Showing posts with label food. Show all posts
Showing posts with label food. Show all posts

Thursday, August 18, 2011

Disloyalty Programs (25 April 2011)

This morning I opened a tub of yogurt and was confronted with the above image...

I was somewhat skeptical. If rewards are easy to get, maybe they are not actually rewards at all, and the word reward is being used to disguise what is really going on. At first I was thinking this was just another example of advertisers luring me into a species of magical thinking in which my specialness (that the company has somehow managed to recognize) allows me to take shortcuts not available to all the other losers out there. It tempts me to believe that what is true for me is different from what is true for the others, because after all, it is my world and the others are bit players in it. Almost all ads play on that sort of solipsism, dissolving the reality of other people's claims, the interdependencies of society, to present a far more convenient world where our consumer decisions are sovereign in the broadest sense -- the only kind of power that is real and worth exerting.

In this particular case, it seems that the yogurt company is wedding the promise of convenience to something that strikes me as rather inconvenient, logging personal information and participating in an online marketing scheme rather than eating yogurt and then going about one's business in life. A reward that comes easy is probably more accurately described as a gift (or even a "free gift"), but this yogurt company wants me to believe that I have somehow already earned the "rewards" they promise, and I all I have to do is enroll in their loyalty program and dutifully record the serial numbers of every tub of yogurt I eat henceforth. I show my loyalty to the yogurt company by reporting on myself to its website, but I don't earn the company's loyalty to me (in the form of coupons on their yogurt) until I have purchased enough of their product.

It seems to me that this is something of a disloyalty program. The yogurt company demands unearned fidelity from me up-front and then teaches me that "loyalty" should be repaid with systematically doled out rewards intended to make loyalty worth one's while. It teaches me the error of being loyal without a reward program; it teaches me that companies don't see themselves as owing anything to the occasional customer, and thus you shouldn't bother to patronize any particular company until they afford an opportunity for you to enroll you and acknowledge your special diligence. I am reminded that the market is not a sphere of inherent trust between parties who share ethical mores about fairness, but instead a sphere of competing loyalties where savvy players are subsidized by suckers who aren't negotiating special favors on the basis of their past behavior. The market doesn't situate us on a level playing field in which the usefulness of what we bring determines its value; instead it is a place where we leverage our reputation and engage in a kind of competitive self-reporting. The market doesn't let one escape the past and it doesn't offer equal opportunities or a level playing field -- it's a place where class advantages and social capital tilt outcomes; it's a place where the burden of the past is reiterated and reinforced, reinscribed again and again so that the pre-existing imbalances between negotiating parties can be reproduced if not exacerbated.

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

Even Better Than the Real Thing (8 Nov 2010)

At Wired.com, Jonah Lehrer posts about Mexican Coke (the soda, not the inhalant tainted with cattle-deworming drugs) and concludes its alleged superiority to American Coke, made with high fructose corn syrup, is a "cognitive illusion." No ordinary illusion, mind you, but one that occurs in your brain.

In a passage that would delight Baudrillard, Lehrer cites blind taste tests to explain how when we consume soda, we mainly taste the branding.
Although I can rationalize away that closet full of Mexican Coke bottles (thank you, Costco!), the psychology of taste perception suggests those rationalizations are wrong. Consider this clever study of soft drinks led by Samuel McClure and Read Montague. The experiment was a recreation of the Pepsi Challenge, except this time all the tasting was being done in a brain scanner. Each person swallowed sips of cola from a plastic tube while their brain was being scanned. When Coke and Pepsi were offered unlabeled, the subjects showed no measurable preference for either brand. Most of the time, they couldn’t even tell the two colas apart. But Montague’s second observation was more surprising: subjects overwhelmingly preferred drinks that were labeled as Coke, no matter what cola was actually delivered through the tubes. In other words, brand trumped taste. We cared more about the logo than the actual product.

Let them eat signs! Rob Walker had covered Mexican Coke devotees before in a Consumed column and concluded that people are attracted to it largely for its nostalgia value. He also wrote this memorable line about his own Mexican Coke purchasing: "I do this because I believe it tastes better, and I really don’t care why." No one knows better than he how fragile consumerist joys can be. Sometimes you have to take pleasures where you find them and not let theory destroy the fantasies that goods can nurture.

Lehrer is not content to leave it at that. He links the point about consuming the brand with neuroresearch that explains how various regions light up in the brain and so on in response to logos, etc. The upshot is that people get excited about the brand for sentimental reasons and this translates into subjective taste preferences attributed to the product. Through a profane transubstantiation of an unholy idea into sickly sweet material substance, we eat the marketing: "As the scientists note, Coca-Cola is 'advertising incarnate.' " This makes advertised Coke even better than the "real thing," the naked product with no semiotic associations invested in it.

These findings are of a piece with the research into wine tasting, which has suggested that people think more expensive wines inherently taste better. What this implies is that in general, our sense of what we like is extremely malleable, far more manipulatable than our egos can generally stand to tolerate. Brand loyalty is in some ways a hedge against this depressing fact; we assert allegiance to a brand to mask from ourselves that this loyalty has no traceable basis in our "real self." It's an inarticulate way of saying "I do this, and I don't really care why" that allows us to avoid confronting the full significance of those words.

I always wonder about the sentimental reasons, the nostalgia, that triggers these neurological responses. How malleable are those triggers? Can they be implanted by the advertising as well as stroked by it? My hypothesis has always been that consumerism works systematically to broaden our sentimentality, supplying a language and a bestiary of symbols to allow us to react emotionally to a broader range of stimuli. This lets consumerism seem to deepen our sense of self, making our lives seem emotionally (as well as materially) richer -- though from another perspective the puppet masters are just adding more strings to their marionettes.

"Hipster on food stamps" (2 Nov 2010)

I haven't posted for a while, so I thought something with an SEO-friendly title would be a good idea. And I thought this was a pretty interesting essay by the Jacobin's Peter Frase, about misguided hatred for the "hipster on food stamps" discussed in this Salon piece from March. He points out how that phraseology invites contempt, because it trades on the idea that anyone who is arty and "creative" obviously has cultural capital and other ideological resources that should prevent him from being poor. Therefore the impoverished hipster must simply be a slacker (to reference a 90s-era proto-hipster archetype) who is voluntarily destitute, slumming it for hipster cred, thereby abusing a system designed to help the deserving poor, i.e. those social disadvantaged folks who, as Neil Young put it, "never go to school, never get to fall in love, never get to be cool".

Frase thinks working-class people who were enraged by "hipsters on food stamps" should stop scapegoating them and start, like Duke in Repo Man, blaming society. Frase writes:
People see others whom they perceive to have lives that are easier, cooler or more fun than theirs, and instead of questioning the society that gave them their lot, they demand conformity and misery out of others. But why? ... Even if creative and enjoyable lives are only accessible to the privileged, that’s not a damning fact about them so much as it is an indictment of a society that has so much wealth and yet only allows a select few to take advantage of it, while others are forced to waste their lives chained to their useless jobs and bloated mortgages.
The working-class Joe's hatred for the hipster, Frase argues, stems from an ideology that perverts the work ethic and regards art-making as worthless and working-class drudgery as a heroic embrace of duty or something. Maybe so. The working class suspicion toward the would-be bohemian fringe certainly has a long history. For example, check out the end of this clip from the 1968 film Psych Out, where the hippies are mocked and menaced by Reagan Democrat types. And as Mark Greif of n+1 reminds us in this essay, the 2000s vintage hipster began by appropriating motifs from poor-white culture. "Let me recall a string of keywords: trucker hats; undershirts called 'wifebeaters,' worn alone; the aesthetic of basement rec-room pornography, flash-lit Polaroids, and fake-wood paneling; Pabst Blue Ribbon; 'porno' or 'pedophile' mustaches; aviator glasses; Americana T-shirts from church socials and pig roasts; tube socks; the late albums of Johnny Cash; tattoos." No wonder there's some skepticism toward the "hipster on food stamps," who can be understood as merely taking this appropriational logic to its endpoint.

Obviously, those thefts belittle and caricature an entire social group's lived experience, ironizing it, cutting away whatever integrity members of that group might feel about what they do from beneath their feet. Not only do hipsters seem to be playing at being poor (which may or may not be true) but they add insult to injury by seeming to make fun of working class culture, treating it like a costume. At play in such appropriations is the kind of capital that allows various folk practices (for lack of a better term) to become suddenly recognized as creative or hip when a non-native adopts them and exports them out of the ignored niche and into "society" -- the realm recognized by the media. The culture is then understood as a fashion choice, not the product of social realities.

What that process does is make "creativity" something that by definition is not accessible to the working class. The appropriators are lauded as "creative" (that is, they seize upon the symbolic usefulness of deracinated practices and bring that meaning value to a broader public), not the poor whites, who are treated as though they are some anthropological artifact, as though they fundamentally lack the ability to be reflexive about what they do. They are, as workers always are, a resource to be exploited. As a result of that, hipsters and the working class are mutually exclusive; by definition, you can't belong to both sets. Starving artists are not proles. The very ability to be recognized as "creative" already sets one apart and above. Rich or poor, hipsters everywhere are a sign of social expropriation, of the semiotic value of denying full humanity to certain social groups.

Frase wants to resolve the opposition between artists and proles by positing a sort of post-work future beyond the alienation of wages, where all will receive a social wage: "Against the invidious politics of the work ethic, it's time to argue that some things should be granted to everyone, simply by virtue of their humanity. Even hipsters."

Interestingly, he doesn't take this argument to the next level: free from having to do work that is necessary merely for capital's valorization, workers are liberated to pursue meaningful, socially necessary work, which all will appreciate and understand as a kind of social art. In such conditions, with no basis for connoisseurial superiority in how one lives and works (which would become synonymous), hipsters would necessarily cease to exist.

(A better title for this post, I think, would be "Artists only.")

Monday, August 15, 2011

Thoughts on Go-gurt (4 Oct 2010)

I have always been puzzled by the concept of Go-Gurt, yogurt that you squeeze into your mouth out of a tube. It seems sort of lewd. I don't know if I could look the cashier in the eye if I bought some.

As if the phallicism weren't salacious enough, Go-Gurt has a flavor called Bikini Bottom Berry. Who is doing their branding? Al Goldstein? Presumably this "flavor" has something to do with Sponge Bob, and if I had children I would understand that the idea of eating Bikini Bottoms is not dirty or scatological but cute. Still, it makes me want to break out Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and get to the bottom of it.

A few decades ago, a product like Go-Gurt would probably have been advertised as space-age, a product that lets kids emulate the astronauts, like Tang (another oddly named product, come to think of it -- perhaps the sexual promise of adulthood is being encoded/coopted in cheeky brand names). But it doesn't seem like too many products are sold to kids through heroic images of adulthood anymore. Now we all learn to want adolescence to last forever.

A defense of foodie-ism (21 Sept 2010)

Almost incidentally, in the course of positing the value of a liberal-arts education, Tyler Cowen presents a sort of defense of foodies:
I am interested in food (among other topics), not only because of the food itself. I also view it as an investment in understanding symbolic meaning, cultural codes of excellence, the transmission of ideas, and also how the details of an area fit together to form a coherent whole. I believe this knowledge makes me smarter and wiser, although I am not sure which mass-produced formal test would pick up any effects. I view this interest as continuing my liberal arts education, albeit through self-education.
Grasping food as a cultural system and understanding how it works makes one smarter, as long as you agree that smarts are a matter of mastering these kinds of decoding and recoding procedures. Liberal arts education, to put it as technocratically as possible, teaches students how to process information in a number of different codes, how to manipulate their idiosyncratic structures of meaning. The problem with foodies (and perhaps libaral-arts types like myself generally) comes when they attempt to assert a kind of dominance through the mastery of these codes -- they try to make the possibility of mastery exclusive, a zero-sum game. That is, they try to impose a status component to the coding/decoding that shifts the original or inherent or latent meanings of the food (or whatever) in a new way that suits their pretensions to becoming an elite. Then connoisseurship threatens to become the only relevant meaning possible to decode from a certain practice. (This is what Baudrillard feared in his ruminations about the consumerist code.) In other words, foodie-ism threatens to take all that rich cultural information inherent in making and enjoying food and flatten it out so that it only indicates where you stand in relation to some food-related trend, as an early adopter or an arriviste. Worse, we can only interpret it that way, and the original data begins to become inaccessible.

I think this sort of pattern fuels a lot of the culture-war animus directed at university-bred "elitists," who are seen as reducing/reifiying the richness of traditional everyday life and making it a big status game.


Trader Aldi's (3 Sept 2010)

I am a little bit obsessed with the oft-neglected connection between German hard-discounter Aldi and U.S. lifestyle-grocery Trader Joe's, mainly because most of the Americans who shop at Trader Joe's would never be caught skulking in an Aldi -- many of which are in lower-income, fringe areas in the U.S. -- and a high proportion of Aldi's customers probably don't even know what Trader Joe's is. It's a not so secret vanity of mine to be one of what I imagine to be few people shopping at both stores routinely. I'm not sure what system I think I am beating; I just feel that "they" don't want you to know that the food in both of these chains is of the same quality. (In Germany, Aldi apparently stocks Trader Joe's branded goods on the shelves, something we will never see in the U.S.)

Though both Trader Joe's and Aldi often get unreasonably crowded and entail long waits in line, they offer a stark opportunity to study class difference in America -- the way the same stuff is branded differently to appeal across income brackets; the different kinds of behaviors customers display and the sort of amenities they expect. Aldi is notorious for offering no amenities whatsoever; the food is piled in cardboard boxes on pallets in the store, and you must pack your own groceries, Euro-style, with bags you have to pay for. Trader Joe's has a weird shtick where the employees are dressed as if they were a ship's crew, and they seem instructed to make cheerful small talk with customers. They offer Dixie cups of coffee and free samples of prepared food -- the scramble for which can often become savage, with lots of anarchic pushing and shoving.

My sense is that Aldi treats grocery shopping the way it ought to be treated, as a grim and necessary duty carried out by responsible adults seeking the best prices and not seeking affirmation about what kind of people they are. The families trudging through Aldi, pushing the oversize cart that you must pay a 25-cent deposit for in the parking lot, are generally nonplussed by the goods on offer, a bizarre array of hapless pseudobrands like "Savoritz" and "Fit & Easy" and "Happy Farms." The products confer no status, so affirmation for people buying stuff there can then theoretically come from more appropriate sources connected to practices more integral to our identity than shopping. Whereas at Trader Joe's customers are patronized like children and flattered and cajoled as if they were helpless simps desperate to be told what will make them cool and clever. The food is marketed as if it all were potentially trendy and impressive. The general impression the experience seems designed to leave shoppers with is that they are superior to the ordinary grocery shopper because they are more alert to a veneer of signifiers overlaying the products and can keep up with and decode these signifiers efficiently. But I don't want or expect to be congratulated for buying the "frozen organic foursome" or "Trader Joe's Ultra-dark Bay Blend" -- I just want my figs and coffee beans and to get the hell out of there.

This recent Fortune cover story by Beth Kowitt supplies some confirmation for my nutty views. Kowitt claims that Trader Joe's is "an offbeat, fun discovery zone that elevates food shopping from a chore to a cultural experience" -- a description that perfectly encapsulates everything wrong with the chain. (And if you don't think it is a chore to be in TJ's on, say, a weekend afternoon, you're nuts. It's like being at a public pool on the hottest afternoon of the year, only everybody is an entitled prig blathering on a cell phone.) Kowitt then systematically undermines that brand identity by exposing the way the illusion is constructed. She notes that TJ's is owned by Aldi and that "big, well-known companies also make many of Trader Joe's products" though they are packaged to seem localish in provenance. Vendors are sworn to secrecy about their relationship to Trader Joe's, allowing the grocer to maintain total control over the brand. She explains how TJ's shops for its customers by seeing which zip codes subscribe to foodie magazines and have high education levels -- these indicators apparently mark the insecure but trend-setting customers they want to attract, people for whom food is not something you struggle to afford but something you struggle to master and awe others with.

None of this is all that shocking, but it just points to the ways in which class gets delineated through consumer practices, as it must in a consumer society that on the surface promises purchasing power for all and equal opportunity to goods. But the class matters at stake in places like Trader Joe's appear to dissolve in an atmosphere of righteousness, of cool, of "quality" being bounced back and forth between customers and products, so that consumers don't believe they are partaking in anything unegalitarian -- they don't see themselves as responsible for reproducing class inequity at all.

Tipping and Servility (18 Aug 2010)

A few days ago Matt Yglesias linked to a blog post by Rachel Ryan about restaurant-tipping customs in the U.S. Ryan notes that her European visitor thinks tipping is ridiculous and essentially anti-capitalistic, saying, "They chose to be waiters. They chose to work for minimum wage. If they want more money, get a higher paying job -- don’t expect me to tip you because you were nice and speedy. That’s your job.” Ryan admits she has no rebuttal for this, since her argument that tipping is a reward for good service is somewhat negated by the fact that we don't tip everybody for doing anything in the service sector (yet -- I've been encouraged to tip just about every type of retail worker I've encountered in New York City).

I think this misses the point about tipping, a paternalistic practice that serves to strip dignity from service-sector jobs, deprofessionalizing them, while giving employers justification for paying employees low wages. You can classify my argument here as part of my jihad against customer service. (Is it okay to use "jihad" that way? I need to ask my local Tea Party apparatchik.) I'll indecently quote myself: "Generally I’m against customer service, which is typically a bogus way of making shoppers feel more important than they really are for an activity that should in no way be thought to dignify them."

The tip shakedown is a variant on the idea that customers have a right to demand special service -- that they are able to buying the illusion that they are treated better than the other customers and are somehow better people. (How often is big tipping not a sign of customer insecurity?) Instead of getting the privileged service automatically, customers must hold out their dollars like treats to get service workers to perform tricks for them. Tipping always and everywhere demoralizes the people who are forced to beg for their pay in addition to doing their work. It's a barbaric backward practice that functions as a kind of institutionalized corruption, as it assumes that workers are all de facto extortionists who will only do something for you for a little extra. Tips are supposed to promote "friendly" service, and admittedly, you don't have to eat too many meals in Eastern Europe to notice a difference in the way customers are regarded. But I don't want waiters to act as though they are my friend, and I don't want them pushing more food and drink on me to inflate the bill and thereby inflate their tip (as one of the commenters on Ryan's post notes). I don't want "good service"; I just want appropriate service, and also not to feel like a phony pasha lording over the lower castes for the duration of my meal.

Being good at waiting tables requires skill and practice, and those who learn to do it well are consummate professionals. But the custom of tipping reduces their labor to a kind of implied prostitution. It builds in the assumption of their incompetence, as though it's only natural they they should again and again prove they are worthy enough to be paid what they should "really" be making.

Saturday, August 6, 2011

Alt.burrito (26 Feb 2010)

Maybe I have been focusing too much on HRO Exegesis lately, but: Is there something that's supposed to be indie or "alt" about eating burritos in America that I am unaware of? Driven to desperate measures by the impassable slush everywhere in New York City, I went next door from my office building to Qdoba, a fast-food burrito chain, and playing over the speakers in the place was "Stillness Is the Move" by the Dirty Projectors. What is that about? I nearly choked on a cilantro leaf. And Chipotle, another haute-burrito chain, has long been in the habit of playing music by the likes of Wilco, Nick Cave, Neko Case, Tom Waits, Bonnie "Prince" Billy, etc., in their dining areas -- perhaps a sneaky effort to quickly drive customers out and keep turnover sufficiently high.

Anyway, what is the explanation for this branding strategy? Is it an effort to make burritos seem safe for white people to eat, to accelerate the process by which Mexican food is demexified?

Monday, August 1, 2011

Cheap and fat (17 Sept 2009)

Vox EU posted a study by Neil Gandal about the relationship of obesity to price sensitivity.
Is increasing obesity due to changes in relative food prices? High-energy density foods are less expensive per calorie than fresh fruits and vegetables. Using data from Israel, this column shows that price sensitivity has a significant impact on obesity. In fact, price sensitivity may be more crucial than income.... We find that women who stated that price was not important at all when purchasing food products had a BMI 1.3 units below those who stated that price was “very important.” A reduction of 1.3 units in the BMI for all obese women would move approximately 25% of women who are in the "obese" category to the "overweight" category.
In other words, according to this study, people who are cost-conscious while buying food tend to be fatter, even after controlling for income. (So perhaps commentators should be careful about reflexively linking poor and fat together; fat and cheap is the proper knee-jerk insult combo.) It seems to suggest by implication, too, that being poor doesn't necessarily make you more cost-conscious about food, which seems a bit hard to believe. Perhaps you don't self-report as "cost-conscious" when you can't choose to spend more on food even if you wanted to.

Eating badly can seem like an ignorant thing to do, and conservative types tend to assume that the poor are poor because they are ignorant as well. So it seems to make ideological sense to them that the poor make bad eating choices out of the same supposed myopic ignorance that has made them "choose" poverty. They aren't forced by straitened circumstances to eat unhealthy food; they choose it. The study could be distorted to support that view. But the study also would seem to suggest that some of the wisdom and economic common sense that the poor are sometimes presumed to lack -- being more rational in the marketplace, finding good deals, being thrifty, etc. (the imprudence that allegedly keeps them poor) -- is precisely what's correlated with the unhealthy eating, that bargain hunting and obesity stem from the same miser pathology. What's clear is that the rationale of the market wreaks havoc on whatever our body might otherwise tell us about what we need nutritionally. We make market-based decisions about what body needs, letting the market dictate those needs, to our body's detriment.

The context for the study is the proposition of taxes on sugar drinks. Gandal notes that "Drewnowski and Barratt-Fornell (2004) conducted a simple "experiment" in a Seattle supermarket and found that, per calorie, carrots cost virtually five times more than cookies or potato chips, and orange juice costs virtually five times as much as soft drinks." One of the reasons for this, as Michael Pollan has argued and as Gandal notes, is U.S. agricultural policy:
Between 1985 and 2000, fruit and vegetable prices in the US increased by about 40%, while the price of soft drinks dropped by 23%. These seem like large changes in relative prices. According to Pollan, the change in relative prices is in large part due to the US farm bill, which provides generous subsidies for corn and soy, which are prime ingredients in high-density “processed food.”

The Economist's Free Exchange blogger puts the findings in perspective and makes a good point: the U.S. should take on the irrational agri-subsidies first before levying nanny-ish taxes on unhealthful consumer behavior.

Friday, July 29, 2011

Televised food and consumption deskilling (4 Aug 2009)

Though it is part of the conspicuous flood of hype for the upcoming film Julia and Julia, Michael Pollan's article about cooking shows for last Sunday's New York Times Magazine is a fascinating look at the way food and cooking are depicted on television and what that indicates about America's relationship to consumption in general. A few things I found particularly interesting:

1. Pollan talks to a market researcher at the NPD Group, which is ubiquitous in stories about retailing in the business press.
Like most people who study consumer behavior, Balzer has developed a somewhat cynical view of human nature, which his research suggests is ever driven by the quest to save time or money or, optimally, both. I kept asking him what his research had to say about the prevalence of the activity I referred to as “real scratch cooking,” but he wouldn’t touch the term. Why? Apparently the activity has become so rarefied as to elude his tools of measurement.
I found it interesting that someone who is only interested in humans insofar as they are shopping would conclude that they are entirely fixated on convenience. The realm of retail is precisely where that potentiality in people is brought to the fore, rewarded, massaged. So it's not surprising that the NPD Group won't deign to measure an activity that runs counter to convenience, that it would prove "elusive." So is the causality backward here? Does the market research and retail analysis start with an assumption of convenience as the desirable value (if that is the goal, then we can seem to solve our problems with shopping) and then impute it to human nature, as a way of shoring up what is an ideological tenet, not a universal psychological truth?

2. Rob Walker higlighted this paragraph, which jumped out at me too:
The historical drift of cooking programs — from a genuine interest in producing food yourself to the spectacle of merely consuming it — surely owes a lot to the decline of cooking in our culture, but it also has something to do with the gravitational field that eventually overtakes anything in television’s orbit. It’s no accident that Julia Child appeared on public television — or educational television, as it used to be called. On a commercial network, a program that actually inspired viewers to get off the couch and spend an hour cooking a meal would be a commercial disaster, for it would mean they were turning off the television to do something else. The ads on the Food Network, at least in prime time, strongly suggest its viewers do no such thing: the food-related ads hardly ever hawk kitchen appliances or ingredients (unless you count A.1. steak sauce) but rather push the usual supermarket cart of edible foodlike substances, including Manwich sloppy joe in a can, Special K protein shakes and Ore-Ida frozen French fries, along with fast-casual eateries like Olive Garden and Red Lobster.
The point is that commercial television's main function is to make viewers into the sort of people who want to watch more and more commercial television. Any of its programs can be reduced to that agenda, ultimately, with the specific content of any show being something of a by-product, an alibi. As a free-flowing, ongoing form of media, television invites us to interact with it constantly; unlike other consumer goods it can refine the wants it satisfies in the process of satisfying them. Watching TV is like eating a meal that tastes great but makes you hungrier. To that end, television wants to provoke us to replace our concrete, direct activities with vicarious ones and demonstrate through its sensory manipulations that the vicarious experience (to paraphrase Baudrillard) is more real than real.

3. Nonetheless, I'm skeptical of this sort of argument: "You’ll be flipping aimlessly through the cable channels when a slow-motion cascade of glistening red cherries or a tongue of flame lapping at a slab of meat on the grill will catch your eye, and your reptilian brain will paralyze your thumb on the remote, forcing you to stop to see what’s cooking." I suppose there has been a study where the brainwave or eyeball movements of participants are tracked and measured to demonstrate some correlation between pictures of food and limbic system activity, but nevertheless, I have a hard time conceding that humans are hard-wired for any sort of vicarious experience. Such explanations for the increasing amounts of vicarious experience in our lives seems to excuse various forms of media have interposed themselves into our lives and prompted us to consume images. And it seems imperative to investigate how the seemingly irresistible appeal of images is constructed and reinforced within the realm of images -- how manipulation via images is a craft, an applied science. Our media are not neutral terrain that merely permit the unveiling of evolutionary mysteries; to what degree do they posit and condition those discoveries about the so-called reptilian brain?

4. Pollan suspects the appeal of cooking shows is that it vicariously fulfills our longing for meaningful work:
“You know what I love about cooking?” Julie tells us in a voice-over as we watch her field yet another inconclusive call on her headset. “I love that after a day where nothing is sure — and when I say nothing, I mean nothing — you can come home and absolutely know that if you add egg yolks to chocolate and sugar and milk, it will get thick. It’s such a comfort.” How many of us still do work that engages us in a dialogue with the material world and ends — assuming the soufflé doesn’t collapse — with such a gratifying and tasty sense of closure? Come to think of it, even the collapse of the soufflé is at least definitive, which is more than you can say about most of what you will do at work tomorrow.
Television presumably undermines the way in which such satisfaction might have been integrated into our leisure time in the form of craft-based hobbies.

5. Television is part of the culture-industry program of deskilling our leisure, or rather removing life skills from everyday, nonwork life and transforming them into hobbies for the few. Cooking, as Pollan suggests, has become another front in that war.
We seem to be well on our way to turning cooking into a form of weekend recreation, a backyard sport for which we outfit ourselves at Williams-Sonoma, or a televised spectator sport we watch from the couch. Cooking’s fate may be to join some of our other weekend exercises in recreational atavism: camping and gardening and hunting and riding on horseback. Something in us apparently likes to be reminded of our distant origins every now and then and to celebrate whatever rough skills for contending with the natural world might survive in us, beneath the thin crust of 21st-century civilization.
To play at farming or foraging for food strikes us as harmless enough, perhaps because the delegating of those activities to other people in real life is something most of us are generally O.K. with. But to relegate the activity of cooking to a form of play, something that happens just on weekends or mostly on television, seems much more consequential. The fact is that not cooking may well be deleterious to our health, and there is reason to believe that the outsourcing of food preparation to corporations and 16-year-olds has already taken a toll on our physical and psychological well-being.
Chris Dillow made a similar point in this post about cooking shows. He blames deskilling on "the spread of purely instrumental rationality - the idea that utility maximization consists solely in maximizing consumption for minimal expenditure of time and money." Not only is it an animating principle of capitalism, instrumental rationality, as the Frankfurt School theorists insisted, is the lifeblood ideology of the culture industry. (See "Enlightenment as Mass Deception") It also animates techno-utopian celebrations of the efficiency of the internet for all sorts of social-cum-commercial functions. In general, instrumental rationality alienates us from process and fixates us on the end product, convincing us that the time wasted in enjoying processes for their own sake is wasted since there are so many cool products out there for us to be enjoying in that time instead. Why cook when you can spend that time online hurtling through blog posts and YouTube videos?

This paper by JoAnn Jaffe and Michael Gertler about consumer deskilling and agribusiness probably has lots of interesting ideas on this point, but unfortunately it's gated. The abstract, though, is promising; it sounds like an academicized version of Pollan's ideas:
The prevalence of packaged, processed, and industrially transformed foodstuffs is often explained in terms of consumer preference for convenience. A closer look at the social construction of “consumers” reveals that the agro-food industry has waged a double disinformation campaign to manipulate and to re-educate consumers while appearing to respond to consumer demand. Many consumers have lost the knowledge necessary to make discerning decisions about the multiple dimensions of quality, including the contributions a well-chosen diet can make to health, planetary sustainability, and community economic development. They have also lost the skills needed to make use of basic commodities in a manner that allows them to eat a high quality diet while also eating lower on the food chain and on a lower budget.
I'm attracted especially by the suggestion that consumers are socially constructed to prefer convenience.

Here (pdf) is another paper on consumer deskilling vis-a-vis food, drawing on the paper cited above and Pollan. It focuses on deskilling, and the problems we face in trying to reskill ourselves (a process, by the way, that the Food Network blocks while seeming to facilitate it): "By gaining experiential knowledge of food, food preparation, appreciation of taste and quality, and increasing food literacy, one renders the range of products and services offered by the industrial food system as both useless and undesirable." In other words, you set yourself against a massive institution that controls most of our access points to the food chain, which means you are in for an endless headache until you are prepared to embrace inconvenience as an ethic of its own.

Thursday, July 21, 2011

Speed eating (6 May 2009)

More collateral damage from the acceleration and disintegration of social life: At Marginal Revolution, Alex Tabarrok links to this Economix post at the NYT site about the relationship between obesity and the time spent eating. This chart tells the story of their possible correlation:
I would assume that this reflects how eating remains more of a social ritual in some cultures rather than a solo refueling mission, as it frequently is in the U.S. It reminds me of my experience in Europe, where I found to my chagrin that the idea of getting coffee to go is practically unheard of. In New York, in my neighborhood, the Greek immigrants sit at the cafes all day and I can't even figure out what could be keeping them there. I find, sadly, that I relate more to the people I see shoving a slice of pizza into their mouths while walking through crowds in Midtown.

But our feeling of perpetually not having enough time seems to rationalize such behavior. Eating quickly, which almost automatically means eating alone, seems a consequence of the enormous pressure we feel to be moving on, consuming more, shrinking the base unit in which we measure the attention we pay so that we have more of it to spend. This need to economize attention (where does this need come from? can it be resisted?) encourages to isolate ourselves so that we may have complete control over our "experience economy". It also prompts us to gird ourselves with gadgetry so that we may streamline our cultural throughput.

Perhaps since Vance Packard and his ilk first made a sensationalized stink about planned obsolescence in the 1960s, it has seemed inherently subversive to slow down or prolong our consumption time. But the time we spent consuming something doesn't seem to be something we can set out to control; it instead seems a byproduct of our engagement with the thing in question, which makes it an insidious target for manipulation. The result is that conscious efforts to slow ourselves down may make us feel intolerably bored with ourselves.

Friday, July 8, 2011

Demise of the Mediterranean diet (24 Sept. 2008)

Matt Yglesias linked to this NYT article about the disappearing Mediterranean diet, and he makes a point that reminded me of what I was trying to get at yesterday about the to-go mentality. Yglesias writes
As an American, I suppose it's somewhat comforting to learn that our bad habits seem to have a quasi-universal gravitational pull and we're not just a uniquely cursed nation. Conversely, the news that the state of public health in the developed world is likely to deteriorate is pretty disturbing.
It seems to me that what spreads is not our taste for specific sorts of food, but our attitude toward eating itself, whereby we treat meals with a kind of disrespect and choose options that allow us to eat with as little time and thought wasted as possible. Globalization and the aggressive spread of consumerism may be making this kind of time pressure universal, seducing people with the idea that their time is better spent consuming more stuff than lingering over a well-prepared meal.

That sounds a little conspiratorial, but it is the planned achievement of the advertising campaigns of multinational convenience-food manufacturers. The NYT article reports:
Dr. Antonia Trichopoulou, a professor of epidemiology at the University of Athens Medical School, said the problem had grown acute with the spread of supermarkets and, especially, convenience foods.
"In the last five years it's become really bad," she said. "The children are all quite heavy. The market is pushing a lot, and parents and schools seem unable to resist."
Advertising geared toward children has invaded Greece full force, stretching into the countryside. On television there are commercials for chips; at supermarkets there are stands of candy. Last year, Coca-Cola sponsored a play about healthful eating.
But facing both aggressive convenience food marketing and obesity for the first time, many rural residents here have little resistance to or knowledge of the dangers.
The question is whether resistance is even possible at this point. Americans, at least, haven't figured it out yet. An "elitist" froufrou commitment to diet and exercise and healthy ingredients may help, but the ability to pursue such a course remains class bound. And even among those who can afford to eat healthily, the compulsion to consume more -- the deeply felt symbol of having become successful in a consumer culture -- is very hard to escape. Resisting the allure of convenience is linked to breaking the quantitative logic that suggests consuming more in the same amount of time means one's quality of life has improved, a logic that is facilitated by the technological developments that make measuring and processing culture as data easier. But is it possible to reverse that logic once it has taken hold, or is it a form of path dependency?

Thursday, June 30, 2011

Ostentatious gastronomy (3 June 2008)

I'm reflexively skeptical of elaborate menu copy -- the lush descriptions of the novel combinations of ingredients (often hyperspecified -- not just cucumber but compressed English cucumber) and unfamiliar modes of preparation for which loan words from French are required. Part of this is because this sort of language betokens expensiveness. I start to suspect I am paying for the sumptuous prose, which has set itself as mediating screen for the food, rather than for the food itself. Eating is inherently a democratic activity -- everyone has equal claim to being right about what they like -- but these menus are trying desperately to obscure that fact, make dining into a region of insecurity, identity formation, and class distinction.

But a larger part of my problem is that these menus make me feel stupid. I don't have the vocabulary necessary to understand them, and autodidact that I am, I hate to ask for explanations. Confronted with the incomprehensible descriptions that I can't really ignore, I often feel like a provincial rube, and I feel like this is by design -- I'm the sort of person the restaurant wants to feel excluded so that the target audience can enjoy their distinction a little bit more. I don't aspire to be sort of person who seeks that form of distinction, so I end up feeling completely alienated, annoyed at the existence of people who are impressed with ostentatious gastronomy; and my mouth refuses to taste what's there in the food as a way of expressing my very pointless protest.

I know that is mostly irrational paranoia, and that this is the sort of situation in which I should be applying Nassim Nicholas Taleb's dictum to reserve skepticism for the big questions -- not for the ulterior motives of small-time restaurateurs. They have the benign motive of wanting to make dining into an aesthetic experience and sharing the chef's artistry, but I don't want to eat aesthetically, so I get flustered by attempts to encourage me to do so. I don't want the chef to be an artist; I don't want to be able to discuss dining as I might talk about a movie or a well-written poem. Not only do I lack the discernment to recognize the chef's effort, but I almost feel negated by the chef's assertion of ego into my attempt to meet my fundamental need for nourishment.

Aestheticization of eating turns something primal into something that other people can judge you for -- if they can deem your ability to eat, to sustain your life, flawed, it is almost like they can reject your right to have any private sensations whatsoever. Shouldn't some aspects of life be beyond stylization? Shouldn't there be reserves of experience that remain direct, beyond the reach of self-consciousness, because they are so basic to our needs as humans? Do I have this backward? Are our fundamental needs the first to become complexly intertwined with society's need to fabricate and perpetuate hierarchies? (Maybe I need to read some Levi-Strauss or something on this point.)

One's tastes in food are extremely personal; they are perhaps the primary way to assert one's individuality. When one surrenders fussiness and learns to trust in the sophisticated concoctions of other self-appointed culinary artists, as expressed in menu copy, one cedes a huge territory on which one can establish identity. When you buy into the complicated menu, no substitutions, no longer can you say to yourself, "I choose what I will eat, for me and me only; my force of will alone will decide what's appropriate to stick in my body approvingly." You are trusting instead that someone else knows better than you about those extremely intimate and ultimately inexpressible and unsharable sensory experiences you will have in your mouth and your stomach.

I have a hard time making the leap, which in many ways feels like the leap to maturity. Instead I have this narcissistic view of food (it's all must be made personally for me, how I want it, because only MY ideas are valid about what I will eat), which requires those who make it to be anonymous, and that their methods be straightforward, transparent, and easily replicable. I want the food's deliciousness to be a reflection of my own ingenuity for choosing to eat it, not the special genius of the cooks who prepared it.

The conserver society (13 May 2008)

Yesterday in the New York Times, Paul Krugman opined that oil prices are high not because of speculation but dwindling supply: "A realistic view of what’s happened over the past few years suggests that we’re heading into an era of increasingly scarce, costly oil." He's not panicking about this, but seen in light of our looming problems with global warming, and reports of fertilizer shortages and the possibility we have maxed out our food production capacity, it makes one wonder if the developed world is ready to give some consideration to John Stuart Mill's idea of the "stationary state," an economy that dispenses with growth and works to achieves intensive rather than extensive gains for its populace.
It is not good for man to be kept perforce at all times in the presence of his species. A world from which solitude is extirpated, is a very poor ideal. Solitude, in the sense of being often alone, is essential to any depth of meditation or of character; and solitude in the presence of natural beauty and grandeur, is the cradle of thoughts and aspirations which are not only good for the individual, but which society could ill do without. Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left to the spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings; every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated for man's use exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved agriculture. If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would. extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or a happier population. I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity. that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compel them to it.

In his 1976 book The Limits to Satisfaction, environmental studies professor William Leiss updates that ideal and bills it as the "conserver society" that rejects the "doctrine of the insatiability of human material needs" -- a postulate of neoclassical economics -- and the idea that "nonhuman nature is ... nothing but a means for human satisfaction." (This reminds me also of Michael Pollan's argument from a few weeks ago that we should garden to lose out "cheap-energy mind" and dreams that someday "not having things might become cooler than having them" -- I am not holding my breath for that.)

According to Leiss's diagnosis, our wasteful society emerges from a process which has systematically confused people about the nature of their needs -- not by implanting false needs (as it is so tempting to argue when we see what other people are buying, or we contemplate the goods in the average 99-cent store) but by making them ever divisible and ever more ambiguous. "Each aspect of a person's needs tends to be broken down into progressively smaller component parts, and therefore it becomes increasingly difficult for that person to integrate the components into a coherent ensemble of needs and a coherent personality structure." We lose our moorings as needs are refined by the persuasion industry, with the consequence that "personal identity becomes a supple mold reshaped daily by the message mix." (Thus, I am a product of my RSS feeds.) Individualtion doesn't guide us to our particualr preferences; rather, an awareness of our individuality is itself a product of our consumer practices. Leiss argues that "the integration of the components tends to become a property of the commodities themselves" -- we become reliant on consumer goods to integrate our self-concept: "The fragmentation of needs requires on the individual's part a steadily more intensive effort to hold together his identity and personal integrity. In concrete terms this amounts to spending more and more time in consumption activities."

Then the problems incipient in the "attention economy" come into play. It takes time to use the goods we are amassing, but time is limited. So we will be motivated to choose activities that allow us to use our goods over ones that don't require things. We won't want to walk in the park when we have a stack of DVDs to watch. Incidentally, This problem is exacerbated immeasurably by the ability to download massive amounts of media for "free." Of course, it's not free; we pay in time, which we seem ill-equippped to properly value in relation to consumption. That is economist Staffan Linder's insight in The Harried Leisure Class, what Leiss calls a Gresham's Law of consumption -- "wants for ever greater numbers of commodities tend to depreciate all types of desires that are not dependent upon the consumption of things." This erodes "craft knowledge" (in Leiss's terminology) or what I think of as a kind of happiness biofeedback -- we lose touch with how to use goods efficiently to satisfy ourselves and concentrate instead on simple maximization. Hence iTunes library with 10,000 songs, many unplayed. Nothing rings more true for me than this comment of Leiss's: "The simple want for larger and larger numbers of things means that the individual must pay correspondingly less attention to the particular qualities of each want and ech thing itself. In other words, the individual must become increasingly indifferent to the fine shadings and nuances of both wants and the objects which he pursues in the search for satisfaction. (Explains a lot about pop culture, I think.) And this process of trying to achieve "increased goods intensity" (as Linder calls it) entices us to incorporate more and more gear into any activity, so that use of the gear preempts the activity itself -- we go camping to make use of all our camping supplies, not because it's fun to sleep in a tent.

Contemplating the situation we find ourselves in, Leiss sounds a lot like Al Gore before the fact: "There are some tolerance limits in the biosphere; the industrial production systems of the developed world are now testing those limits; we do not know what these limits are at present; it is unwise to continue along our present path until we reach or overshoot these limits, since by that time it may be impossible to mitigate the adverse effects or to do so only at the cost of catastrophic social disruptions." He then suggests we might limit our economic development by extending legal rights to nonhuman life and considering the "needs of nonhuman nature," to my mind a terrible way of putting the important concept of considering externalities and the mounting problem of environmental destruction. The phrase suggests I should care about environmentalism because the trees have feelings too, and despite what some believe about the secret life of plants, I remain skeptical. The reason it is imperative to reform our environmental practices -- the only reason that can resonate universally -- is the debt we owe to one another, to other humans who inevitably suffer from the damage we cause and to posterity. A tree can't advocate for itself; only humans can do so on its behalf, and that's when it becomes especially slippery, because who is to say that what the human advocate does is not simply on that specific human's behalf, at the expense of other humans.

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Green thumb strategy (2 May 2008)

Responsible-eating advocate Michael Pollan asks a pertinient question in the recent NYT Magazine issue devoted to reducing readers carbon footprint: Why bother?
Let’s say I do bother, big time. I turn my life upside-down, start biking to work, plant a big garden, turn down the thermostat so low I need the Jimmy Carter signature cardigan, forsake the clothes dryer for a laundry line across the yard, trade in the station wagon for a hybrid, get off the beef, go completely local. I could theoretically do all that, but what would be the point when I know full well that halfway around the world there lives my evil twin, some carbon-footprint doppelgänger in Shanghai or Chongqing who has just bought his first car (Chinese car ownership is where ours was back in 1918), is eager to swallow every bite of meat I forswear and who’s positively itching to replace every last pound of CO2 I’m struggling no longer to emit. So what exactly would I have to show for all my trouble?
His answer:
If you do bother, you will set an example for other people. If enough other people bother, each one influencing yet another in a chain reaction of behavioral change, markets for all manner of green products and alternative technologies will prosper and expand. (Just look at the market for hybrid cars.) Consciousness will be raised, perhaps even changed: new moral imperatives and new taboos might take root in the culture. Driving an S.U.V. or eating a 24-ounce steak or illuminating your McMansion like an airport runway at night might come to be regarded as outrages to human conscience. Not having things might become cooler than having them. And those who did change the way they live would acquire the moral standing to demand changes in behavior from others — from other people, other corporations, even other countries.

I give Pollan a lot of credit for trying hard not to come across as a scold in this essay, and he is certainly one of the most persuasive writers about environmental topics for those not already convinced. But it's hard not to notice how inconvenient and, in the case of getting a hybrid, pricey it is to "bother big-time" and maintain the standard of living Americans have come to take for granted and people around the world, judging by their consumer behavior, want to emulate. Pollan's not particularly novel answer to the question doesn't seem to take that into account, and that's one of the reasons it seems so inadequate. It costs time, money and energy to avoid what our economy has made superlatively easy -- a wasteful approach to life made exceedingly comfortable. Pollan blames cheap energy and specialization for fomenting this lifestyle, but what sort of energy would foment the shift to where people suddenly are trying to set a virtuous example? A sudden surge in righteous arrogance? Not having things is never going to be cool -- it's poor people who don't have things. The rich have elaborately expensive ways of not seeing to have things, and the striving middle just needs to consume in every direction, burning carbon all the way, trying to cover all the bases. The "cheap-energy mind" that Pollan sees as the problem is equivalent to bourgeois consciousness, and it won't be surrendered. It would be akin to surrendering the class status one has worked hard to achieve. Could planting a garden compensate for that loss, as Pollan urges us to believe at the end of his essay? It seems more likely to do so if adopted as a hobby and urged as a kind of spectacular leisure, not as an ascetic sacrifice for the good of humanity. People probably don't want the fate of humanity hanging over their heads while they try to learn to garden.

Following Wendell Berry, Pollan notes "the climate-change crisis is at its very bottom a crisis of lifestyle — of character, even," But I don't think it's exactly a character issue in the sense that people are too lazy to choose to live better -- it's not reasonable to expect every person in a culture to anchor their character in rejecting the way of life that is embedded in every aspect of society, that is rooted in the assumptions that make it virtually every institution and every code of conduct we've absorbed since childhood. Consumerism is the crucible in which our character is formed, and it hinges on the pursuit of convenience and the amassing a swell collection of identity-building goods. It's not easy to choose to reject the only life that seems feasible, even when it's made clear how destructive and unsustainable that way of life is. It is easy to understand the logic of the environmentalists' case and be convinced, it's easy to feel convinced to try to bother, but then confronted with the monolith of culture not designed for such good intentions, it's much easier to fall back into the mind-set that is in harmony with the material culture we must in the end make our lives out of. Rejecting that, all we know, seems like to much of a sacrifice in the small quotidian moments where the important decisions about how one really lives day-to-day are made.

Friday, June 24, 2011

"Starve your neighbor" (16 April 2008)

When people are driven to protest because they can't afford to buy food, it's pretty unsettling.
Rioting in response to soaring food prices recently has broken out in Egypt, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ethiopia. In Pakistan and Thailand, army troops have been deployed to deter food theft from fields and warehouses. World Bank President Robert Zoellick warned in a recent speech that 33 countries are at risk of social upheaval because of rising food prices. Those could include Indonesia, Yemen, Ghana, Uzbekistan and the Philippines. In countries where buying food requires half to three-quarters of a poor person's income, "there is no margin for survival," he said.
The NYT quotes IMF honcho Dominique Strauss-Kahn as commenting that "the food crisis posed questions about the survivability of democracy and political regimes." According to Strauss-Kahn "sometimes those questions lead to war." Great. The possibility of a soylent green future is being casually bandied about in the newspaper by some of the world's most powerful bankers.

“As we know in the past, sometimes those questions lead to war,” he said. “We now need to devote 100 percent of our time to these questions.”
This chart from yesterday's FT shows all the locations of the recent rioting.
In the article, the authors explain how globalization has made food-importing countries extremely vulnerable to the whims of producing nations, who ultimately have a lot less invested in making sure foreigners don't starve.
today’s high and volatile prices make it increasingly costly to cushion the blow for consumers and many of the poorest countries’ governments cannot afford indefinitely to hold food costs down. Instead, they have started to remove import tariffs and impose export bans in an attempt to transfer income directly from farmers to consumers – in effect preventing farmers from selling their produce at the highest price they can find on international markets.
Such measures may alleviate domestic supply problems in the short term. But they also create shortages in global markets, accentuating the problems of those who have to depend on imports – particularly when highly efficient net exporters of grain such as Argentina and Ukraine restrict exports. Joachim von Braun, director-general of Ifpri, calls them “starve your neighbour” policies.

Famine no longer depends entirely on natural causes -- weather, depleted soil, no arable land, etc. -- now economic interdependence itself can create shortages and politicize food supplies on an international scale. Hence, as quoted in the WSJ article, the Indian and Turkish finance ministers direct barbs at U.S. energy "policy":
"When millions of people are going hungry, it's a crime against humanity that food should be diverted to biofuels," said India's finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, in an interview. Turkey's finance minister, Mehmet Simsek, said the use of food for biofuels is "appalling."
The intent of the juxtaposition is clear; people in India or Turkey or anywhere else shouldn't be starving so Americans can salve their conscience when driving and/or wasting electricity. And it's not just energy policy that is problematic. Economist Martin Feldstein took to the WSJ editorial page to argue that Fed rate cuts are pumping up commodity prices and fueling global inflation, exacerbating the food problems.

Yves Smith points to this Telegraph editorial by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard for some forceful rhetoric on the subject. "Hedge funds played their part in the violent rise in spot prices early this year. To that extent they can be held responsible for the death of African and Asian children. Tougher margin rules on the commodity exchanges might have stopped the racket. Capitalism must police itself, or be policed.... A new Cold War is taking shape, around energy and food. The world intelligentsia has been asleep at the wheel. While we rage over global warming, global hunger has swept in under the radar screen."

Though Evans-Pritchard seems to want to discredit worry over global warming as much as raise the alarm about food shortages, the specter of global unrest motivated by famine is pretty scary. It's one thing to try to convince people to give up an anti-modern and anti-democratic ideology (the alleged purpose of the "Global War on Terror"), but quite another to try to convince them to go hungry.

The return of Malthus (7 April 2008)

In his NYT column today, Paul Krugman, writing about food prices' recent rapid climb, sounds a grim, almost Malthusian note, concluding that "cheap food, like cheap oil, may be a thing of the past." Wheat prices are astronomical already, and rice stores have become so depleted in Asia that many producing countries are threatening to stop exporting the grain. (I have seen the writing on the wall. Last weekend, I went to Pacific Supermarket and bought a 20-pound bag of Nishiki brown rice. Get it while you can; that's all I am saying.) Krugman cites a few factors contributing to the problem -- oil prices, droughts -- and really lays into the biofuel industrial complex.
The subsidized conversion of crops into fuel was supposed to promote energy independence and help limit global warming. But this promise was, as Time magazine bluntly put it, a “scam.”
This is especially true of corn ethanol: even on optimistic estimates, producing a gallon of ethanol from corn uses most of the energy the gallon contains. But it turns out that even seemingly “good” biofuel policies, like Brazil’s use of ethanol from sugar cane, accelerate the pace of climate change by promoting deforestation.
And meanwhile, land used to grow biofuel feedstock is land not available to grow food, so subsidies to biofuels are a major factor in the food crisis. You might put it this way: people are starving in Africa so that American politicians can court votes in farm states.

Alongside the theme of neutralizing the farm lobby is a hint of population-control politics that we haven't heard much about since its heyday in the late 1960s, when widespread affluence was considered a problem in the West and books like Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb were being sold in drugstores in pocket-size paperbacks. The idea that food prices will remain high (i.e. that food supply will remain scarce, that we have reached some new plateau of productive capacity that caps that supply) could be seen as a harbinger of food rationing and famine, and an indicator that Malthus's scenario is finally coming to pass -- namely that food supplies can't keep up with a population that grows exponentially. But now the problem takes a slightly different form; with so many people wanting to eat luxuriously, the resources necessary for everyone to eat at all are being hoarded and consumed by the more affluent. Krugman calls it "the march of the meat-eating Chinese" and notes "the growing number of people in emerging economies who are, for the first time, rich enough to start eating like Westerners. Since it takes about 700 calories’ worth of animal feed to produce a 100-calorie piece of beef, this change in diet increases the overall demand for grains." In other words, developing countries want to imitate the standards of living that Americans have inaugurated as the prerequisites of economic maturity. National diet (as with wasteful patterns of energy consumption) can function as mark of national status and can stifle potential political unrest with luxuries, and this leaves little room for conservation.

The problem, then, is not so much a population explosion, but an explosion of those who expect middle-class comforts (and those who use those comforts for political control). Not a Malthusian issue so much as a Veblenesque one: That package of expectations and the ideology of entitlement that goes along with it, will probably come under increasing fire. Hence the cult of asceticism that has derived from the environmental movement -- the way to be even more middle-class in terms of prestige, from this point of view, is to deprive yourself for a noble cause -- limit your choices by viewing them through the lens of "sustainability." (Whether that can be adequately defined to make it an operational distinction is an open question.) With this ideology, at least the status hierarchy is being leveraged to accomplish some good.

Oh, and on a related note, Jon Taplin points to Merrill Lynch analysts explaining that American households spend more on debt service than food.

Thursday, January 13, 2011

Foodie infantilism and vanity (16 May 2007)

Asad Raza, one of the proprietors of the 3 Quarks Daily blog, wrote a long provocative essay about alienation in Whole Foods Market, contrasting shopping there with shopping at some of the butcher shops and fish stands and so on in Lower Manhattan. In Whole Foods, Raza contends, groceries are mediated by explanatory text and rendered safe -- kind of like foreign countries in Disney's Epcot center. Whereas at vegetable stands in Chinatown, consumers have a much more direct relation to food, trusting their senses instead of the copy.

The Bowery Whole Foods tells us something remarkable about its shoppers: how ignorant they are of where they are and how alienated they are from food. Perusing it, the thing that impresses you most is the pervasive labeling, the enormous amounts of information appended to everything. Everywhere are little identificatory notes, signs overhead, brochures on what to do with their sausages (eat them?), glossy photos of the smiling man who supposedly dredged up your mussels or baited the hook upon which your (always already headless and filleted) wild salmon met its end. This is food shopping for people who have come to trust only that which is mediated by text, addenda, explanations, certifications. It is a website come to life, or a piece of life for those who prefer websites: each piece of signage functions as the hyperlink that clicks through to a capsule review.

The food has become text, something we read and write rather than consume; we communicate with it and corrupt our sensual relationship with it, thinking it rather than tasting it. It's a similar point to the one I was making about music a few weeks ago. Raza is suggesting a more authentic relation to food that is corrupted when we turn it into information we can master and identify ourselves with -- it may be more pleasant to we information workers to know things than to eat things.
There is something else alienating about Whole Foods: it posits a universe in which we are all only consumers. The holism its name gestures towards is not the holism of a community in which buyers and sellers know each other. Instead, it's purely about the foods themselves: one's interest in food is projected as only another form of self-interest.... These neoliberal shoppers prefer the impersonal embrace of a corporate parent, disguised as some vague moral goodness. Yet a principle like seasonality is sacrificed to the lure of exotic, irradiated produce available year-round. Such are the characteristics of the so-called "foodies." Even the term suggests a cute and infantile hobby. And it does seem infantile to shop at Whole Foods while all around you sits the very food cultures about which Whole Foods' publicity materials fantasize.

He has a point here; it seems odd to choose Whole Foods over the more authentic food shops around it. (It's not really all that odd though; those shops can be insular and hard to negotiate; Whole Foods charges more to provide customers with a more conveniently familiar experience.) Raza argues that "in a world in which we've been socialized to distrust the claims of brands, we paradoxically require ever greater documentations of authenticity, ever wordier mediations between ourselves and things." But Raza's own apparent mastery of the food scene on the Lower East Side and his evocative description of it calls his own discourse into question; his eloquence about food is not entirely different than the Whole Foods blurbs, and he is supplying some website content that could supplant direct experience in the process of trying to inspire it. If we use his essay as a tourist guide to butcher shops, then our experience of those shops may be no different than our experience in Whole Foods. Slumming it in old-school bakeries and fish stands is not necessarily any more authentic, since authenticity depends on the subject position of the consumer and whatever patterns and intentions that consumer follows through with over time. Food tourists are food tourists, whether they are at the novice level of shopping in Whole Foods, or at the advanced level of gutting fish on Grand Street. Any way we get our food in the city is going to be alienated and inauthentic relative to some other way of procuring; to fetishize one or the other can ultimately seem an attempt at self-aggrandizement, for dignifying whatever progress we have made toward our own ideal.

Raza's critique of foodie infantilism seems misleading: His criticism is that foodies' yearn for safe experiences of esoteric consumption, but I think one becomes more of a foodie the more daredevilish one's consumption becomes. The goal is to make eating an experience rather than a routine -- make it an activity in which one can deploy connoisseur knowledge and come away with untoppable stories. (Are snobbery and vanity infantile? Perhaps.) But to escape the pejorative connotations of foodie-ism, one commonly tries to associate food practices with sociopolitical goals; this move supplies a rationale for consumption choices theoretically external to personal identity building. You can go to the co-op or the green market and have environmentally and politically wholesome reasons for your food choices that you can refer to when someone wants to prick you for your pretensions. But this has the unfortunate effects of tainting those wholesome aims with the stench of privilege, which in turn supplies the enemies of such notions with a useful line of attack: sustainability movements, etc., become the province of self-satisfied do-gooders who have the luxury for such preoccupations.

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Farm subsidies (23 April 2007)

Economists aren't always thought of as environmentalists, but both are concerned with scarce resources and how they are distributed. Environmentalists happen to be concerned with "public goods" -- the sorts of things that often seem free to citizens, like clean air and a livable climate. It's difficult to align self-interest to secure the provision of these goods, since many people basically take them for granted and want someone else to worry about them. Economists, along with scarce resources, study incentives and even the most conservative of them will suggest ideas for aligning them with sustainable resource distributions; one of those is a tax on carbon usage, another is to end farm subsidies.

Michael Pollan, not an economist but the author of The Omnivore's Dilemma, a series of case studies in the forces that shape how we eat, has a passionate essay in today's NYT Magazine about U.S. farm legislation, which he argues is the reason junk food (Made of corn and soy and wheat and the livestock corn feeds) is cheaper than healthy food (other vegetables).

A public-health researcher from Mars might legitimately wonder why a nation faced with what its surgeon general has called “an epidemic” of obesity would at the same time be in the business of subsidizing the production of high-fructose corn syrup. But such is the perversity of the farm bill: the nation’s agricultural policies operate at cross-purposes with its public-health objectives. And the subsidies are only part of the problem. The farm bill helps determine what sort of food your children will have for lunch in school tomorrow. The school-lunch program began at a time when the public-health problem of America’s children was undernourishment, so feeding surplus agricultural commodities to kids seemed like a win-win strategy. Today the problem is overnutrition, but a school lunch lady trying to prepare healthful fresh food is apt to get dinged by U.S.D.A. inspectors for failing to serve enough calories; if she dishes up a lunch that includes chicken nuggets and Tater Tots, however, the inspector smiles and the reimbursements flow. The farm bill essentially treats our children as a human Disposall for all the unhealthful calories that the farm bill has encouraged American farmers to overproduce.

Later Pollan suggests that the farm bill regards American eaters as "food processors" who vacuum up "industrial raw materials" manufactured by agribusiness. He urges Americans to complain to legislators about the farm bill (which ought to be called the agribusiness bill) and argue for one that puts consumers' rather than producers' interests first. But because the U.S. Constitution protects the interest of small states in various ways (the Senate, the Electoral College), this is easier polemicized than done. The major presidential candidates are far more likely to call for more subsidies for corn (to boost the ethanol industry unnecessarily, since it's cheaper and better for the environment -- the whole reason to use ethanol in the first place -- to make the fuel from Brazilian sugar) than to campaign for their withdrawal.

Friday, November 5, 2010

Fat taxes (18 October 2006)

Everybody's getting in on banning trans fats: New York City, Chicago, Disney, Pepsi, Wendy's. But why impose a ban when you could generate some revenue with a tax?

On his and fellow conservative Richard Posner's blog, (which is totally bizarre from a rhetorical point of view; it seems as though it were written by Spock), Gary Becker, an economist famous for treating human beings as a commodity (human capital), and performing economic analyses on drug addiction (it's rational) and domestic life (it's a factory), mulled over the implications of a tax on fat, which would be a less paternalistic way of ridding the world of trans fats (a.k.a. hyrdogenated oils) that clog arteries and cause obesity. (Some health officials go so far to compare hydrogenated oils to the threat posed by lead paint, but I think I'd feel substantially more comfortable with children eating doughnuts than paint chips.)

Becker is skeptical that the danger outweighs the social pleasure afforded by hamburger sandwiches and french-fried potatoes, and suspects that obesity is more attributable to kids' propensity for such "sedentary activities" as "listening to music on iPods and other devices." Kids spend too much time in front of computers, he suggests, and we wouldn't want to start imposing Pigovian taxes on Internet usage, would we? This seems like a red herring to me -- to find something more appealing to substitute for fat in order to make the argument against social engineering through taxes seem more salient. The same goes for when Becker, evoking the idea that obese citizens may stress the publicly financed health care system and should therefore be taxed to compensate for that (a la one of the rationales for cigarette taxes), shifts the subject to health-care savings accounts and consumer-driven health care, the preferred conservative nostrums for America's health care crisis.

Posner, in his reply to Becker, seems more cogent on the subject. He raises the point that obesity is correlated with poverty, so a fat tax would likely be regressive and would possibly fail to achieve its intended effect.
Indeed, high-caloric "junk food" might conceivably though improbably turn out to be the first real-world example of a "Giffen good," a good the demand for which rises when the price rises because the income effect dominates the substitution effect. A heavy tax on high-caloric food might so reduce the disposable income of the poor that they substituted such food for healthful food, since fatty foods tend to be very cheap and satisfying, and often nutritious as well.
But his main contention is that the rationale for a fat tax relies on the belief that people who eat fatty food are making informed rational choices and revelaing a preference for Ho-Hos and Doritos over broccoli. Posner, somewhat surprisingly, is willing to throw rational choice out the window here:
I don't think the fact that obesity is correlated with poverty is due entirely to the fact that fatty foods tend to be cheap as well as tasty and satisfying. I suspect that many of the people who become obese as a result of what they eat do not understand how, for example, something as innocuous as a soft drink can produce obesity. I also suspect that producers of soft drinks and other fatty foods are ingenious in setting biological traps -- designing foods that trigger intense pleasure reactions caused by brain structures formed in our ancestral environment (the prehistoric environment in which human beings attained approximately their current biological structure), when a taste for fatty foods had significant survival value.
Because of these biological traps, and the imperviousness of poor neighborhoods to nutrition education, Posner is willing to consider a ban of deceptively innocuous products like soft drinks: "And while generally parents know better than government what is good for their children, many parents who permit their children to drink soft drinks do not."

As much as I don't think the government should be telling people what they can and can't eat, it's hard to see the harm in disincentivizing food that makes for fat children. But the problem seems larger than the junk-food industry, which arises in response to generalized time crunch and the devaluation of time spent sharing a meal. I don't think the poor are necessarily ignorant about the ill effects of junk food, but they don't have the time to put into policing these questions or pursuing the frequently labor-intensive alternatives. We have developed a food infrastructure premised on the idea of delivering filling calories quickly to serve the need for convenience rather than nutrition. What may be needed is a proposal that could provide incentives for convenience, which is almost impossible to imagine, seeing how convenience virtually has become the definition of incentive.