising business. "Advertising is both an art form and, when you're in your car or alone on foot, a form of entertainment that helps relieve solitude and boredom."
My sympathy makes me wonder if my culture has brainwashed me, and whether that makes laws such as SĂŁo Paulo's that much more necessary, as much as the paternalism and free-speech implications of it bother me. Should public space remain blank to remain neutral, to remain a public good to the entire public? Or is the brokered colonization of that space adding value to all as well as creating an industry that keeps people employed and others consuming?
Sometimes, in the most feverish moments of my antiadvertising fervor I would dare to dream about such a ban but found it quite impossible to imagine it, in part because as a child growing up in a sleepy semi-rural part of Pennsylvania, I craved much more visual stimulation in the public sphere and was drawn to what seemed to me the de facto excitement of neon. This signified to me the hustle and bustle of commerce, which I had naturally come to think was the essence of "real" life. Nature? Yawn. Reality, as far as I was concerned (though it's not like I was consciously conceiving a philosophical position about it) was the process of exchange, and all the emotions that process inspired. Sometimes I want to blame American culture for instilling this impression in me, but I find I still can't quite shake it. I still get awfully nervous when I find myself "stranded" in the countryside. (In Mediated Thomas De Zengotita has a good passage relating the unnerving quiescence of finding oneself free of media blare, how one can feel strangely orphaned.)
That feeling led me to live in Las Vegas for several years in an attempt to surfeit myself on neon, and on the abstract notion of "action," both visual and propositional. It almost worked. Las Vegas seemed like a blank slate invigorated by huckster energy that manifested as flashy come-ons and temptations, but that impression is part of what the town's vested interests worked to create, the retrospective illusion that there was nothing until they came. But by the time I left there I had grown to have a newfound ardor for "emptiness," for the grandeur of the high sierras, for Death Valley, for the miles of desert surrounding roads that seem endless, roads so featureless that drivers routinely end up in accidents out of boredom. Now, I feel both repulsed and attracted to visual noise and the way it can alter our consciousness and our priorities, the way it signals a falsely triumphant subjugation of nature by humankind. But I wonder whether to live in a place where billboards were taken down but their infrastructure remained would feel like living in an urban ruin, in a dead space where vitality had drained away. How long and how much commitment would it take to eventually dispel that feeling?
Labels:
advertising,
aesthetics as ideology,
boredom,
design ideology
Sunday, January 2, 2011
Beauty and its enemies (9 Feb 2007)
In this Atlantic article, Virginia Postrel -- libertarian author of The Substance of Style, a full-throated celebration of style marketing, and the vaguely fascistic-sounding The Future and Its Enemies -- presumes to tell us the truth about beauty by way of an analysis of Dove's recent marketing campaign. While you may be one of the dopes who believes in "the crowd-pleasing notions that beauty is a media creation, that recognizing plural forms of beauty is the same as declaring every woman beautiful, and that self-esteem means ignoring imperfections," the strong among us face up bravely to the truth (if evolutionary psychologists think it's so, it must be Truth) that "Beauty exists, and it’s unevenly distributed." Postrel elaborates cheerfully, "We know beauty when we see it, and our reactions are remarkably consistent. Beauty is not just a social construct, and not every girl is beautiful just the way she is." Luckily technology exists for women to correct Nature's malfeasance in shortchanging them in respect to this eternal ideal, and that technology is not Dove soap, which Postrel seems to imply is perpetrating some fraudulant conspiracy in linking its straightforward, inexpensive product to a message of self-acceptance for those who can't afford or can't be bothered with the cultural imperative with which woman are increasingly burdened -- to perfect themselves through expensive surgical interventions (which incidentally makes beauty a better proxy for class; very useful for policing class boundaries, helping put a stop to the problem that Samuel Richardson first pinpointed in Pamela). The implication seems to be this: Women who view themselves as a being capable of doing things and seek to be judged for their actions rather than being judged as a beautiful art work (like the Venus de Milo and Nefertiti sculptures Postrel cites) are quite clearly deluded, and this malicious Dove campaign is keeping the wool pulled over their pathetic eyes.
In her conclusion Postrel notes that "Real confidence requires self-knowledge, which includes recognizing one’s shortcomings as well as one’s strengths." And to the degree that Dove's campaign occludes self-knowledge, I can see why she's bothered by it. But all ad campaigns seek to subvert self-knowledge; they work by promising to know more about you than you do yourself and to thereby help you attain some false aspiration it seeks to convince you is your own. But the "false" aspiration Dove's campaign seeks to persuade us to adopt is fairly benign compared with the opposite message undergirding virtually every other beauty-product marketing campaign, namely that you are an object to be judged, your value lies in your appearance, and you should feel mortally insecure until you do everything in your power to rectify these lapses from evolutionarily-proven good taste.
If Postrel wants only to fault Dove for choosing beautiful women and then trying to pass them off as ordinary in an especially devious fashion, that would be an astute point. If Dove was truly on a philanthropic mission to refute restrictive media peceptions of female beauty, they might have chosen plainer-looking women. But it seems that most of all Postrel can't stomach the idea that the campaign would have the temerity to try to redefine beauty as some kind of inner quality.
The point is, women shouldn't have to feel tyrannized by the need to attain some level of physical attractiveness, even if evolution would seem to have conspired against them on that front. The survival of the human race no longer depends on this. But the survival of the cosmetics, fashion and plastic surgery industries do. Why is Postrel carrying their water, still?
In her conclusion Postrel notes that "Real confidence requires self-knowledge, which includes recognizing one’s shortcomings as well as one’s strengths." And to the degree that Dove's campaign occludes self-knowledge, I can see why she's bothered by it. But all ad campaigns seek to subvert self-knowledge; they work by promising to know more about you than you do yourself and to thereby help you attain some false aspiration it seeks to convince you is your own. But the "false" aspiration Dove's campaign seeks to persuade us to adopt is fairly benign compared with the opposite message undergirding virtually every other beauty-product marketing campaign, namely that you are an object to be judged, your value lies in your appearance, and you should feel mortally insecure until you do everything in your power to rectify these lapses from evolutionarily-proven good taste.
If Postrel wants only to fault Dove for choosing beautiful women and then trying to pass them off as ordinary in an especially devious fashion, that would be an astute point. If Dove was truly on a philanthropic mission to refute restrictive media peceptions of female beauty, they might have chosen plainer-looking women. But it seems that most of all Postrel can't stomach the idea that the campaign would have the temerity to try to redefine beauty as some kind of inner quality.
Another Dove ad, focusing on girls’ insecurities about their looks, concludes, “Every girl deserves to feel good about herself and see how beautiful she really is.” Here, Dove is encouraging the myth that physical beauty is a false concept, and, at the same time, falsely equating beauty with goodness and self-worth. If you don’t see perfection in the mirror, it suggests, you’ve been duped by the media and suffer from low self-esteem.If what you see in the mirror makes you feel inadequate, you are simply being honest with yourself and that has nothing to do with the media, but if you accept what you see, you've become the dupe of Dove? If the word beautiful is as powerful as Postrel thinks it is, isn't that more reason to denature it by watering it down to refer to all a person's noble qualities? Isn't it good if women can be "beautiful" for being smart, productive, engaged? If they look in a mirror and think that? Physical attractiveness exists, it just shouldn't be all-important. Media, ads inculded, are just one of the many institutions that tries to make a woman's attractiveness, or fertility (as Postrel wishes to interpret it), into the only significant quality she has to offer society.
But adult women have a more realistic view. “Only two percent of women describe themselves as beautiful” trumpets the headline of Dove’s press release. Contrary to what the company wants readers to believe, however, that statistic doesn’t necessarily represent a crisis of confidence; it may simply reflect the power of the word beautiful.
The point is, women shouldn't have to feel tyrannized by the need to attain some level of physical attractiveness, even if evolution would seem to have conspired against them on that front. The survival of the human race no longer depends on this. But the survival of the cosmetics, fashion and plastic surgery industries do. Why is Postrel carrying their water, still?
Labels:
aesthetics as ideology,
beauty,
design ideology,
fashion,
marketing
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