Showing posts with label feminism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label feminism. Show all posts

Thursday, August 11, 2011

Backlash to the M.I.A. Backlash (10 June 2010)

A few weeks ago the NYT Magazine published a piece by Lynn Hirschberg about M.I.A. that made M.I.A. (aka Maya) seem like a hypocritical phony. (New York magazine helpfully listed the 10 harshest parts here.) Maya likes to portray herself as a sort of musical terrorist for the globally oppressed and the Tamils of Sri Lanka in particular, but this sits uncomfortably with her engagement to corporate scion Ben Bronfman, heir to the Seagram's heir, and her life of luxury in the wealthy apartheid of Southern California. These apparent hypocrisies are amplified by the apparent inauthenticity of her Western fans, who are open to the accusation of dabbling in orientalist exoticism and radical chic. M.I.A. sells a certain brand of cosmopolitan clamor, a would-be righteous antagonism, which is by some conceptions an ideal that should not be commodified and trivialized. Her music seems to want to put its "dangerousness" into quotation marks.

That's not such a bad thing. I don't think Maya is really a revolutionary anymore than I think Jay-Z was really a big-time drug dealer -- it doesn't matter for my purposes as a listener. It seems plausible enough while the songs are playing to hold my attention in a particular escapist way. For what it's worth, I like listening to M.I.A. but feel a little embarrassed about it, like I am trying to prove something. I wish there was more pop music like hers so that listening to M.I.A. wouldn't stick out and seem like a statement of some kind. I sort of think of her as Fela lite. I don't pay much attention to her politics or her lyrics, largely because I can't decipher them and also because I don't care about the meaning of lyrics generally. I just want them to sound right in context. In the grand scheme of things, there's probably not much difference between the lyrics of "Paper Planes" and those of "In Da Club."

Momentum has been building in the blogosphere in support of the argument that Hirschberg's hit piece was not merely unfair but antifeminist. Women's behavior is so culturally prescribed that a readymade list of criticisms is always at hand for commentators to tear down any woman's particular accomplishments, as Amanda Marcotte points out here. At Tiger Beatdown, this essay by Sady makes the case that M.I.A. is more vulnerable to charges of being a phony because as a woman, her choices are inauthenticated in advance.

there are a few common-sense things to be pointed out here: That it’s not unusual for women to work throughout their pregnancies, that lots of women go to work on the day that they’re scheduled to go into labor, that labor itself is a long process (the profile even notes that M.I.A.’s son wasn’t born until three days after the performance) and so many women often continue to work throughout the early stages of labor, especially if they’re doing something important or time-sensitive that can’t be re-scheduled — like, say, performing at the Grammys. Or, for that matter, the fact that implying that a woman ought to neglect her job because she’s knocked up is the flip-side of the rationale that says it’s okay to not hire or promote women because they will have to neglect their jobs once they get knocked up. But never mind all that: I mean, the wheelchair was right there, but instead M.I.A. was up on stage, almost naked, singing her violent lyrics about murdering people, because she cares more about performing and being famous than she does about her poor little helpless baby boy. What a monster.

M.I.A., Sady also suggests, is a living embodiment of how capitalist co-optation works: "I read M.I.A. as a person in a difficult and contradictory position: Someone who’s come into a huge amount of privilege, after growing up without it, someone who’s benefiting from the very system she condemns, and is attempting to use her position of power to bring attention to the problem." The problem with Hirschberg's article is that she sides at a deeper level with capitalism, marginalizing and dismissing Maya's efforts to embody the contradictions, as it were, as simple hypocrisy. M.I.A. struggles obviously with being a sell-out; Hirschberg has been a sell-out all along and now enforces for capitalism and the Establishment against those in the gray area. The same old story: character assassination and ad hominem attacks on the messenger so that the message will be ignored or invalidated.

That's why complaints about authenticity tend to be a ruse, and why authenticity is a dubious criterion whenever it is invoked. Marcotte notes that:
The craving for this impossible standard of authenticity causes neurotic behavior, depression, and withdrawal. To make it worse, “authenticity” is not just a lie, but it’s also a black hole. It eats up everything around it, including those things that are real, like quality and effectiveness.
Also on the M.I.A. defense team is Andrew Potter, author of The Authenticity Hoax (which I am eager to read) and its associated blog; he mounts a similar defense of Maya on this basis. "In this age of authenticity, where an artist is only entitled to those forms of personal, artistic, and political expression that are properly underwritten by their background. If you don’t live it, you can’t say it, and a hypocrite is the absolute worst thing you can be." This is the "authenticity hoax" and Hirschberg falls for it and is thus out of touch. (Also for what it's worth, I've written my share of posts about authenticity; here's the most recent, about why reflexive authenticity is a trap.)

At one point it was important to claim that the personal is the political to secure recognition for certain forms and modes of struggle. Where one is coming from matters in terms of what one ends up claiming to be objective. But the personal-is-political approach got subverted itself by the dubious but persuasive argument that one can't be self-consciously calculating about living one's politics without invalidating them.The collapse of the separation of public and private has turned out to be disastrous for the public sphere, for the existence of a form of privileged discourse about ideas as opposed to grievances. Now ideas are grievances.

UPDATE: Potter has an updated piece about the M.I.A. article here.

Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Free love on the free-love freeway (17 Oct 2009)

Christopher Shea linked to this post at the Awl, in which Tom Scocca threw up all over Mark Greif's earnest look in n+1 at sexual freedom as a way out of capitalism's confinements. Greif writes,
“Sex without consequences” becomes the metaphor for cooperative exchange without gain or loss. For basing life on the things that are free. For the anticapitalist experience par excellence.
Scocca's retort to this sort of sentiment: "What is this CUDDLE-PUDDLE BULLSHIT?"

Though Scocca is taking a deliberately obtuse and unsympathetic tack to squeeze out a few laughs at Greif's expense, this is a fair question. Greif is polemicizing about "repressive sentimentalism" but puts forward his own sort of sentimentalized absolute -- sex for pleasure. (What David Brent celebrates as Free Love on the Free Love Freeway.) Greif's interpretation of domination as repression ignores Foucault's arguments about the political uses of pleasure. I'm tempted to call this move repressive tolerance, though that doesn't quite fit. Actually, Greif is arguing that gay-marriage rights are a form of repressive tolerance, masking the underlying domestic system of oppression. Power, however, can work through permissions as well as through prohibitions in the sexual sphere as well. One can end up in the trap of competing to see who can become the most liberated, a competition that suits consumerism -- which aids this pursuit with a variety of lifestyle accouterments -- just fine.

Greif's take on free love is grounded in an essentialized version of libido:
Yet you have to stick with sex, as a utopian—even when you’re not a particularly lubricious person yourself.
You have to defend sex because we still have no better model than the actual, concrete sexual relation for a deep intuitive process opposed to domination. We have no better model for a bodily process that, fundamentally, is free and universal. It does not produce (there is no experiential remainder but pleasure) nor consume. It is cooperative (within the relation of the lovers) and, in that relation, seems to forbid competition. It makes you love people, and accept the look and difference of their bodies.
The amount of qualifications Greif has already had to put in that proposition is a clue that it's pretty dubious. I'm reluctant to agree that a sexual relation is "a deep intuitive process." It seems more a labile, tentatively constructed thing, highly normative as opposed to instinctual. I'm totally with Greif that marriage supports patriarchal arrangements regardless of the gender of those marrying, and that a radical restructuring of society would require a drastic reordering of domesticity. (Laura Kipnis makes a similar argument in Against Love.) But free-love utopianism feels like a short-circuiting of the sort of theorizing necessary to address the problem, which is ultimately one of who performs the socially necessary emotion work. Sex is great and all, but it is not the only "authentic" form of pleasure. To regard sexual relations as directly given to our consciousness is to submit to a fantasy about sex's pure spontaneity, the final destination in the quest for an unmediated private and personal relation, independent of society.

But sexual desire is far from "universal" in its expression. The sexual relation is not necessarily economic in nature, but that doesn't it mean it pre-exists economic relations or is capable of purifying them or that it is automatically egalitarian. Sex doesn't inherently make you "love people." That claim reimports the sentimental cant about love that he began by wanting to banish. Also, "Sex without consequences" is not really possible because all actions have consequences. Ruling out one particular set of consequences does not mean there are none at all. It seems morally foolish to posit as the ideal the ability to act without consequences -- not to go all existential, but that makes for a freedom that is inherently meaningless. Acting in the world is the self's pursuit of responsibility, but advocating the pursuit of pleasure "without consequences" as model behavior seems like a wish to abdicate it in the search for oblivion.

It seems to me Greif is more on the right track when he talks about the seductiveness of the existing system of marriage:
Domination depends rather on the beauty of sex with consequences, the pleasure of sex with consequences, to guarantee commitment to the family-centered fold. Women’s straight desire and wish for love and pleasure is the thing that’s supposed to seduce women back into the system of inequality—a beautiful inequality mentally structured by childbearing and the determination of your life course by the consequences of desire. It is beautiful, in its way; as oriental despotism was beautiful, too. You must give something up to leave the system—or else the system is revealed as naked and weak. Thus feminism always needs to be pictured publicly as sexless, man-hating, or just manless—not to mention babyless—or it would become appealing. (Indeed, baby love may furnish the greater lifetime erotic satisfaction for straight women, on the traditional system.) If desire fails to pull people back into patriarchy, patriarchy’s arsenal is diminished.
Yes. It seems that feminism needs to reach a point where it need not be deliberately "represented" at all -- a point at which it so thoroughly saturates our values that the fact that someone is a "feminist" wouldn't jump out at us. In other words, it needs to cease to be an identity and simply be a practice.

Chris Dillow linked to a paper that takes an entirely different approach to marriage.
I’m intrigued by this new paper on the economics of marriage by Gilles Saint-Paul.
He begins from the premise that the gains from marriage arise from innate biological differences between men and women - that men can have loads of children, but don‘t know which ones are theirs, whilst women cannot. Given this, marriage is a potentially mutually beneficial trade. Men get to know which children are theirs, which is utility-enhancing if they care about the human capital of their offspring. And women get someone to help (if only financially) with child-raising.
This, in Dillow's interpretation, means that "repression of women’s sexuality operates to the benefit of second-rate men. If women were free to shag around, they’d only go with the best men and ignore lower-quality ones. Repression and marriage thus give second-rate blokes a chance." When women pursue "sex without consequences," by this reasoning, they curtail the possibility for sexual liberation for those average men who won't find willing partners. That sounds a lot like the "nice guy syndrome." Here's a definition from the Urban Dictionary:
A annoying mental condition in which a heterosexual man concocts oversimplified ideas why women aren’t flocking to him in droves. Typically this male will whine and complain about how women never want to date him because he is “too nice” or that he is average in appearance. He often targets a woman who is already in a relationship; misrepresenting his intentions of wanting to be her friend and having the expectation that he is owed more than friendship because he is such a good listener. He is prone to brooding over this and passive aggressive behavior.
He is too stupid to realize the reason women don’t find him attractive is because he feels sorry for himself; he concludes that women like to be treated like shit.
As Greif notes, Houellebecq's novels are about this problem -- free love becomes institutionalized, yet "nice guys" find themselves under more pressure than ever to use prostitutes in order to get in on the action. Maybe Greif in his essay is trying to find a way to circumvent nice guyism without giving way to Tucker Max-ism, intellectualizing what is easily reduced to an alpha-male evolutionary premise in order to redeem it, dignify it, preserve it as "hopeful." But as anyone who has seen the preview for Tucker Max's movie knows, there is no hope for humanity.

Saturday, July 16, 2011

Sex and travel (13 Feb 2009)

I went to see Godard's 2 or 3 Things I Know About Her last night and left fairly perplexed. His films are frustratingly discursive that they seem haphazard (and half-assed) to me while I'm watching, but then afterward, I usually find that there was something to it after all if I can force myself to think it through.

In 2 or 3 Things, as in many other of his 1960s films, Godard starts with the idea that being an attractive woman in the city is a very mysterious proposition. He can't bring himself to then demystify femininity; instead he intensifies the mystery, revels in it, seems to honor it, which makes his films seem sexist. A specific type of young Parisian woman becomes the generalized Other that is longed for but impossible to apprehend. If I were a woman, this would probably irritate the hell out of me. But Godard, to his credit, seems interested in further questions the derive from this ideal he can't quite relinquish: What if you are that Other? What is the other for the Other? Are women their own other, doomed to spiral into narcissism? Or do they withdraw into some deeply inaccessible inner space within urban modernity that can only be caught in oblique, accidental glimpses, in the interstices of everyday life.

That idea warrants Godard's strategy of just sort of following women around town rather than fashioning a plot. Of course, he's adopting Brechtian techniques, eschewing tried-and-true methods for drawing viewers in (making us like characters and care about a suspenseful story) and instead making efforts to heighten our discomfort and our awareness of conventions. So 2 or 3 Things begins with the actress Marina Vlady introducing herself to the camera as herself, quoting Brecht on how to read dialogue as if it were being quoted, and then introducing herself again as the character she is supposed to be in the film. But she is never wholly one or the other; she is both playing herself and a role at all times, both the subject specified in the script (assuming there was one) and her objective self. So it is for women in cities generally. They are intensely objectified by the attention they attract in quotidian urban life and serve as fantasy objects, occasions for dreams of escape, akin ultimately to consumer goods, with which Godard juxtaposes them, especially in 2 or 3 Things. (The film closes with lights dimming on an array of branded products laid out in a kind of graveyard.) Living with that burden, women must at the same time fashion their own means of escape, in part to preserve their own subjectivity. So in the film, Vlady is often speaking out existential riddles and philosophical speculations in the midst of pursuing stereotypical female activities -- washing dishes, shopping for a dress, putting on cosmetics, getting a haircut at the hairdresser's, taking care of children, and so on. Frequently these question the role of language in framing desire and limiting our ability to know ourselves, as Godard cuts to advertisements, and other signs with words printed on them, cropped to be meaningless and without context. The language through which we know ourselves is being denatured, afflicted with unsettling meanings by its commercial use. And women, the implication seems to be, are acutely aware of being both signifier and signified, of being the subject and object of discourse, with their essential being strewn between these dichotomies, impossible to resolve.

Godard ups the ante considerably on this female subject/object problem by making the women in the film prostitutes (more sexism), seeming to suggest that all women are confronted with the issue of whether to exploit their objectified femininity. Through their scrutinizing gaze, men have turned women they see in the city, on the street or in the cafes (where someone is inevitably playing pinball), into consumer goods. To make the connections explicit Godard has the women sell sex, which seems to stand in for feminine mystery, and escape generally, for the men who purchase it. Godard memorably illustrates this in a ham-fisted (yet awesome) scene in 2 or 3 Things when a john (wearing an American flag T-shirt) has the women he's hired wear airline-issued carry-on bags on their heads. In an earlier scene, the rooms of a brothel hotel all have cheery travel posters on the walls. Sex and travel are brought together in the commercial exchange for a woman's time and attention, and thereby made into manifestations of the same male desire for novelty and mystery. (In one telling non sequitur, a man in a cafe -- named Bouvard, one of the clownish autodidacts in Flaubert's Bouvard et Pécuchet -- calls out an order for mystery-flavored ice cream.)

If sex is the degree zero of desire in Godard films -- the essence or representation of all the other forms desire takes -- then prostitution is emblematic of the general corruption and exploitation of desire in general by social institutions, by capitalism as a system. It's a somewhat hackneyed metaphor for what consumerism does to desire, how consumerism "solves" the problem of desire. It sells us inadequate substitutes for that fulfillment while convincing us we don't want the entanglements that go along with pursuing true desire. Desire requires our full vitality and presence; consumerism tells us we can't live up to that standard and it's easier and just as well to have prostitutes, tourism, brand-name goods, etc., instead. It's fun to visit jouissance, but you wouldn't want to live there.

So the real subject of the film is how to preserve true desire and find it within the quotidian in modern city life. Women, he seems to suggest, have an inside track on this. But alongside that theme is some inchoate material about Vietnam and something about suburbanization -- the film charts Vlady's journey from the banlieu on the outskirts to Paris and back, and frequently the camera lingers on highway construction sites and brutalist apartment towers. The city as a technology for facilitating social exchange, a whispered voice-over tells us, is being replaced by new media -- television, telephones. We would now add, the internet. But in these films, is the city the last hope for nurturing real desire -- a place where spontaneous social interaction can be fruitful; where we are not stuck permanently in predetermined ruts that make desire beside the point -- or is it one of the earliest first technologies for replacing desire with alienation and convenience, one that is now being supplanted and perfected in new media? Maybe I need to watch Weekend to get to the bottom of that.

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Forced smiles (28 Oct 2008)

I've noted before Dialectic of Sex author Shulamith Firestone's fatwa against smiling. Firestone responds to the way men often demand smiles from women (and children) and mask their aggression with this request that seems to them innocuous, almost a favor (she’ll be so much prettier if she smiles!) by calling for “a smile boycott, at which declaration all women would instantly abandon their ‘pleasing’ smiles, henceforth smiling only when something pleased them.”

She wouldn't be happy with this article by Carl Zimmer in Discover magazine, noted by Alex Tabarrok at Marginal Revolution. The article suggests that women with their faces frozen in a smile by Botox are possibly happier because they are always smiling, and they are also consequently making others happy with their contagious expression:
People with Botox may be less vulnerable to the angry emotions of other people because they themselves can’t make angry or unhappy faces as easily. And because people with Botox can’t spread bad feelings to others via their expressions, people without Botox may be happier too.
It's easy to imagine this being distorted into lending support to the sexist idea that women owe the world their smiles, lest they become guilty of transferring negative emotions to the world. Maybe Botox is less about wrinkle eradication (a mere alibi) than it is about making women into dolls that can only express placid agreeableness. Zimmer sensibly warns, "Making faces helps us understand how other people are feeling. By altering our faces we’re tampering with the ancient lines of communication between face and brain that may change our minds in ways we don’t yet understand."

The ability to use our face to express what we feel -- the ability not to smile -- seems fairly significant. When you are being leered at, for instance, it's probably comforting to have a sneer in your arsenal to discourage others from consuming you as an object. The idea that what our mind feels can be altered or dictated by what our body is doing involuntarily is sort of scary and probably should be resisted, not abetted. Freezing our faces into a nonexpressive mask just doesn't seem like a good way to enhance our interactions with the world, regardless how pleasant others may find it when we are incapable of expressing displeasure.

Thursday, July 7, 2011

Brand anorexia (13 August 2008)

Advertising blog AdFreak passes along this finding: "Jeremy Kees of Villanova University has published a study that suggests that seeing skinny women in ads makes women feel worse about their personal body image but better about the brands advertised." The blog poster, Rebecca Cullers, asks of her ad-industry peers: "assuming you think the study's findings are correct, would you use anorexics in your ads if testing showed it sold the product better?" I think anyone who has seen a fashion magazine knows the answer to that question.

The typo-ridden press release for the study details its method, which seems somewhat absurd, almost demeaning.
The controlled study of 194 women ages 18-24 on two college campuses, finds that after seeing an ad featuring a thin model, young women are twice as likely to decline to eat a cookie or chose a low fat alternative.
It reminds me of a scene in a fifth-season episode of The Larry Sanders Show where Todd Barry, as one of the writers, tries in a patronizing voice to force a swimsuit model to eat a cookie. "Come on, you want a cookie. Just one cookie."

The account of this research can't help but trivialize women: "All women (high and low self monitors) were more likely to choose reduced fat Oreos or opt for no cookie. Compared with those who saw advertisements without models, the women exposed to the models were nearly 4 times as likely to decline a cookie and 42% more likely to choose reduced fat cookies." It's hard to imagine research revolving around Oreo consumption being conducted on men. But then our culture is much less likely to consider a man's weight an index to his character or social relevance.

But the core finding here is pretty dismaying, as it suggests not only that destructive fantasies of what weight is appropriate for women have taken a firm hold, but also something that we should all probably take for granted, namely that marketing can often become more effective precisely by making us feel worse about ourselves. After seeing ads, we don't necessarily have to feel good in order to feel good about the brand. The study's findings also seem to suggest that brands take on the exclusionary "glamour" associated with emaciated models whose figures are impossible for the ad's target audience to achieve.

This sort of phenomenon isn't limited to fashion, though. One of the inegalitarian aspects of ads is that they elevate expectations of what is a "normal" standard of living across the board, projecting a fictional classless society in which everyone can indulge in luxury without pain of privation. We can all participate in this fantasy thanks to the media, but we don't all experience the same amount of harsh cognitive dissonance upon realizing just how far we are from actually achieving those standards. Our exclusion from the reality doesn't undermine the fantasy, though we probably would be better off hewing to a sour-grapes reaction to the unattainable things that marketing misleadingly promises. Instead we react to the exclusion by imagining what was promised was even better than we might have thought initially. And if we actually achieve what seemed impossible, acquire the goods that signify the better standard of living that once excluded us, of course we will be disappointed in it.

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Bogus babymaking crises (17 June 2008)

Via Will Wilkinson comes a link to this Reason piece about fertility fears by Kerry Howley. The upshot: social conservatives love to use demographic fears to try to roll back feminist advances, though any pragmatic effort to reverse low birth rates typically involves implementing the sort of social welfare programs that are anathema to conservatives.
Practically speaking, on the policy level, demographic panic is only useful for one purpose: the promotion of social welfare programs many social conservatives would oppose. From France to Poland to Singapore, governments are responding to low fertility with policies social democrats have always favored. Almost any aspect of the welfare state can be construed as encouraging procreation; more to the point, low fertility can be blamed on the lack of any particular social welfare program. A dearth of pregnancies is evidence that protections for workers are too few, social welfare allowances too small, public school days too short, mandated maternity leave too limited. Women want to fulfill their natural roles as mothers, goes the assumption, but dog-eat-dog capitalism stands in the way.
Howley points out that demographic fears are often stirred by xenophobia (a low birth rate is akin to "race suicide," as Theodore Roosevelt termed it), which is then leveraged against women, who are forced back into traditional, limited domestic roles (though this does nothing to increase fertility), nicely knitting racism and sexism together.
Periods of anxiety over “race suicide” are rarely good times for women. Protestants who were worried about the rising tide of foreign Catholics passed anti-abortion laws in the 1880s that endured until 1973, when Roe v. Wade limited their scope. Embracing historical continuity with the nativists who came before him, Mark Steyn takes time in America Alone to blame women for aborting the generation that might have stood between us and the coming Islamification of the West. It’s not surprising at all that the single greatest social anxiety of our time has been reduced to crude demographic projections that pin the blame on empty wombs.
Like concerns about abortion, concerns about fertility rates ultimately come down to checking feminism and restricting women's ability to control their own lives. Instead, their wombs are presumed to be owned by society collectively, and politically administered by the state.

Howley's conclusion explores how this sort of sexism is buttressed by nationalism.
At the heart of any fertility incentive lies an attempt to encourage a particular group of women to orient their bodies in a traditional way. Every pro-fertility policy is an effort to slow cultural transformation, to stabilize a society’s ethnic composition, to ossify a current conception of a national culture by freezing the genetic makeup of a nation. From Poland to Singapore, swollen wombs are a bulwark against change.
There is a reason we speak of “Mother Russia” and “Mother India.” Feminist sociologists such as Nira Yuval-Davis refer to women as the “boundary markers” of a state or society. While men may leave, fight, and be compromised, women represent purity and continuity. Yuval-Davis points out in her book Gender and Nation that the Hitler Youth Movement had different mottos for girls and boys. The boys’ motto was: “Live faithfully; fight bravely; die laughing.” For girls: “Be faithful; be pure; be German.” Girls simply had to be. They were the collective.
In times of great social anxiety, we see new calls for women to return to home and hearth—calls alternately cast as a return to tradition and as a progressive leap forward, but efforts, nonetheless, to enlist women in a national project while defining the boundaries of national inclusion. Depopulation is not a given, but ideologically fraught and scientifically questionable debates about gender, race, and culture will be with us no matter which way the population swings.
Depopulation is basically a stalking horse for deeper problems, which appear to be inextricably bound with one another. A reminder that one can't attempt to remedy sexism without at the same time tackling other forms of bigotry.

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Peyton Place and the roots of reality entertainment (8 May 2008)

For a long time, I have wanted to read Grace Metalious's Peyton Place, a notoriously lascivious book about the seamy secrets of a small town in New England. This grand ambition of mine was fueled not only by my academic interest in "commercial novels" (i.e., novels interesting primarily for their commercial success) and my fascination with Twin Peaks, which seems deeply influenced by Peyton Place's core idea, but by the line on the cover of the edition I bought at an Astoria junk store: "The best-selling paperback novel of all time." Surely something so popular would yield some sort of insight into the American reading public and the nature of the mass market of the Eisenhower era. A 2006 Vanity Fair article about Metalious's own sordid life offered this about the novel:
Fifty years ago, Peyton Place helped create the contemporary notion of "buzz," indicted 1950s morality, and recast the concept of the soap opera, all in one big, purple-prosed book. It would spawn a sequel, a smash film nominated for nine Academy Awards, and television's first prime-time serial. A week before it hit bookstores, on September 24, 1956, it was already on the best-seller list, where it would remain for half a year. In its first month, it sold more than 100,000 copies, at a time when the average first novel sold 3,000, total. It would go on to sell 12 million more, becoming one of the most widely read novels ever published. During its heyday, it was estimated that one in 29 Americans had bought it—legions of them hiding it in drawers and closets due to its salacious content.
Clearly it was widely bought, but whether it was widely read can't really be known. Having just slogged through it, I figure most readers skimmed it, looking for plot points and dirty parts.

On the whole, the book is shoddily constructed, veering from one "shocking" event to another with apparently only a sense of how outraged people would be guiding Metalious as she proceeded. This leads her to be radically frank for her era about the reality of familial sexual abuse, but it also leads her to create such ludicrous scenes as the one where a minor character loses an arm in a carnival-ride catastrophe. Though it seems now to be populated with Main Street caricatures, Peyton Place was heralded at the time as an expose of small-town hypocrisy and breakthrough for freedom of expression about the kinds of problems that were probably pretty endemic in town life, and probably still are. And some scholars regard it as a feminist work, probably for its handling of female sexuality (though like most romances, the only woman who has a positive sexual experience has to basically be forced into it, have her animal nature awakened by a brute show of force by her mate) and its efforts to call into question domestic pieties. Mostly, though, the book seems animated by the spiteful sullenness that marks the main character, wanna-be writer Allison McKenzie, who, interestingly enough, in the novel mines small town life for material for her own frank stories. It's like the novel depicts its own creation within itself, so maybe it's a self-mythologizing postmodern classic. It is certainly chaotic enough to be postmodern, shifting registers and genres and eschewing careful development of characters in favor of lurching from mini-plot to mini-plot haphazardly like the soap operas that would come in its wake. No effort is made to explain events; they happen simply because of an evil destiny settling on the land. Unlike Twin Peaks, which with its Lodges and feints at mysticism, tried to cook up a cosmogony to explain why events unfolded and where the submerged small town evil came from, Peyton Place revels in the unexplained evil, takes superstitions as given, and offers by way of spiritual subplots an unintegrated story about a Congregationalist minister who decides to become a Catholic basically because he is Irish.

If anything unifies the hodge-podge of the novel's incidents other than their calculated potential to outrage, offend, and titillate, it's the development of Allison as writer, with her ethical quandaries worked out by the novel's form as it unfolds: basically the novel's structure seems to be in dialogue with Allison, showing her that the way to get a novel written is simply build every chapter around some secret someone wouldn't want told, whether it's secret drinking parties, oral sex, or a mother's getting off on enemas and breast feeding. Secrecy becomes the essence of what makes for plot, all other possibilities for development are foreclosed -- so there is no bildungsroman organized around Allison, or Selena Cross, the working-class girl "from the shacks." Instead, the novel just jumps in forward in time at arbitrary intervals and makes no effort to develop themes linking the two characters' development at any but the superficial ways their lives intersect. We can do the work on the novel's behalf and come up with ingenious comparisions, but that is not what was expected of the original audience for this book. That audience, as the marketing campaign detailed in the Vanity Fair article suggests, was meant to be salaciously enticed and afforded a delicious chance to wax righteously indignant while thrilling at the sexual perversity.

So the whole novel feels very cynical, mainly because it is prurient but also because none of the characters are very sympathetic from a contemporary perspective. When they are not mouthing some hypocritical idea about not wanting to be talked about, they seem like puppets contrived to act out preconceived sensationalistic tidbits. Because Metalious seems to have decided from the outset that readers would only be interested in juicy scenes full of the seemingly unsayable, she makes little attempt to supply anything else, aside from the odd awkward poetic passage.

The book pretends to reveal the secrets of small-town life as if these reflect some core truth, as if these would dispel hypocrisy, but instead it partakes of that same hypocritical spirit, the refusal to grant people their private lives, and it comes across as a gossip dump, with the effect of making the story feel unverified and exaggerated despite purporting to be fiction (and despite the fact that much of it was drawn from Metalious's life and her home town of Gilmanton, New Hampshire, apparently). And though the characters are obsessed with being talked about, as if this were their worst fear, it reads more as though its what give them an identity -- the fear of being watched seems more like a secret wish to be noticed. The idea that you become an indvidual when you are noticed, hailed by your society in the way it has settled on offering recognition -- à la Althusser's argument in the "Ideological State Apparatuses" essay: "Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ ") It's not the police who do the interpellating in Peyton Place, it's the town's network of gossip, occasionally dramatized by the chattering in the diner or on the street by various yokel characters, or by Metalious simply attributing certain views to the town, as if it were a character itself. It's out there, giving each person it notices some internal coherence in its eyes.

One can construct noble reasons for Peyton Place to have existed and become popular after the fact; one can argue for a liberating effect it may have had on its female readership and so on, but that requires a blinkered reading of the text. In the novel itself, the most palpable motive for what it exposes about small-town life is that it will boost the book's sales, the lesson Allison seems to learn in the book and a lesson proven by the novel's marketing campaign and its subsequent success across several media platforms. For though Peyton Place seems like a critique of small-town gossip's regulatory function of enforcing a moral and traditional code of conduct -- and it certainly indulges the juvenile fantasy of being the herald who broadcasts all the secrets that structure the repressive code and thus brings down the walls of Jericho -- the novel is just that gossip served up for consumption by strangers with nothing invested in the code. It doesn't destroy the code's power, it just amplifies the code so it has power on a bigger stage, transforming it at the same time so that its prohibitions become provocations. On the small town level, gossip is like a confession carried out by townsfolk that serves to solidify the individuality of its subjects, but on the level that Peyton Place as media phenomenon promises, being talked about just makes one famous and interesting, to those who have no reason to want to see you disciplined according to the local mores.

Thus the novel supports an ideological framework that has become omnipresent now: that you want to be gossiped about, as that is what makes you exist in a way that transcends friends and family. Being the subject of gossip is the pathway to fame, and media creations like Peyton Place will spread your notoriety. The novel can be seen as a guide to what sorts of behavior counts as exciting scandal, thus updating for the mid-20th century the information supplied by scandal novels since the invention of the genre. Peyton Place is a bourgeois version of Delarivière Manley's romans à clef from the early 18th century that tracked and popularized aristocratic scandals of the time, helping forge the very definition of what was to be considered scandalous. (Incidentally, her books -- The New Atalantis is the most notable -- are as unreadable as Metalious's.) Being talked about no longer individuates one simply to impose disciplinary control, instead it calls one into being for a mass audience, on a level where personality traits are irrelevant compared with the sensations one can transmit vicariously for captivated observers. In other words, one goes from being a shameful internal exile in a small town to becoming a celebrity who is beyond moral judgment.

The lesson of Peyton Place as a phenomenon is that on the level of mass popularity, being interesting trumps being moral. And a new set of values is born that applies not to communities (and is unenforceable by communities) but instead applied to individuals participating in a mass culture that isolates them from community with a promise of larger-than-life notoriety. Thus "being a slut" is bad when it is restricted to the eyes of your neighbors; on The Real World though, it is awesome. What makes you scandalous locally makes you fabulous nationally. Hence the impulse to disclose all sorts of embarrassing personal incidents are on TV that one would other wise keep private. And when they are disclosed, they are shared in the manner that Peyton Place exposes them, with a ruthless bluntness that presumes that secrets are always best exposed, for everyone's sake -- that anything less than full disclosure an exposure is some form of prudish hypocrisy. The shallowness of the novel's characters is now the shallowness we aspire to, for it seems to promise the most widespread recognition we can hope for. We can spread ourselves thin across all the media available for us to disseminate our image and maybe if we are lucky disappear into a sublime ubiquity.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

No smiles (30 March 2008)

Watching Saturday Night Fever got me thinking about this. The film's usually remembered as the film that launched disco into the mainstream, but it's a pretty disturbing, dark film, full of class-inflected racism and misogyny. It climaxes with a gang rape in the backseat of a car while Travolta, thwarted in his own rape attempt, sulks in the front seat. Then the Bobby C., the kid who got a girl pregnant but doesn't want to be forced to marry her, jumps off the Verrazano Bridge, seemingly trapped by her refusal to get an abortion. The woman-hating is pretty raw and only partially redeemed by the implication of the final scene, that Travolta escapes juvenile mediocrity and working-class self-sabotage by learning to have a mature friendship with a woman, his dance partner who has already made the symbolic leap to Manhattan. The unpleasant ending all but obliterates the vicarious liberation supplied by the peerless dance sequences (now no longer kitschy but just incredible), leaving viewers feeling trapped with a bunch of narrow-minded bigots and misguided dreamers who don't have enough sense to hope for the sort of things that we watching can approve of. It's uncomfortable, but does it serve any useful purpose to confront us so starkly with the limited horizons, the doomedness, of the people it has chosen to depict and give an aura of reality to? Is it some kind of implied critique, or are we still vicariously thrilling, only to something else, something meaner, the kind of harsh reality we are happy to see inflicted on other classes (making us feel a bit immune from it)? In Fear of Falling, Barbara Ehrenreich argues that the film fits in to the late 1960s-early 1970s "discovery of the working class" by the middle class interests that control the media and have a lot at stake in fashioning a working class other to demonize and contrast themselves with. And it certainly sets up admission to the middle class as maturity, the prize for rejecting the hedonistic life of the disco and the immediate gratifications it caters to. But is there also a critique of misogyny in all the female hating throughout the film, or simply a reinforcement of its alleged inevitability, or of the hopelessness of trying to changing it?

I want to give the film the benefit of the doubt and view it as exposing underlying misogyny that most films have built into their structure. Something Shulamith Firestone points out throughout Dialectic of Sex is that sexism often manifests in forms we're trained to regard as appealing and pleasant, or as harmless fun; this is how it gets replicated and reproduced for generation after generation. For example: "Because the class oppression of women and children is couched in the phraseology of 'cute' it is much harder to fight than open oppression." Cuteness is a form of infantilization and self-trivialization, but there can still be something irresistible and fun about cataloging cute things and cooing over them. It would be curmudgeonly and false to deny their appeal, only they have become intimately connected with setting out the boundaries of gendered behavior. Firestone responds to the way men often demand smiles from women (and children) and mask their aggression with this request that seems to them innocuous, almost a favor (she'll be so much prettier if she smiles) by earnestly calling for "a smile boycott, at which declaration all women would instantly abandon their 'pleasing' smiles, henceforth smiling only when something pleased them." Of course, I, like most white middle-class men, have been enacting the smile boycott my entire life and never understood it to be a politically motivated action. The freedom to express one's feelings naturally is not automatically granted. In fact, it's finding out who experiences that freedom and takes it for granted is a good way to identify who has privilege in a society.

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

The end of the sexual class system, circa 1970 (7 March 2008)

It's an indicator of the degree to which women's liberation was at the forefront of American culture in the early 1970s that a book like The Dialectic of Sex by Shulamith Firestone (subtitle: "The case for feminist revolution") was not only issued in a mass-market pocket-size paperback by Bantam Books but also sold enough copies to now routinely turn up in thrift stores from Arizona to South Dakota to Delaware, where I bought it for probably the fourth time. I'm trying to imagine this book on a Rexall's rack in 1970, and what sort of consumer would have been drawn in by this cover line: "The HUMAN ALTERNATIVE to 1984 -- a slashing attack on male supremacy that charts the end of the sexual class system." It's hard to conceive of our culture being this interested in feminism, to the extent where a fairly radical version of it could be advertised as a selling point rather than be regarded as an awkward embarrassment. Women's lib was a mainstream consideration that must have seemed omnipresent relative to our own "post-feminist" epoch.

But was that just because its novelty could be exploited commercially by the media industries? I wonder if transforming women's lib into Bantam paperbacks wasn't some way of attempting to neutralize the threat, turn feminism into another shoddy, sensationalized product that could be consumed as fantasy by some Stepford Wife who had the little book stashed away in a handbag and could secretly thrill to exhortations to abolish childhood and traditional sex roles, or could be dismissed as mass-produced crap, as pop psychology or specious self-help, or could be read as an alarming warning of the crazy things these women's libbers had in mind. (It's generally a good reactionary strategy to find the most extreme voices for the reform you oppose and try to popularize the idea that they are representative of the movement as a whole.)

In general, the mass-produced paperback format has the effect of bathing the work in the aura of disposable entertainment. Similarly, today's ubiquitous trade paperback (for me anyway) has an effect of gentrifying ideas, making them into dainty knick-knacks on my intellectual mantelpiece. Because publishers are so complicit with capitalism, their material products end up embodying capitalist ideals, even if the ideas in the pages are undiluted Marxist propaganda. Maybe that means the Web will be a better source for the promulgation of radical ideas?

Monday, January 3, 2011

Hook-up culture (22 Feb 2007)

Laura Sessions Stepp's Unhooked seems like a ludicrous book (it's about the shocking fact that girls these days seem to enjoy sex rather than using it as relationship bait), and it's good to see scorn being heaped on it appropriately. Zuzu at Feministe parses some of the book's repugnant imagery. Stepp writes: "Your body is your property. . . . Think about the first home you hope to own. You wouldn’t want someone to throw a rock through the front window, would you?" To which Zuzu responds, "I dunno about you, but if someone throws a rock through my window, it’s a safe bet I didn’t give them permission. I let my guests in through the door. And it’s not going to fall off the hinges if I let more than one person through (even at once!)."

Julian Sanchez is skeptical about the insistence that sex and love always be joined:
"Is it excessively cynical of me to think that the first casualty of an insistence on love and sex always going together might be your criteria for being "in love?" As in: "Holy hell, I'm 25 and have never had sex... You! SOUL MATE! NOW!"

Matt Yglesias links to a Washington Post review that makes the fair and self-evident point that "both males and females should work hard to gain another's affection and trust. And one's sexuality is not a commodity that, given away too readily and too often, will exhaust or devalue itself." At Slate Meghan O'Rourke suggests the problem isn't that girls are hooking up but that they have such a joyless approach to it:
The hookup culture is part of a wider ethos of status-seeking achievement. As one girl puts it: "Dating is a drain on energy and intellect, and we are overwhelmed, overprogrammed and overcommitted just trying to get into grad school." So they throw themselves into erotic liaisons with the same competitive zeal they bring to résumé-building: "If you mention you think a guy is hot, your friend may be, 'Oh, he is hot. I'm gonna go get with him,' " Anna, a high-school student, reveals. The combination of postfeminist liberation and pressure from parents to "do it all"—as one kid puts it—has led girls to confuse the need to be independent (which they associate with success) with the need to be invulnerable. Thus, they frame their seemingly explorative sex lives in rigid, instrumental terms, believing that vulnerability of any sort signals a confusing dependence. The result? Shying away from relationships that can hurt them—which includes even fleeting obsessions that can knock them off balance.

I'm a little skeptical of that analysis, if only because it's not only girls but adolescents in general who confuse independence with invulnerability. (That's why my auto insurance rates were so high when I was 18.) Not that teenage girls are not under unique pressures -- just look what society does to celebrity teenagers (the Lindsey Lohans of the world) as they verge closer to adulthood. Female sexuality obviously evokes all sorts of hysterical responses among those who want to lock it down and control it.

I think Echidne is more on the right track with this: "Sessions Stepp does have a point in worrying about the increasingly early sexualization of girls, a sexualization that comes from outside and has very little to do with what ten-year old girls, say, actually think about or want to do, and much more to do with the popular culture and the porn world. I also think that it is hard for women to understand their own sexual needs in a world which blasts them with messages about how best to service men for the pleasure of the men, and I think that the real sexual liberation of women is a very unfinished business." For much more on how sexualization harms girls, here's a comprehensive report from the American Psychological Association -- it's obviously a problem, but it seems the Session Stepps of the world draw the wrong conclusion and think girls must be convinced to be nonsexual, or to treat their own sexuality like a precious valuable commodity, as was mentioned above. Perhaps superficializing sexuality may be a way of retaining control over it as the problem it poses for every one else becomes more apparent. But ultimately the point is that whatever young women choose to do sexually needn't be pathologized automatically; it seems that the search for explanations for whatever sexual behavior a woman exhibits is ultimately an attempt to wrest it from her.

Echidne also notes that "Session Stepp's point is naturally that it is the women who are supposed to do the relationship-work. Men can just do whatever they always have done in the past, and if that happens to be exactly what the author worries about, well, who cares. It's not a guy thing." This sounds a lot like sociologist Arlie Hochschild's analysis of the extra burden of emotional work women are expected to assume. This work is alleged to come naturally for women, but it is really one of the more insidious patriarchal exploitations, to keep women performing this arduous and self-abnegating work of relationship preservation with no reciprocity.

UPDATE: Tyler Cowen reprocesses Unhooked into a rational-choice model here.

Saturday, November 6, 2010

Family sentimentality (11 December 2006)

In continuing to mull over the ways in which child-care responsibilities derail women's careers, I began reading The Way We Never Were, a history of the American family by Stephanie Coontz. She puts forward the argument that in promoting individualism (and a separate private sphere), capitalism also instigates a gendered division of labor that shunts onto women all the various ways in which we remain socially dependent, locating them all within the family and outside of the public sphere and the recognized economy so that men can be productively self-seeking: "Self-reliance and independence worked for men because women took care of dependence and obligation.... The cult of the self-made man required the cult of the True Woman" -- the "angel in the house". (This argument is echoed in Nancy Armstrong's Desire and Domestic Fiction, which finds evidence for it in female-authored novels).

Women are presumed to be altruistic by default, while men are "rational" and businesslike in pursuing their advantage, maximizing utility and so on. And when the dog-eat-dog Hobbsean world of unfettered individualism begins to upset men, they can turn to their sheltered women, who exist above such calculation and competition, for solace. "Men began to romanticize women as givers of services and emotions that could not be bought on the open market or claimed as political tribute but seemed to flow from generosity and self-sacrifice rather than calculation of exchange." (Sociologist Arlie Hochschild's notion of emotion work, laid out in The Managed Heart is relevent to this, too; she argues that women make a economic resource of their emotional management skills after having other avenues to economic self-sufficiency systematically closed off.) From this historical account Coontz concludes that "liberal capitalism's organization of both society and family depended on a rigid division of labor by gender that denied women the assertiveness that was supposedly the basis of contract rights and denied men the empathy that was supposedly the basis of companionate marriage. The chasm...was to be bridged by love." (Laura Kipnis's Against Love has a good rundown of all the confusion, hypocrisy and injustice that stems from this sentimental arrangement.)

This, then, is the backdrop against which we are socialized into our genders. If you accept this account of capitalism's rise, the difficulty of educating away the gender gap in career outcomes becomes much more stark. Those gendered tendencies are embedded in the structures that allowed our economy to assume the form we assimilate ourselves to. The whole thing seems like an inescapable, tautological loop.

The TLS and the egregious she (6 December 2006)

I've had an on-again, off-again relationship with the Times Literary Supplement for several years now. I first encountered it when I was roped into house-sitting for one of my English professors, and it seemed like the kind of publication you'd subscribe to if you were going to take the belletristic life seriously (not recommended).

This cycle then ensued and has since repeated itself several times: At first I find the range of books covered interesting, and I think how well-rounded it's making me to be reading reviews of biographies of 17th century naval geniuses and overviews of minor authors like Ronald Firbank and round-ups of the latest work in analytic philosophy or what's new on the rare-manuscript auction scene or what have you. And the stuffy, priggish tone of the magazine is amusing at first -- it can found in its most concentrated form in the NB column in the center pages, where the editors mock recent publishing trends, hold court on punctillos of usage, and report haughtily on trivial yet erudite diversions -- cataloging translations of an "untranslatable" Beckett poem, for instance. I always get laughs reading this, but sometimes they are nervous sniggers of relief that I can still recognize a distance between my own attitude and the proud pedantry on display there.

But reading it week after week (it starts to feel like a Sisyphean task to keep up with each issue) starts to weigh on me, and I start to wonder why I ever renewed my subscription. Usually it starts when I notice one too many A.S. Byatt appreciations, or I get exasperated by a series of reviews of textbooks and anthologies and books about botany. but what clinches it is my noticing a piece of tut-tutting on the letters page from some academic whose peacock feathers have been ruffled by a reviewer and who now feels the need to do some score-settling.
Sir, – Since Lucy Beckett admits to having found my book Being Reasonable About Religion confusing, perhaps I may correct a couple of inaccuracies in her review of it (November 10). First she complains of “one page of unexplained symbolic logic”. In fact, the four short logical formulae I give on page 147 are all explained quite straightforwardly. Second, she twice charges me with “relativism”. The Vatican is always thundering against relativism, but it refrains from identifying anyone guilty of it, and Lucy Beckett, whose loyalty to Rome is shown by her recommending a recent papal encyclical to my readers, apparently imagines she has detected a culprit.
Sometimes the correspondent, with simmering outrage at the affront to his honor and dignity, usually offers a terse defense (Sir, -- I am grateful to Frederic Raphael for correcting my quotation from the Martin Scorsese film, The Departed, in my review of October 20. With first-run movies, one can't always cite exactly, unless privy to the screenplay -- and this would compromise the viewing experience in innumerable ways") or a condemnation of some misstep, which is only fair because a surprising number of reviews turn on a paragraph that comes near the end, after the obligatory lengthy summary, where the reviewer takes the author to task for some petty oversight in research ("... would have been surprised to see his name spelled Lee rather than Leigh...", etc.) or for typos and things like that. It always seems utterly beside the point to point these things out, but then the TLS probably considers itself the journal of record for these kinds of mistakes, a home for this kind of academic umpiring, the place where the errata can be noted and scored.

It depresses me that extremely smart people spend their formidable mental powers worrying about this stuff, about whether Wordsworth was two years older than Coleridge or vice versa, whether they were falsely accused of reversing the numbers on an address where someone was supposed to live, or some such unimportant fact. I begin to feel myself swinging over to the other side of the reactionary pendulum and see why liberal arts academics are regarded as impractical ivory-tower cuckoos, and maybe if they were disciplined by market forces they would be investing some of that considerable human capital elsewhere.

But this time what has me irked is this snotty piece of sexist complacency and entitlement from the editors in the NB section:
When we get round to updating the TLS Reviewer's Handbook we intend to confront the issue of the non-gender-specific personal pronoun. What to do in a sentence like "As the reader turns the page, he finds that..."? Use "he" or "she"? Use "they"? Or the egregious "she"? The last is the choice of the lily-livered male and the sexist female. Whereas a non-gender-specific "he" in this context means "the human race in general", sanctioned by centuries of use, the common reader naturally takes "she" to refer only to females.
You see, women are exceptions to the general rule that only men are worth considering and would be reading and participating in public life in general. Using she to refer to a random person is "egregious" not only because tradition ("Centuries of use" also "sanctioned" the horse and buggy and the slave trade -- perhaps we should never have tried to alter those practices) and nature (it's perfectly natural to be jarred by an egregious she in our book-review reading -- who let her out of the kitchen?) tell us it is odd, but because it would be so unlikely that a woman would be doing something worthy of public notice. Maleness is the default status of the "human worth mentioning". Women's experience is always exceptional, peculiar, other -- not quite human in the abstract. And if you are a man who undermines this fundamental natural fact of the invisible omnipresence of the masculine, you are a "lily-livered" pansy, possibly an egregious she in disguise. I am glad the TLS has taken the time to straighten this out.

Are pronouns the most pressing front in the feminist struggle? No. But when you bear down to the minutiae the TLS likes to preoccupy itself with, you can see how sexism roots itself in small things and attempts to branch out from there and spread as a flourishing of simple common sense. This argument makes plain the petty concerns of antifeminists, who are willing to write out of everyday public life an entire gender for all of history just to prevent their having the odd stumbling moment of confusion in their idle reading.

Mommies' remorse (22 November 2006)

A recent NBER study finds, unsurprisingly, that the burden of child rearing derails women's academic careers in the sciences: "Women are less likely to take tenure track positions in science, but the gender gap is entirely explained by fertility decisions. We find that in science overall, there is no gender difference in promotion to tenure or full professor after controlling for demographic, family, employer and productivity covariates and that in many cases, there is no gender difference in promotion to tenure or full professor even without controlling for covariates. However, family characteristics have different impacts on women's and men's promotion probabilities. Single women do better at each stage than single men, although this might be due to selection. Children make it less likely that women in science will advance up the academic job ladder beyond their early post-doctorate years, while both marriage and children increase men's likelihood of advancing."

The explanation for this seems obvious, as Matt Yglesias points out: structural sexism. "Here, as in much of life, women and men are now allowed to compete on 'equal' terms. The terms, however, were set up long ago -- by men -- before that was the case, operating under the implicit assumption that the competitors would be men who, if they had children, would have wives at home to take care of the children." Part of this structural sexism would have to be a matter of socialization, through which women are encouraged to be nurturers and to find fulfillment in the drudgery of child rearing -- thus girls are invited to see motherhood as the culmination of their existence, as the capstone that will complete them as women.

Anyway, as Julian Sanchez explains, we have to address this early socialization if we are unhappy with this outcome -- like the libertarian in good standing that he is, Sanchez implicitly argues that women should bear the responsibility of their choice to have children and its career consequences (assuming it's a choice -- the essence of social conservatism is to prevent women from making choices about motherhood. As Amanda Marcotte puts it: "anti-choicers are pretty consistent in their worldview—they believe that women are second to men, that women should be punished for having sex, and that pregnancy is god’s way of enforcing women’s second class status.") Choice in this instance is its own reward, apparently, and not a burden dumped on women (tough biological break for them) that society should structurally compensate for.
Obviously the "internalized stereotype" account points to an element of potential unfairness in the early socialization of boys and girls, but once the preferences are there, I'm not sure to what extent we should regard outcome differences flowing from them down the line as cases of additional unfairness. Or, more to the point, I don't know what the remedy could be, given that they are nevertheless now genuine preferences, beyond trying to change our educational policies for the next generation. (Raising the further thorny question what kinds of differences in socialization should be seen as inherently pernicious.) Least ambiguous seems to be the case where average levels of interest in hands-on childrearing just differ biologically across genders—here "fairness" doesn't seem to enter into it at all, unless we want to consider "maternal instincts" as a kind of unlucky genetic disability for which society should compensate people.
In other words, if we want more women to work as academic scientists, we should discourage them from motherhood early -- why? Because motherhood, is hard, distracting, indivisible work, at least in Megan McArdle's view (emphasis added):
Some things I believe:
1. For most people, the most rewarding jobs have the highest degree of autonomy and cognitive content.
2. Those jobs cannot be successfully divided. A very smart expert working 80 hours a week will be more productive than two equally smart people working forty hours a week. Because their jobs involve facts and ideas linking up in new and unpredictable ways, the more time they spend accumulating facts and ideas, the better they will be at their jobs. And the higher the informational component of the jobs, the trickier the handoff between two people. Increasing worker autonomy increases coordination problems exponentially.
3. Whether or not you think they are overpaid, most people with these jobs are making a very valuable contribution to society.
4. Whether you assign it by gender or not, the "Mommy" role is a real thing, and it is not divisible. The gay couples I know with children have found themselves falling into traditional "Mommy" and "Daddy" roles, and not because they're uncommitted to overturning traditional gender norms. Becoming a parent means taking charge of another person's entire life, and this is a difficult job to split between two people: imagine having two personal assistants, with neither one in charge, running your life. The co-ordination costs are large for the parents, and made larger by the fact that highly standardized routine is the best way to inculcate good habits in a child. Splitting the labour between two people does not mean that each of them spends half as much time on childcare.
5. Professional organisations cannot produce the same level of output with a significant number of people working half time. Such arrangements are easily incorporated when they are a few exceptions, but when half the team is unavailable at any given time, the coordination problems mount rapidly. Anyone who's worked for both European and American firms can vouch for the fact that all that glorious European vacation makes everything take a lot longer in Europe than it does in America, because at any given time someone who has a critical piece of information, or decision-making ability, is missing.
This leads to the following conclusions:
1. Even for parents who outsource most of their childcare, having children will make at least one parent less valuable to their employer.
2. The idea of (in essence) splitting one high-powered job between a couple who then spends the other half of their time on childcare, as a substitute for having one high-powered career and one stay-home spouse, is probably not going to work.
3. Ceteris paribus, couples composed of two professionals will see at least one career suffer from the decision to have children.

Her ultimate conclusion is essentially an endorsement of the status quo: that maybe girls should be socialized for motherhood (it's a dirty job, but somebody's got to do it), and exceptions like herself will just have to be strong enough to swim against the tide. The alternative would be for your society to die out from attrition, to suffer the decline and fall consigned by demography -- if we don't produce new generations, we have no workers to support us in our old age and no one to carry on our traditions, etc. But her reasons are interesting -- motherhood, as an irrevocable decision, may lead to greater happiness, since, as Daniel Gilbert argues, we adapt to accommodate and rationalize choices we can't reverse. There is presumably no mommy's remorse. (You can see the seductive elision available to social conservatives here -- they can try to conflate irrevocable choices with the eradication of alternatives -- shifting the irrevocable decision back to the egg's original choice of an X chromosome in the fallopian tube.) And motherhood may be a more rewarding job than the ones women typically surrender -- again, as a stolid libertarian/economistic thinker, McArdle assumes that if you choose motherhood over your job, it's because motherhood offers you more utility at the margin. (And maybe it's lamentably true that women in our current society garner more social recognition for mommying than for scientific inquiry.)

I'm less sure these "choices" women are making aren't coerced -- it's easy to authorize the coercion along the lines McArdle has delineated -- that it's for the good of society. And I think women end up with the burden of family care not because it's so fun and superior to office jobs but because men have taken care to rig society in such a way that it falls to women, leveraging advantages held over from pre-capitalist economic formations. (So basically I agree with Yglesias.) Children are necessary, but caring for them involves a lot of self-sacrifice, which capitalist economics assumes doesn't really exist; rational choice militates against having children, since it's not clear that the pleasure they may bring will compensate for surrendered wages and costs of upkeep; the magnitude of the reward is not likely to compensate us for the risks taken -- unless you a brainwashed by childcentric ideology. Thus women, in order to make such sacrifices, must simply be volunteering to remove themselves from that economy. It seems as though how the inevitable childcare burden is distributed in a society is one of the primary ways it stratifies itself. Also, is it basically true that a growth-oriented capitalist society may come only at the expense of one that truly values and rewards domesticity?

Friday, November 5, 2010

Rape logic (15 November 2006)

I woke up this morning as usual to NPR (National Public Radio, or Nice Polite Republicans, as the liberal blogosphere has been calling it), but I heard a piece of news that seemed to come from an alternate reality. It was a BBC report about how the Pakistani parliament was reforming the law that required women to produce four sworn male witnesses before they could proceed with a rape accusation. The reforms, however, did not guarantee that the accuser, the raped woman, would not still be charged with the crime of adultery herself. In my coddled and sheltered little nook of the world, the idea that rape is still regarded in many places as a kind of property crime by men against other men was a little bit shocking. (It certainly puts Borat's admonitions to the "village rapist" in a different perspective.)

This reminded me of a recent Slate article by economist (and frequently smug contrarian) Steven Landsburg crowing about a study that correlates Internet access and its corresponding distribution of pornography to teens leads to a decrease of the incidence of rape. Landsburg seems pleased because this shows up psychologists and their silly, well-intentioned studies:
Psychologists have found that male subjects, immediately after watching pornography, are more likely to express misogynistic attitudes. But as professor Kendall points out, we need to be clear on what those experiments are testing: They are testing the effects of watching pornography in a controlled laboratory setting under the eyes of a researcher. The experience of viewing porn on the Internet, in the privacy of one's own room, typically culminates in a slightly messier but far more satisfying experience—an experience that could plausibly tamp down some of the same aggressions that the pornus interruptus of the laboratory tends to stir up. In other words, if you want to understand the effects of on-screen sex and violence outside the laboratory, psych experiments don't tell you very much. Sooner or later, you've got to look at the data.
As Amanda Marcotte points out, Landsburg and the researcher he cites blithely assume that rape is a crime committed out of sexual frustration, from an inability to find a lawful receptacle for lusty impulses, just as public urination is a crime caused by the unlucky perpetrator's inability to find a suitable bathroom. They don't recognize the view that rape is first and foremost a hate crime and has little to do with sexual desire -- instead it expresses contempt for the victim and a desire to see them suffer and be put in their place. A reason why patriarchal societies are hesitant to criminalize it, then, is because it's an enforcement tool (think of prisons) for assuring subordination. It reminds victims that not even their bodies belong to them. As Marcotte asks, "if rape is motivated by sexual frustration, why do rapists so often brutalize their victims more than is 'necessary' to subdue them? And if it’s about getting off, why do rapists do things like throw their victims out to walk home in a humiliating state of undress, if they aren’t enjoying the suffering?"

But if Landsburg's assumptions are correct, and porn can be substituted for rape, that might actually be worse, because then the implication would be all men who look at porn (i.e. pretty much all men) are basically would-be rapists, and that looking at sexualized women is tantamount to raping them (as antiporn feminists have claimed all along). Marcotte asks:
So is porn a way to release sexual tension so men don’t rape? Or are the defenders of porn-as-a-crime-preventative saying that porn is a substitute for rape itself, the urge to violently hurt and humiliate women? If porn is basically rape-by-proxy, then are they implying that all men who look at porn want to hurt women?
Is that assumption so much of a stretch in a society dependent on female subordination? In such a society, all men are supposed to want to hurt women, to its structure apparent to all. Pornography then would have to be considered a product to accommodate men whose culture encourages them to think of rape as their natural hierarchical right but can't bring themselves to actually enact the droit du seigneur. They are supposed to be raping, to demonstrate their rightful place in patriarchal society, and reinforce the rules of that society, but instead take the cowardly way out and merely "rape" women by consuming them in pictures or videos. These pictures and videos then stand in for all the consequently uncommitted rapes as the evidence patriarchy requires to show that it still adheres.

Thus the creepy subtext of Landsburg's article: "These women are lucky there's Internet porn around, or else more of us would have to resort to harsher measures to show them their place." Let's just hope Marcotte's right (that rape may be diminishing because patriarchy is waning and feminism has reeducated society), and that this study merely amounts to evidence of how some people strongly wish this link between rape and pornography existed, so that pornography could continue to be a proxy for the fear women are supposed to feel, but are hopefully feeling less and less (outside of places like Pakistan, that is). If the massive mountain of Internet porn is a pile of possible rapes (throw into this the frequent assumption that women are coerced, literally or economically or psychologically, into appearing in pornography), then it can be lorded over women as so many cautionary tales -- a gendered take on that moment in Do the Right Thing: No matter how nice the men in your life seem to be, here's what they think about you.

Not that pornography isn't ever a tool of oppression and exploitation, but as I've written before, I think pornography serves primarily as a model for commmercializing natural experience -- the leading edge in making all experience subject to mediation, packaging, impulse buying, etc. -- all the hallmarks of quotidian life in consumer society. An interesting question is to what degree pornography's position in consumer society suggests that such a society must also be patriarchal/sexist.

This just in: Women enjoy shopping (30 October 2006)

Maybe I'm missing the point, and I know it's just a dumb article about marketing, but it seems like this NY Times article seriously wants us to consider the inclusion of women in shopping focus groups as "the first step to a matriarchal society." The article's opening gambit is about how women were able to bring their domestic sensibility to revise a Calgary builder's home plans with such touches as a better laundry room and kitchens with windows that permit maximum surveillance of children. Bravo! It's woman's world after all! Men design and build the houses and make the money from selling them, but because women have been asked what they think of these houses, we're supposed to herald the fruits of the female-centric revolution.

Never mind the insulting proposition that purchasing power is an equivalent to social power (the organizing ideological tenet of the consumer society that consigns a populace to perpetual fits of fruitless desire and ceaseless identity-building lifestyle projects.) The idea that women do the shopping -- that "women are running their households like purchasing managers" -- is an old one, is one of the pillars of the home-economics conceit that would segregate women from "real" economics and entrepreneurial activity. The time-honored stereotype is that men earn the money and women spend it, and this article only tweaks that narrative slightly: The women now earn money (fancy that!) and they may be involved with buying some traditionally male products like electronics gear.

But the overriding tone remains one of mild astonishment at women's presence in the economic realm. "Market researchers are now embracing women as much more than domestic divas. They recognize them as buyers with their own careers and fattened pocketbooks, who are finding plenty to do and plenty to buy outside the home. Over the last several years, a cottage industry of consultants and authors, all offering advice and analysis, has sprung up around the pervasiveness of women in the marketplace." (Note "much more than" -- because all women are at their root "domestic divas," hypersensitive shrews preoccupied with inconsequential household trivia to boost their self-importance. And note the pejorative "fattened pocketbooks," and women's "pervasiveness" in marketplaces, as if stores were just clotted with women.) We're still expected to react as if this were a radical departure from their accustomed place in the home, sheltered from the hugger-mugger world of commerce.

With the ultimate aim of arguing that hotels are becoming more amenable to crucial women's needs (like storing jewelry and having better places to put their makeup in the bathroom) the article offers an anecdotes of women giving stereotypically male behavior the feminine touch: "When they arrived, the hotel gave them gift bags containing OPI nail polish that they swapped among themselves, based on their color preferences. They dined in the hotel’s restaurant and then returned to their suite for a private Texas Hold ’Em lesson from a poker expert, while the hotel sent up a steady flow of cocktails and snacks. 'We really had a good time,' Ms. Krause said. 'We played a round of blackjack, and craps, too.' " A whole round of blackjack. Very exciting, very matriarchal, not at all patronizing.

Also shoehorned into the piece is the tenuously related concept of special tourist packages designed for women to allow them to get together and shop unimpeded by men and thereby bond.
Ms. Biringer also arranges travel shopping trips for small groups of women to places like Los Angeles and New York. “Some of us end up in Prada, some of us in Century 21, but we always have a blast and, yes, ring up the purchases,” said Barbara Travers, who also attended a Crave Party in Seattle in August. “I’m usually the one dragging us into four-star restaurants and wine shops; they’re usually dragging me into Henri Bendel and Saks.”
Group events like these are tailored to women’s interests, Ms. Biringer said. “We need to get away from it all and be with our trusted friends,” she said. “Despite what people think, we don’t really pamper ourselves that much. When we do, we’re really happy, and men appreciate that.”
Women's interests: shopping, conspicuous luxury spending, "trusted" friends, but not too much self-pampering, not that much. This article is truly breaking new ground in discovering what women "really" want.

The article wraps up by returning to the home-builder anecdote, and lays the emphasis not on how women produced award-winning designs, but on how women's nagging bogs the process down: "Mr. Wenzel says that Shane Homes now takes about five times longer to design a home than it did just a few years ago. 'It’s critiqued once, twice, three times,” he said. “It’s a longer process, but we end up with better designs.' "

In all the article is a fine example of how journalists lean on gender stereotypes to structure their evergreen lifestyle articles, to make them smoothly familiar for readers, reinforcing comfortable but slightly outmoded stereotypes while pretending to challenge them. Readers can have their fears of the real threat (actual feminist progress; shifting responsibilities among gender lines) assuaged by the phony narrative the story supplies interstitially, wherein the yearned-for past is presented as the oncoming inevitable future.

Thursday, August 5, 2010

Cosmetic surgery as clothing (14 October 2006)

I'm always a little wary about getting into gender issues because I don't want to lapse, as may be the male tendency, into a paternalistic, patronizing attitude about them: My friend Carolyn has fond grad school memories of being lectured to about what it means to be a woman by some male student who had read a little Cixous and Irigaray ("Don't you see, Carolyn? All women wear the mask"); I definitely don't want to be that guy. I'm not entirely sure which is worse, blundering through a discussion of such issues in ways that reveal my tunnel vision or ignoring them altogether -- but then again ignorance never stopped me from proclaiming opinions on other subjects, so why should it stop me here?

In yesterday's WSJ was a review of Beauty Junkies, a book about the cosmetic surgery industry and women who are "addicted" to having work done. Reviewer Alexandra Wolfe sums the situation up this way:
These days, dots on the derriere are just one clue among many -- including the shiny sheen on stretched cheeks, the ever-alert eyes and the perky, unbouncing breasts -- that someone has "had a little work done." Beauty Junkies captures the sad fate that has befallen the feminine ideal: Since women can achieve an approximation of attractiveness through one procedure or another, they all end up looking vaguely like the same person: an aging porn star. In the end, the book leaves the reader not only aware of the emptiness of cosmetic surgery's results but also conscious of the vacuity of our current concept of beauty itself.
Though I would toss out the reference to the feminine ideal, that seems an apt description of what is so creepy about cosmetic surgery: it permits women to eschew their natural looks in favor of a technologically produced fashionable alternative. The standardizing technology of the surgeries and injections and so on allow the beauty of any person to be judged by the same set of criteria, rather than each person evoking her own criteria to explain her unique beauty. And it makes of this standardized "beauty" a proxy for money and class -- those with the income and the access to the right surgeons can achieve the robotic look Wolfe describes and will thus be held to be beautiful by society, though they are clearly hideous to any person marvelling at their plasticity close up. Aesthetic beauty has no objective reference point (there's no universal "feminine ideal"); it always derives from the imperatives of signifying class. Cosmetic surgery forwards that aspect of the ideology encoded in beauty; it makes it a choice but presents that choice as a natural fact (much like class is supposed to be, blue blood is proof of a natural and God-intended superiority). Cosmetic surgery extends fashion's domain from their clothes to their very bodies, which in turn allows the outward expression of their natural self to be altogether eradicated. Carolyn's grad-school friend might say they are completely and perpetually safely behind "the mask."

My defensive preface to this post comes in here, because I don't want to sound as though the women who get plastic surgery are either dupes, victims or shallow collaborators with an oppressive male order. As Pandagon blogger Amanda Marcotte is always pointing out, "you can criticize the power inequities that the garment is evidence of without attacking women who are better off wearing it than not, for whatever reason. And same thing with make-up or high heels or shaving or whatever. That women feel they have to act more or 'do' femininity to achieve perfectly reasonable goals, like be attractive or to get a job or whatever is not a sign that those women are somehow awful. It’s a sign that they are in a socially inferior position and have to put up with more shit to get half as much."

But this isn't so much about gender, I guess, as it is about technology standardizing behavior and expectations as it presents more "choices." Women have more choices and options than ever in how to conform to an oppressive standard of beauty; isn't that great? What freedom. The choices are actually coercive in practice; they destablilize one's sense of self and intensify feelings of insecurity, they intentionally create the impression of inadequacy. When consumer choice colonizes a realm of everyday life, it absorbs it into the play of the cycle of fashion and the zero-sum rigor of manufacturing class distinctions, the requirement of consuming conspicuously. That's why Marcotte's prediction that the pressures of self-presentation men and women will be subject to will be distributed more equally seems both plausible and extremely depressing. "Grooming standards are going to go in this direction, I suspect. As women gain power, we’re going to grow weary of tap dancing for men, but on the other hand, men are going to start tap dancing for us. I’ve got no problem with this; in the abstract sense, a lot of things marked feminine are joyful in themselves, but only problematic because they’ve got the baggage of inferiority attached to them. Ornamental dress and grooming isn’t really a problem, unless you have some sort of grudge against color and beauty." I guess I do have a grudge against color and beauty, because in consumer society those concepts aren't for themselves but are tools of producing, displaying and reinforcing inequality -- now they reinforce gender inequality, but should they shift in the way Marcotte anticipates, then they will express and uphold class inequality. The "baggage of inferiority" is always attached to beauty once it becomes subject to fashion -- that is, once it becomes an on-demand product; ultimately that's the whole point of "feeling beautiful" as opposed to simply being beautiful: to make yourself feel superior and others inferior. And its byproduct, that we all feel insecure over just where we rank in the beauty hierarchy, just makes us that much more cooperative with the existing social order.

Tuesday, August 3, 2010

Collecting people (29 August 2006)

I found this passage from Steven Metcalf's Slate review of the new Rohmer DVD boxed set interesting:
The most pleasant surprise of the set is La Collectionneuse, which Rohmer filmed on the cheap in the Côte d'Azure while waiting for Jean-Louis Trintignant to free up his schedule. The film is Rohmer's sun-kissed flip-off to all the Roger Vadim clichés: a young unattainable goddess pursued by a tormented man, and all the Which is worse, capturing her or not capturing her? blah blah that accompanies the genre. Instead, Rohmer gives us Haydée, a terrifically sexy gamine who is rather too easily had. What irritates her would-be pursuers, two art-world poseurs, to the point of outright contempt is that she hasn't cultivated herself as a mysterious object of enchantment. Having deprived them of this story line, they turn on her and call her a "collector"—that is, they project onto her their own worst qualities as dandies.
The passage suggests something of the difference between a woman whose sexuality is active, for itself, and a woman for whom the project of becoming sexy is a means to another end, a useful distinction to remember when considering controversies about pro-sex feminism and the nature of sex work. The power to be had in exploiting one's own sexuality is different than the power that comes from becoming a sexual subject (from desire enriching one's subjectivity and impelling one to act rather than wait).

Also, it hints at a pervasive anomaly of male sexuality: I think many men have a collecting attitude toward women, which is one of the reasons they appreciate their overt objectification -- why they will collect and save every issue of Playboy, for instance, which pins down a carefully selected specimen like a butterfly each month for the reader's bemused inspection. I wonder about the direction of causation though -- whether the collecting fever comes from being accustomed to a culture in which women are objectified, or whether women are objectified to suit an inherent male passion for mastery over objects. Is it even a fair assumption to make that women are less likely to be collectors? Is the woman in Rohmer's film actually a collectionneuse or is that merely a male misunderstanding of female jouissance? (Where are my Lacan books when I need them?)

Perhaps it is this: Collecting allows men to exempt themselves from the objectification that sex seems automatically to enact -- the regression into the anonymity of physical pleasure. Integral to the passion for collecting women, I would argue, is the man's certainty of a monetary exchange mediating the collecting. If the women in the magazine were volunteers -- if they were freely pursuing their own sexual aims -- the attraction of collecting them would diminish, possession of them (or their image, a proxy) would lose its value. By transforming sex from an activity into an acquisitive hobby, from a matter of doing to a matter of owning, men protect themselves from dissolving their identity in passion and instead ground it more concretely in an array of women-turned-positional goods.